

CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



JACOB H. SCHIFF
ENDOWMENT FOR STUDIES
IN
HUMAN CIVILIZATION

Cornell University Library
DK 262.D85

Russian realities & problems.



3 1924 028 376 014

olin

DATE DUE

~~NOV 14 1973 F~~

~~JAN 9 1974 F~~

~~APR 28 78~~



Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

Russian Realities & Problems

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

C. F. CLAY, MANAGER

London: FETTER LANE, E.C. 4

Edinburgh: 100 PRINCES STREET



New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

Bombay, Calcutta and Madras: MACMILLAN AND Co., LTD.

Toronto: J. M. DENT AND SONS, LTD.

Tokyo: THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA

All rights reserved

Russian Realities & Problems

By Paul Milyoukov, Peter Struve,
A. Lappo-Danilevsky, Roman Dmowski,
and Harold Williams

Edited by J. D. Duff
Fellow of Trinity College

Cambridge :
at the University Press
1917

DK
262
D85

Schiff
15/xi/18

A.382175

X

Schiff

First Edition 1917

Reprinted 1917

PREFACE

THESE lectures were delivered at Cambridge in August 1916, during the Summer Meeting arranged by the Local Examinations and Lectures Syndicate. The main subject of study at this meeting was "Russia and Poland," and, out of the many lectures that were then delivered, these have been chosen for publication, because each of the speakers is, in his own department, an unsurpassed authority.

Paul Milyoukov, a scholar and a statesman, was formerly a Professor at Sofia University, and has been one of the most prominent figures in the Duma ever since it was called into existence in October 1905. He was leader of the Constitutional Democrat party; he organised and now leads the Progressive *Bloc*, with equal courage and sagacity. No man living knows more of recent political history in Russia; and few men have had better opportunities of following the tortuous course of Balkan politics.

Peter Struve is one of the most eminent of Russian economists and has written valuable works on Prices and Labour; he is now editor of an important periodical (*Russian Thought*) and occupies the Chair of Political Economy in the Polytechnic Institute of Petrograd. He also has had practical experience of politics: he sat formerly in the Duma as Member for Petrograd.

Alexander Lappo-Danilevsky, who here gives a general survey of the progress of learning in Russia, is a distinguished historian and a Fellow of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, the famous institution

founded in 1725 by Peter the Great. The Transactions of the Academy contain many important historical monographs from his pen.

Roman Dmowski is a Pole and was for some years leader of the Polish party in the Duma. No one represents with more authority and greater ability the view that Poland's hopes for the future are most likely to be realised by coming to terms with the great Slav Empire.

Harold Williams, an Englishman who has resided for fifteen years in Russia, is considered by Russian scholars to have no rival, even among natives, in his special department of knowledge, the ethnography of the Russian Empire. Here he has given in a few pages a summary of his comprehensive knowledge of this vast subject.

These eminent men made the journey, at great inconvenience to themselves, from Russia to England, on purpose to deliver these lectures. The lectures were given in English, and the speakers entrusted their manuscripts to me for publication; and some of them, modestly distrusting their own skill in writing a foreign language, gave me authority to make such changes in the form of expression as I thought necessary. I trust that none of these distinguished scholars and courteous gentlemen will feel that I have abused this authority. Where I have made changes in the wording, it has been with the sole object of making the writer's meaning clearer to the English reader.

J. D. DUFF.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE WAR AND BALKAN POLITICS	I
P. N. MILYOUKOV	
✓THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM IN RUSSIA	25
P. N. MILYOUKOV	
PAST AND PRESENT OF RUSSIAN ECONOMICS	47
PETER STRUVE	
POLAND, OLD AND NEW	83
ROMAN DMOWSKI	
THE NATIONALITIES OF RUSSIA	123
HAROLD WILLIAMS	
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND LEARNING IN RUSSIA	153
A. S. LAPPO-DANILEVSKY	

THE WAR AND BALKAN POLITICS

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

The great struggle we are now carrying on as allies can be looked at and its meaning explained from two points of view which are sometimes considered to be entirely different and even opposite to one another. On the one hand, it is a world-struggle, originating in a clash, foreseen but unavoidable, between the growing imperialism of a newcomer and the existing state of things. On the other hand, it is a local struggle in the south-east of Europe, originating in Balkan relations. From the first point of view, this is chiefly a war between Germany and England. From the second point of view, it is a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

To keep these two views disconnected, as if they had no concern with each other, is extremely profitable to our enemies. They might choose whatever view they liked while addressing themselves to different members of the *entente*, in order to dissociate them and to sow the seed of suspicion and discontent. They would come to you, for instance, and they would tell you that "you are taking a parochial view of Armageddon if you allow yourselves to imagine that this is primarily a struggle for the independence of Belgium or the future of France. We Germans," they would

say, "are nearer the truth when we regard it as a Russo-German war. Was not, indeed, the original issue, 'in plain words, whether Serbia should become an Austrian vassal or remain a Russian tool¹'? Why should you fight, then, for Serbia and for Russian predominance in the Balkans?" And then the Germans would come and say to us, "Well, this is, in the first place, our quarrel with England, for 'a place in the sun.' Did not they invent that wretched encompassment policy in order to encircle us and to cut us off from every foreign market, thus blocking the way to the realisation of our world-policy? Why should you Russians, whose dynasty has always been friendly with ours, join them and play their game? Why should you, chiefly a Continental and Asiatic power, whose principal interest lies, according to us Germans, in the Far East, why should you fight for British predominance on the seas?"

Well, ladies and gentlemen, what is the best means to parry and to refute such arguments, based chiefly on the idea of the incongruity of interest between the allies? Is it not to show that the two views on the war which I have just set out are one, or rather, that they are two different sides of the same view? There is something in common between the German world-policy directed against Great Britain, and the Austrian Balkan policy directed against Russia; and that something is German aggression. I do not think that the first part of this assertion, *i.e.* that the German conflict

¹ The quotation is taken from Mr H. N. Brailsford's article in the *Contemporary Review*, reprinted as a leaflet, No. 4 ("The Origins of the Great War"), by the Union of Democratic Control.

with England is based on German aggression, needs any further proof on my part to-day, as the opposite view is defended in this country only by a small misguided minority. But I shall proceed to develop the second part of my assertion, namely, that Russian policy in the Balkans was to a great extent provoked by the same cause, by German aggression, because here different views may be taken; and in particular I must show you that these two aspects of German aggression, the western and the eastern tendency, practically start from the same source and have the same origin.

Let me remind you, first, that both aspects of German aggression, which I have just called the western and the eastern, can be designated by geographical names. The name for German aggression in the west is Morocco, and the name for the other, the eastern arm of the German push, is Mesopotamia. You know that the Germans came rather late in their endeavour to secure good colonies. What were left unoccupied at that time were second-rate or quite worthless. But here, on the very outskirts of Europe, lay two of the best granaries in the world which seemed to be falling from the grasp of their owners, with no heir to the succession. Morocco and Mesopotamia—in these two words centres the whole story of German diplomacy in the twentieth century.

I cannot tell you the story of German intrigues at Morocco and their failure. I can only remind you of the fact that the German "bluff," for such it was then considered to be, in regard to Morocco was countered in this country in July, 1911, by Sir Edward Grey's declarations to the German ambassador, and by the

famous speech of Mr Lloyd George at the Mansion House, where the Chancellor of the Exchequer made this plain declaration: "If a situation were to be forced on us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position which Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."

Morocco gone, Mesopotamia remained; and, while recalling to your mind the story of German attempts to bluff us here, I shall be more than once tempted to repeat, on behalf of vital interests of Russia, the utterances of Mr Lloyd George on behalf of Great Britain.

Here we come to the Balkans, the Balkans as the only way to Mesopotamia. The German push to Mesopotamia has also got its geographical expression, and even two expressions: one for Austria-Hungary, from Vienna to Salonica, and another for Germany, from Berlin to Bagdad. This is an old story: it is not at all recent, but at the beginning it looked inoffensive, and it was called "economic penetration" of Asia Minor. In order to show you just how old that penetration is, I will give you a quotation from a famous pamphlet by Dr Sprenger, published in 1886 under the very telling title of "Babylonia, the richest land in antiquity and the most paying place for colonisation in the present." Among other things you can read there, is the following: "The east is the only region in the world which is not yet appropriated by any one of

the expanding nations. If Germany does not let slip her chance, but puts it into her pocket before the Cossacks can dip their hands into it, she will soon have the best share in the partition of the world. As soon as some thousand armed German colonists begin to till the splendid soil, the fate of near Asia will be in the hands of the Emperor." This was written in 1886. I will not detain you by recalling how these ideas were realised. I suppose you know all about the friendship of William with the "Red Sultan," about the Emperor's theatrical journeys in 1898 to the tomb of Saladin in Damascus and to the Holy Places in Jerusalem, with all that display of German splendour, and with the profession by the Emperor that he is the only and the best friend of the Sultan, the only one who does not think of any partition of Turkey—and that because he wants her all for himself—the Emperor, the true and faithful protector of the Moslem all over the world. And then, after the Emperor, came the Krupps and von der Goltz: instructors for the Turkish army and concessions for German capital. The railway line—very short at first—from Haidar-Pasha to Ismid; then just a little further to Angora; then by a short cut down to the south to Konieh; and finally, in 1899, from Konieh to its terminus on the Persian Gulf—this is in a few words the story of the Bagdad railway.

I am not going to dwell on all these developments, which I suppose to be known, and I pass on to my chief point. How did all this expanding policy of Germany in the Near East affect Russia and her policy in the Balkans? Russia as a whole—I do not mean single politicians—paid simply no attention to it for a

very long time, and, even at the most important moment of that development and economical expansion, permitted the Germans to divert her attention from the Near East to the Far East, just as you permitted Germany to take Heligoland from you when she was on the eve of building her huge fleet. We were both taken unawares. In 1878, while prosecuting her traditional policy in the Balkans, Russia liberated Bulgaria, in harmony with Gladstone and in opposition to Beaconsfield. But what did she gain for herself while doing this? We are now informed, owing to revelations from the family archives of the Austrian statesman, Count Julius Andrassy, that, before going to war, Russia, in the first place, by the secret treaty of Reichstadt, of the 26th of June, 1876, and by secret conventions of the 6th of March, 1877, handed Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Austria-Hungary, to be annexed whenever she liked without recourse to arms. In the second place, Russia formally renounced all claims to Constantinople and control over the Dardanelles, and all claims to an exclusive protectorate over the Christian nationalities in the Balkans. Thirdly, and finally, after her victories over the Turks, victories which cost her hundreds of thousands of lives, Russia submitted to Austria her preliminary draft for the armistice in the beginning of January, 1878. She conformed her claims to the "Observations" formulated by the Emperor Francis Joseph, and she reduced her demands on Turkey to which Turkey had consented in the preliminary treaty of San Stefano. I do not mean to say that all this was done without hesitation and protest, but such was the leading policy of the then

Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, and this course was taken not only in order to comply with the wishes of the European Concert, but also because it represented the views of our leading statesmen during the reign of Alexander II. Certainly the feeling of offence at this humiliation was very strong, and also of bitter dissatisfaction with Austria and Germany who had helped in diminishing our advantages secured by war, and these feelings were largely spread among the Russian masses. This compelled Russia to change her whole system of foreign policy. It was during the reign of Alexander III that we approached France, and that the basis of the Russo-French Alliance was laid down. However, our traditional relations towards Austria-Hungary still remained unchanged. In February, 1897, the Emperor Francis Joseph visited St Petersburg, and an agreement on Balkan affairs was concluded between Russia and Austria-Hungary on the basis of a partition of the Balkan peninsula into two spheres of influence—the western, including control over Servia, Macedonia, and Albania, and the eastern, where Russia was to control Bulgaria and European Turkey. At that time, as you may see, we did not at all resent the Austrian push to Salonica. The line of division between the two spheres of influence in the Balkans was considered to be traditional, and went back as far as the reign of Catherine the Second and the Emperor Joseph. I can add that this line of division between the two spheres has actually become the traditional view in the Balkans. Serbia was considered, accordingly, to belong to the Austrian sphere of influence. There even existed a secret treaty of

1881, renewed in 1889, between Austria and King Milan, according to which Serbia was made a tool of Austria in her push to Salonica, Austria formally promising her aid in the extension of Serbia in the direction of the Vardar valley, on condition that they were not to extend either to the Sanjak of Novy Bazar, a passage between Serbia and Montenegro, which Austria kept to herself according to the treaty of Berlin of 1878, or to the Dalmatian shore on the Adriatic. Still later, as recently as 1913, I personally heard from Ferdinand, the King of Bulgaria, the expression of his view that Serbia was to remain under Austrian sway. He even told me that he impressed this opinion upon Alexander, the Serbian heir-apparent. That was also the reason why Russia considered herself unconcerned in Macedonia: Macedonia was the sphere of the Austrian push, and as late as 1897 Russia agreed with Austria to preserve the *status quo* in Macedonia, and continued obstinately to defend it down to 1904 in spite of British demands for a serious reform in that wretched country.

We can state exactly when the traditional policy of Russia gave place to a new and an opposite line. It was at the time when Russia had finally altered her international course and had drifted into the channel of the *entente* with England. It was in the years 1907-1908. In August, 1907, a treaty with England had been concluded on Asiatic questions, and in May, 1908, there was an interview between the Tsar and King Edward VII. These two years, 1907 and 1908, represent the period of transition when the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Izvolsky, after having found new

friends in England, was still unwilling to surrender old friends in Austria, and so he is found discussing with them, to our great disadvantage, new schemes conceived under new international conjunctures. The possibility of the final downfall of Turkey, the possibility of the advance of Austria-Hungary to Salonica and of Russia on the Bosphorus, were the subjects of secret discussion on former lines. But at the same time new developments took place, and two facts in particular must be remembered as outward symptoms of the changing situation.

First, in June, 1903, a new dynasty appeared in Serbia, the dynasty of Peter Karageorgevic, which was friendly to Russia, and then there began a bitter struggle for the emancipation of Serbia from the economic bondage of Austria. A Russophil Radical party, under the leadership of Mr Paschic, took a line which entirely changed the whole situation. It was then that Austria began to talk about the Serbian danger. Then, secondly, Baron Aerenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, on the 27th of January, 1908, made his famous speech about the new railway line to be constructed through Sanjak,—through the corridor I have mentioned,—and he particularly emphasised the importance of that railway as a means of direct communication between Vienna, Egypt, and India. This speech was an open avowal, and from that moment the Eastern Question was reopened in all its historical magnitude and significance. Under this new light the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 received a meaning quite different from what it was supposed to have in 1876, at the time of

the Reichstadt concession. It brought about an acute conflict with Russia, and this diplomatic defeat of Russia at the hand of German bluff in 1909, served as an antecedent to the German policy of 1914. Thus, people who insist upon the fact that there must be a direct connection, as cause and effect, between these events of 1907-1909 and the present war are right, I suppose. The war might have begun from various causes and on many pretexts on the part of Germany, but, as a matter of fact, it began by reason of the Eastern Question being reopened, and we cannot understand the present situation in the Balkans unless we discuss the Eastern Question in full.

Coming to this part of my lecture, I find a very good definition of what the Eastern Question properly is, in its European shape, in the initial phrase of Mr Miller's book on the Ottoman Empire. He says: "The near Eastern Question may be defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe." "Filling up the vacuum." I agree with this definition, but with one correction, and a very serious one. There is no vacuum, no emptiness, not only in the world of physical things but also in the world of morals. As long as there were no moral entities—by which I mean no nations conscious of themselves—as long as there were no moral entities in the world of the enslaved *rayáh* in Turkey, there was also no vacuum. Accordingly, there was also no dislocation of Turkey, although the symptoms of decrepitude and of coming decay were already present and numerous. The process of decomposition developed as the consequence of a new

process of national integration, as its counterpart or inverse.

Look at this little collection of maps, showing different projects for a partition of Turkey. I took them from the book of Mr Djuvara, who counts a hundred of these projects, beginning as early as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and half of them are earlier than the eighteenth century, *i.e.* before the beginning of a real dislocation of Turkey. Compare these maps with the ethnographic map of the Balkan Peninsula. You will see how these early projects for the partition of Turkey make a clean slate of its ethnographic composition. Here, for instance, Father Coppin contrives to give something to everybody, to France, and to England, to Spain, to Modena and Parma, to the Pope and to Venice,—and all that on the very small spot of the Morea, which he divides into six parts. Next, Mr Carra, a Girondist executed by the Jacobins during the French Revolution, gives Prussia a place on the Danube and the Black Sea. Others cut to the quick in the living but torpid bodies of nations, drawing lines from north to south, or from west to east, of the Balkan Peninsula¹. Looking at some of the later maps², you will see that the vacuum begins to fill up with living matter, and will notice how political frontiers of projected local kingdoms begin to coincide with national or religious divisions. Well, this change in political cartography reflects in itself the whole story of the Eastern Question. The real dislocation of the

¹ Projects of Catherine II (1772) and of Alexander I (1808).

² Projects of Capodistrias (1828), of Dandolo (1853), of Mathias Ban (1885).

Ottoman Empire begins with the real growth of the Balkan nationalities, and fantastic schemes and combinations are soon eliminated by substituting for them real solutions. The only trouble, which is a new one, is to find just where the ethnographic frontiers go. Populations are mixed, claims are uncertain,—and a new and internal struggle begins between the Balkan nationalities themselves. Their original and lofty aim—that of national unification—gradually assumes the shape of new aspirations towards an “equilibrium of power,” while ethnographic frontiers begin to serve only as a pretext covering hidden tendencies towards hegemony and domination.

Let us now, for a time, put aside the far-reaching designs of European conquerors and diplomatists in the Balkans. Let us even forget dynastic intrigues, favoured or hampered by the reigning families of Europe. Let us review the double and elementary process of Turkish decay and of national awakening in the Balkans. What exactly was the principal cause of the destruction of Turkey? The answer may be partly found in what has been said already. But I want to impress it on you by the aid of an English book which, according to my view, is undeservedly forgotten, and which I wish particularly to recall to your minds at the present time: I mean Prof. Edward Freeman's book on *The Ottoman Power in Europe*, which was written on the eve of the Berlin congress of 1878,—and met at the time with a rather unfriendly reception. It might have been written to-day. This is what Freeman says: “The presence of the Turk in Europe is incidental. They remain at the end of 500 years as

much strangers as they were at the beginning. European ideas and words, like 'nation,' 'government,' 'law,' 'sovereign,' 'subject,' do not apply to them. How can they form a 'nation' when the Mahommedan part of the population has always been a ruling race and the Christian or other non-Mahommedan part has always been a subject race? The non-Mussulman 'subjects' of a Mussulman ruler sink to the condition of a subject people. The utmost that the best Mahommedan ruler can do is to save his subjects of other religions from actual persecution; he cannot save them from degradation; he cannot, without forsaking the principles of his own religion, put them on the same level as Mussulmans. That is why in Turkey there can be no 'subject' and no 'national government.' When we call an Englishman a British subject, we mean that he is a member of the British state. But if we call a Bulgarian an Ottoman subject, it means that he is the member of a body which is held in bondage by the body of which the Ottoman Sultan is the head, and he is also subject to all the lesser Turks as his daily oppressors. As far as the Turks themselves are concerned, the Turkish Government is a 'government,' *i.e.* a system of the administration of the law. But their rule over the Christian is a rule of mere force, and not a rule of law. The Christian is, in strictness, out of the pale of the law; the utmost that he can do is to purchase the security of his life and property and the exercise of his religion by the payment of tribute. That is why, among the nations of Western Europe, no one wishes to get rid of the government of his country, though he may wish to modify

and improve it in many ways. But the Christian subject of the Turkish Government does not wish to reform the Turkish Government. He simply wishes to get rid of it altogether. He wishes to become a member of a political community of his own nation, which shall have nothing to do with the Turk. That power could not redress their grievances, because the existence of that power in itself is the greatest of their grievances, the root and cause of all lesser grievances. The only solution is the transfer of the power of the Turk to other hands."

I have known Turkey for nearly twenty years, and I can give you no better explanation of the real causes of her fatal downfall, than that given by the famous English historian. You will ask me perhaps, seeing that the book was written in 1878, how it is possible to apply Freeman's statements to regenerated Turkey, the Turkey of to-day, the Turkey of the Young Turks after their revolution of 1908? Well, there was one moment when I myself had some doubts, and after that a time when I did not wish to play the part of the bird of ill omen. But when two years had elapsed after the revolution—after this two years' test it became clear, even to those who knew nothing about the internal state of Turkey, that the trial had failed. I was in Constantinople ten days after the revolution of July 23, 1908, had begun. I saw the general enthusiasm of the crowds in the streets. I sympathised with the initiators of the national movement; I made acquaintance with some of them one week later in Salonica; day by day I was able to follow their first attempts to formulate their political programme; it

was intended at least as much to liberate Turkey from Europe as from the old Sultan. As to their relations with Christian nationalities, I saw the chasm which existed between their idea of a united Ottoman Empire whose members should enjoy equal rights, and the firm decision of Christian subjects to preserve their separate national existence, their native habits, their inherited traditions, based on concessions given some hundreds of years ago by the early conquerors of Byzantium. No, Freeman was right: complete separation was the only possible solution of the problem. I left Turkey with the impression that her fate was sealed.

But who was to profit by the coming destruction of Turkey? The most natural answer was given already by Gladstone. "It will be in the first place the Balkan nations themselves." The Balkans were to be given to the Balkan nations. Well, that was not an anti-Russian solution. The only thing Russia claimed in the Balkans in case of the disappearance of Turkey was a narrow strip of land all along the Straits, with a comparatively mixed population. But it was beyond doubt an anti-Austrian solution, because it blocked for ever the way to Salonica, and an anti-German solution, because it completely destroyed the scheme of Berlin to Bagdad. Germany did not fail, in the famous speech of the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg before the Reichstag, in April, 1913, to acknowledge that it was a "disadvantage" for her, "that the position in the balance of forces, which was occupied hitherto by European Turkey," began to be "filled in part by Slav States." The Chancellor pointed out, at this date, that such a state of things might bring about

"a European conflagration, which sets *Slaventum* against *Germanentum*," and thus make it necessary for Germany to help Austria-Hungary "not merely within the limits of diplomatic mediation"—thus foreshadowing the arguments of the German White Paper of August, 1914.

The chief strength of the anti-German solution was this, that it satisfied local interests, and stood in perfect harmony with the national aspirations of the awakening Christian populations of the Balkans. Looking backwards at the events, we may say that all diplomatic designs, however farseeing they seemed at the time, have miserably failed in case they were inconsistent with local national needs, and that, on the contrary, small Balkan nations, steadily growing in consciousness and cohesion, have always found their way, mostly taking by surprise diplomatic wisdom. The two kinds of help they really wanted from the *entente* were, first, to let them alone and to ward off Austro-Germany while they were fighting their common enemy, Turkey, and, secondly, to suggest, and, if necessary, to impose solutions in very delicate and disputed questions of establishing satisfactory and permanent ethnographic frontiers. The *entente* succeeded in accomplishing the first task and utterly failed in the second.

The only possible way to defeat Turkey by the forces of the Balkan nations alone was to arrange a compact amongst them and to lay the foundations of a Balkan League, while the only chance of Austro-Germany to win the game was to keep them disunited, and to foster internal dissensions and national rivalries in the Balkans. Germs for both were not lacking, and

the story of the relations between the Balkan States is, in substance, the story of a continuous struggle between these two tendencies of union and discord.

The idea of a Balkan Union is not new. It was dreamed of by Slav idealists and intellectuals over half a century ago. It was even tried by the Serbian patriot, Prince Michael, who, as early as 1866-68, *i.e.* about the time of the unification of Italy and Germany, concluded the same system of treaties¹ which forty-five years later brought about the victory of the Balkan peoples over the Turk. But for a time it did not succeed. In May, 1868, Michael fell victim to a conspiracy in which Austria had some hand, because Austria knew how dangerous it was for her to see that union of the small Balkan nations accomplished. With Michael's death Serbia lost her chance of becoming what she sought to be, the "Piedmont" for all Balkan Slavs, because in the next years another Slav state in the Balkans was formed by Russia. This was Bulgaria, whose national consciousness was being awakened. Thenceforward there began a growing rivalry between the two related nations. Bulgaria had won (1870) her own national church, the Exarchy, while Serbia remained under the Greek Patriarch, and, as the Patriarch proclaimed the Bulgarians to be schismatics, here was the new difference of religion to increase the feeling of national disparity. It was then that the struggle for Macedonia began, and grew ever fiercer. Before that time, the Serbians did not claim the

¹ With Greece and Montenegro, and with the "apostles" of Bulgarian freedom, the Bulgarian revolutionaries.

Macedonian population as their own. Macedonians called themselves "Bougari," and spoke a Bulgarian dialect. But Serbian patriots, from the end of 1860, claimed Macedonia as an historical inheritance of the Tsar Dushan, and tried to prove that there were Serbian sounds preserved in Macedonian dialects. The feeling of the Macedonian Slav population was not with them. Macedonian Bulgarians participated in general Bulgarian risings of the seventies, and suffered equally when the Bulgarians were massacred by the Turks; and they were included by Russia in the liberated Bulgaria by the treaty of armistice of San Stefano (March, 1878). The "undivided" Bulgaria of San Stefano has always remained since then a national ideal. If Lord Beaconsfield had not listened at that time to the Austrian advice of Count Andrassy, and if this ideal had then been realised, there would have been no ulterior struggle between Serbia and Bulgaria, and no attempts on the part of Austria to make use of this struggle in order to divert the attention of Serbia from the Adriatic shore and from Dalmatia, which is Serbian, to the valley of the Vardar and to Salonica. The treaty of San Stefano, I am sorry to say, was torn to pieces at Berlin (July, 1878) by the help of English statesmen who suspected Russia of designs for expansion; but this suspicion afterwards proved quite unfounded. The "wrong horse" policy showed here at its worst. And thus it finally happened that the Bulgarian national ideal, based on ethnography, is at this moment being realised by Germans, and by that royal degenerate, their King Ferdinand.

Meanwhile, there was a moment when it seemed that a just and reasonable partition of Slav lands owned by the Turk was likely, in spite of Austro-German attempts to sow discord, to be attained by the Balkan states themselves, united in one Balkan League. The possibility of building such a union appeared again with the change of dynasty in Serbia in 1903. The younger generation of Serbian and Bulgarian intellectuals did very much to cool down international irritation, and in 1904 an attempt was made to conclude a commercial treaty, with the further prospect of a customs-union and even a treaty for mutual defence. Unhappily, this treaty met with a formal veto on the part of Austria. Still, conversations were resumed as early as 1909, and proceeded further in Petrograd in 1910, without coming to any definite result in regard to Macedonia; and, finally, a formula of partition of Macedonia was secretly arrived at when the Turco-Italian war of 1911 made it clear to everybody that Turkey's life in Europe was soon to end. By the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of March 13, 1912, the limit was finally drawn in Macedonia, approximately, according to the view of Mr Tsviyits, the best Serbian specialist in geography, on the lines of Serbian ethnographic research. This treaty was followed by the Graeco-Bulgarian treaty of May, 1912, wherein, unhappily, no frontiers were established which could settle conflicting claims. Then, when the Albanian revolt of 1912 proved finally the weakness of Turkey, military agreements were concluded on September 5, 1912, with Serbia, and on September 28, 1912, with Greece. On October 13, the allied Balkan states

formally demanded Turkey's consent to the autonomy of the European vilayets, redivided according to nationality, and on October 17 Turkey replied by declaring war on Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, Montenegro having been at war since October 9.

Nobody expected at the time a decisive victory for the allies, and thus it was easy for Russia, England, and France to persuade Austria-Hungary to let the Balkan states fight it out by themselves. Austria confidently expected that the Balkan states would be beaten by the Turks. It was a great disappointment, therefore, for both Austria and Germany when, in the short space of a few weeks, the allies had become masters of the Turkish provinces in Europe. The war for liberation was properly finished at Lulé-Bourgas on October 31 for Bulgaria, at Salonica on October 27 for Greece, and at Monastir on October 28 for Serbia. If by that time, by the end of October or, perhaps, November, a treaty of peace could have been concluded, the question of a just ethnographic partition should have been solved. But now there began a war for conquest, which was to end with the capture of Adrianople by Bulgaria on March 13, 1913, of Yanina by the Greeks on February 24, and of Durazzo and Scutari on April 9 by Serbia and Montenegro.

Unhappily, this war for conquest was also the end of the Balkan League. Encroachments on foreign nationalities did not fail to revive ancient mutual animosities. Serbia and Greece, having become masters of Macedonia, began by very summary means to assimilate the local population. Bulgaria grew impatient to conclude peace with Turkey in order to turn against

the allies herself. Serbia and Greece answered by concluding a treaty of alliance on May 29, 1913, against Bulgaria, in order to defend their booty. As the treaty of March 13, 1912, provided, in case of conflict between the allies, for arbitration by the Tsar, Russia made an attempt to convoke the quarrelling allies before her tribunal in Petrograd. But at the same time Russian diplomacy made Bulgaria understand that she must yield and make some further concessions to Serbia. This sufficed to make Bulgaria resort to the foolish proceeding of trying a solution by force. On June 29 a sudden attack was made by the Bulgarians on the Serbians and on the Greek army, and then a veritable avalanche of misfortune descended upon Bulgaria. Russia let go Roumania, whose soldiers advanced to Sofia. England did not stop the Turks, who recaptured Adrianople and passed on to Bulgarian territory. At the same time the Greeks reached the frontier of the kingdom at Djumaya; while the Serbians were besieging Vidin. After two weeks of unequal struggle, Bulgaria appealed to Europe. Two weeks later she asked Roumania to mediate. On July 30 negotiations were opened at Bucharest, and on August 10 a hasty peace was concluded which simply mutilated Bulgaria and distributed Balkan territory among the victors as if no ethnography existed. Thus the work of the Balkan union was utterly spoilt, and it was the Austro-Germans who really won the victory at Bucharest.

At the beginning of 1914 I wrote in the Report of the Carnegie Commission sent to inquire into the causes and conduct of the Balkan wars: "The treaty of Bucharest has sown a new seed of discord in its violation

of the sentiment of nationality. It divides the Balkan territories on the principle on which the treaty of Vienna divided national regions in Europe in 1815. This historical example suggests that here, too, national reaction will follow on the work of diplomatic and political reaction. Those who won claimed that a balance in the Balkans had been secured, an end made of pretensions to hegemony, and peace thus secured for the future. Unhappily, a nearer examination leads rather to the conclusion that the treaty of Bucharest has created a state of things that is far from being durable." While writing these lines, I was far from foreseeing that this prophecy was to be accomplished during that very year and the next.

You can see now the bearing of the events of 1913, and of the mistaken policy of a fictitious equilibrium in the Balkans, on the events which brought about the present war. If the partition of Christian populations in the European provinces of Turkey had been made according to the treaty of March 13, 1912, and in accordance with the actual ethnographic frontiers, the Balkan League would have been kept in existence and Austria-Hungary would not have dared, would not even have thought of sending her ultimatum to Serbia. I do not mean to say that in that case there would have been no European war. What I mean is that, probably, there would have been no war in July, 1914, on the pretext of a Serbian danger for Austria.

Still, when this war began, not everything was lost in the Balkans. On September 17, 1915, the diplomatic representatives of the *entente* powers visited the Bulgarian premier, Mr Radoslavov, and handed to him

identical verbal notes. They acknowledged in these notes that Bulgarian pretensions to Macedonia were just, and they gave Bulgaria a solemn guarantee that Macedonia would be given back to her, within the limits of the treaty of March 13, 1912, quite independently of what Serbia or Greece might think of it. They even proposed as a guarantee immediately to occupy the promised territories with the Italian army. If this proposal, instead of being made in September, had been made in March, half a year before, I am nearly sure that Bulgaria would have sided with us. But at that time there was no unity of opinion among the diplomatists of the *entente* as to the better solution to choose. Does not this mean that sometimes—let us be charitable—diplomatists are liable to be out of touch with the existing reality, and not quite well acquainted with things they ought to know?

Well, ladies and gentlemen, things are just now so complicated in the Balkans that I do not venture to utter any opinion as to what is to be done immediately in that region. We are now in the very process of development of new military operations which, in a few weeks, perhaps, may change the whole situation. But what I know, and what looms over momentary events so as to be seen afar, from a distance, is the conspicuous lesson given by the occurrences of the past which I have just recalled to your memory. Nothing short of extermination can change the state of national feeling, and the task of diplomatic wisdom is quite plain and simple if it does not permit itself to be guided by feelings of hatred or revenge. The settlement in the Balkans, to be durable, must be based on

the just national aspirations of the Balkan peoples. The allies, who are led by feelings of justice and freedom, will know how to rearrange the conditions of national life in the Balkans in order to prevent the recurrence of mutual distrust and that false principle of "balance of power" which is profitable only to our enemies, and to crown our victory, which is sure to come, with a new reconstruction based on international law and guaranteed by international sanctions.

THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM IN RUSSIA

“The Duma is dead; long live the Duma!”

I wonder whether you know, ladies and gentlemen, just when this historic phrase was pronounced by the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Some members of the first Russian Legislative Assembly had just come to London in July, 1906, as representatives attending the Inter-parliamentary Union for Arbitration, when they learnt that the assembly they represented was dissolved. The Duma—the first Russian Duma—was dead. It died while attempting to regenerate the political and social life of Russia on a completely new and largely democratic basis. Autocracy and landed nobility, the two chief agencies of historical Russian life, though decaying, had proved too strong for the newly born national representation. The conflict between the new and the old did not even last long. The important work performed by the first Duma was done by it in an existence of only seventy-three days. Then the Government, in order to have a more subservient chamber, used all their power in influencing the elections for the second Duma. The result was just the opposite of what they expected. Instead of a strongly constitutional Duma, with a constitutional-

democratic majority, a socialistic and revolutionary Duma was returned with no majority at all for the Government. If you will look at these figures which show the composition of the first and second Duma, you will see the difference exactly. In the first Duma

TABLE I

Parties	The 1st Duma	The 2nd Duma
Right	21	63
Moderate right	38	34
Constitutional democrats ("cadets")	187	123
Poles	32	39
Left wing ("Labour group")	85	97
Socialists	26	83
Independent	112	22

the so-called Cadets or constitutional democrats numbered 187, and in the second Duma the representatives of socialism, in both its forms of agrarian and urban socialism, formed the majority of 180. This Duma knew its weakness very well, and tried to keep clear of any direct conflict with the Government. But it was useless: this chamber, too, was dissolved, after 103 days of existence.

It was a dramatic struggle, that struggle which was carried on by those two Dumas, and it was observed with keen sympathy and followed with the closest attention by the whole civilised world. The Duma was dead again. But—"Long live the Duma!" The memorable greeting of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, while it acknowledged the crisis through which the young Russian representative institutions were pass-

¹ The Right group of the first Duma preferred to be classified with the "independents."

ing, expressed at the same time the firm belief that the Russian constitution could not be destroyed either by the whim of single persons or even by the mistakes of its own political inexperience. The Duma has lived on. But the first, the "heroic" age of its life, was really at an end. Thenceforward the Duma was to live in obscurity. After a few months of meteoric splendour, there followed long years of a very modest existence. I should call the second age of the Duma's life that of political mimicry. The Duma with its changed composition tried to adapt itself to its political environment. The new majority renounced bold schemes for the general reform of Russia and devoted themselves to the rather ungrateful task of self-preservation. The Duma was still interesting to observe at close quarters, but it was much more difficult to admire and indeed was thought negligible as an agent in Russian politics. I suppose that is why the Russian Duma since 1907 has been nearly lost sight of by the world.

I am going to speak to you about this—the unknown Duma of the last ten years, which include the action of the third Duma from 1907 to 1912, and the fourth Duma, which was elected in 1912 and will expire in 1917. I shall try to explain to you just why the Russian Duma was unable to take a more prominent place in Russian political life, just what it lacks in order to become a real and strong representative of the people. At the same time you will see, I hope, that in spite of all drawbacks and deficiencies, the Duma has contrived to make itself an indispensable engine in the national life, that it soon struck root in the country,

and that it retains the vital essence inherent in the very principle of national representation.

What is the chief difference between the two first and the two second Dumas, and what is the precise reason of this difference? First and foremost, it was the change in the electoral Law that opened a chasm between these two groups of Dumas. At the time of the dissolution of the second Duma on June 16, 1907, an edict was issued contrary to a fundamental law, that is to say, without the approval of the Duma itself, which entirely changed the composition of that body. The political parties which had built up the majority in the first two Dumas were proclaimed "illegal" on the alleged pretext that their program was to fortify the constitution by "revolutionary" means. The settled composition of the Duma was curtailed in parts which were considered to be "unreliable"; thus the number of Polish deputies was diminished and the Asiatic provinces were deprived of all representation. Then—and this is the chief point—the political centre of gravity was transferred from the democratic groups of population to the higher social classes which were

TABLE II
Social Composition of the Duma

		Before 1907 Per cent.	After 1907 Per cent.
Landed gentry	...	34	51
Peasants	43	22·4
Citizens	23	24·2
Working men	...	3·4	2·3

believed to be more reliable. Look at the figures which show the social composition of the Duma before

and after 1907. These two sets of figures explain everything. You see that in the first two Dumas the relative majority of 43 per cent. was composed of peasants, but that 51 per cent.—that is to say an absolute majority—consisted of the landed gentry in the second two Dumas. That, as I say, explains everything. Before 1907, it was the peasants who were favoured by the electoral reform. They were supposed to represent the Conservative and traditional basis of the national life; the gentry were regarded at that time as exponents of modern Liberal tendencies, owing to their foreign education. But when the first and second Dumas proved that the peasants were strongly inclined to agrarian revolution, the Government transferred their confidence to the small but influential group of reactionary landlords who succeeded in organising themselves under the name of the "United Nobility." I have used an English word, "gentry," but I must point out the difference which exists between the Russian gentry and the English. Our gentry are much more dependent upon the Government, having been liable in ancient times to military service, and having received their lands as recompense. After the reforms of Peter the Great, the same class entered the Civil Service; and here too they depended on the Government for promotion from grade to grade, from *chin* to *chin* as we say in Russia; and hence they are called *chinovniks*, "men of the grades."

Now, if you consider the social position of the different political parties in the third Duma, you will see at once which of the parties was thought to be

most dependent on the Government and therefore most reliable. It was that party which contained the largest number of the landed gentry.

TABLE III
Social composition¹ of different Parties in the Third Duma

Parties	Gentry Per cent.	Peasants Per cent.	Priests Per cent.
Poles (from the Czardom of Poland)	82	18	—
Poles (from the Western Russian provinces) ...	66	17	17
<i>Octobrists</i>	57	11	1
<i>Nationalists</i>	48	25	13
<i>Right</i>	44	21	28
Oppositionary groups			
Progressives	33·3	3	15
Constitutional democrats	32·8	1	15
Socialist democrats ...	14	64	15
Labour party	14	71	—

I shall leave out the Polish deputies, of whom in the third Duma 82 per cent. were nobles. The Poles, whatever their views on social questions, belong to the opposition, because the Government would not yield to them on the matter which chiefly interests them, *i.e.* the future organisation of Poland. But let me draw your attention to three groups—the Octobrists, named from the manifesto which granted the constitution in October, 1905, the Nationalists, and the “Rights.” In these three groups, the landed nobility form 57, 48, and 44 per cent. respectively; and these are the groups most favoured by the Government in

¹ The politically more independent groups of citizens and of “liberal professions” are not included.

the two later Dumas. We must take a brief survey of their characteristics.

The Octobrists claim to be constitutionalists. But the Nationalists and particularly the Right group are unwilling to admit that autocracy has ever been limited by the constitution, and their extreme wing even strives for the restoration, if necessary by violent means, of the autocratic form of government which existed previous to the October manifesto. The Octobrists are chiefly the party of former bureaucrats and functionaries; by their previous avocations they are much better prepared for legislative work, and at the same time they are much more subservient to the Government, whilst both the Nationalists and the Right group include more democratic elements—peasants and priests together with the gentry, and are less ready to be led and less prepared to lead in matters of politics. After the dissolution of the second Duma, the Cabinet with the late premier Stolypin at their head were inclined, at first and by way of transition, to lean on the Octobrists. But political agencies behind the Cabinet, together with the powerful ring of the so-called "United Nobility," would have preferred to join forces immediately and openly with the avowed partisans of autocracy. The whole internal policy of Russia, as well as the internal history of the Duma, during the last decade, reflected the struggle between these two tendencies. With the Government's aid the Octobrists prevailed at the elections to the third Duma, at which the edict of June 16, 1907, was first applied. In this Chamber the Government used its influence, much increased by means of the edict, on the one hand

to paralyse the opposition, and on the other to keep up a steady control over the extreme Right element, the uncompromising "revolutionaries of reaction." The Right and the Nationalists did not exist at all as political parties in the country. It was only after the elections, within the Duma itself, that they took shape. The general result of the elections on the basis of the electoral edict of June 16, 1907, is shown in this Table.

TABLE IV

Parties in the Third and Fourth Duma

<i>Right wing</i>				<u>3rd</u>	4th
Right	52	65
Nationalists	93	88
				<u>145</u>	<u>153</u>
<i>Centre</i>					
New (Nationalist) "centre"	—	32
Octobrists...	133	98
				<u>133</u>	<u>130</u>
<i>Left wing</i>					
Poles and Mussulmans	26	21
Progressives	39	48
Constitutional Democrats	53	59
Labour group	14	9
Socialist democrats	14	15
				<u>146</u>	<u>152</u>

As you see, the result did not quite correspond with the Government designs. The "illegal" parties of the opposition were present to the rather significant numbers of 146 and 152. This opposition had to sustain various attacks on the part of the Right groups, particularly during the first year of the Chamber. Nevertheless the opposition succeeded in keeping its head above water; then it quickly mastered the situation, and

soon the Octobrists and Central group, in order to secure a majority, found themselves bound to go with the opposition in many cases, in committee work, in budget questions, in international questions, in questions of popular education, in a number of religious issues, and sometimes even on constitutional points. The result was that in the second half of the life of the third Duma the Government turned their backs on the Octobrists. Mr Stolypin now tried to approach the Nationalists, the more Conservative group. By that time, rumours were rife again that a *coup d'état* was in preparation. The third Duma, however, was permitted to live up to the end undestroyed. But at the election for the fourth Duma fresh exertions were made by the Government in order to defeat the Octobrists, and it now became their turn to fall into opposition. The negative aim of the Government was to defeat the Octobrists, and this task was easy because the Octobrists had made themselves exceedingly unpopular in the country by their subservience to the Government in the third Duma. It was far more difficult to attain the positive aim: that of electing a Nationalist majority. The Octobrists were defeated, but there was nobody to take their place. There was no majority in the fourth Duma, as the Nationalists, even with Government aid, did not succeed in getting a majority. The opposition reappeared in slightly increased numbers, while the Octobrists, left to themselves and deprived of the element of discipline which they had owed to Government protection, fell to pieces. There were now three different groups, the central, the left and the right wing. With a composition like that, the

fourth Duma seemed unable to live, and it would have been dissolved if only its existence had been considered of any consequence at that time. But just owing to its entire lack of power the fourth Duma was suffered to live, and the Government only tried to use the opportunity in order again to circumscribe and limit the rights of the chamber. Here, however, they met with opposition. A majority, which was not to be found for constructive work, was forthcoming in the fourth Duma when such matters as the right of interpellation or the right to legislative initiative or even the freedom of parliamentary speech were questioned by the Government. About two years ago, for the first time during the existence of the Duma, some votes of credit were refused to the Government, as a means of political resistance, and the vote of disapproval was carried by a majority. Such was the state of the internal struggle when the present war began. With this war all internal strife was postponed by the same majority in order to devote themselves to the one task of carrying the external struggle to decisive victory. Only two months ago you saw here in England representatives of all parties in the fourth Duma, and they appeared before you as they are now in their own country, united by one aim—to make national defence as efficient as possible.

I have given here only a few hints as to the internal story of the last two Dumas, but they are sufficient to show you two things: first, how difficult it was for the Government to secure a majority to their taste, and, second, just how much the representatives of the nation were handicapped in their endeavours for the

regeneration of their country. It will help you to a still clearer understanding of the situation if you make yourselves acquainted with the structure of legislative institutions in Russia.


Let us begin with the electoral Law. Bismarck is said to have called the Prussian electoral system the most wretched in the world. I should think that the Austrian system before 1905, before the granting of universal suffrage, was still worse than the Prussian. And I may say that the Russian system is much worse than the Austrian. The system of Russian representation is purely artificial and depends entirely on the Government. For voting purposes the population is distributed into separate groups, called "curias." The principle accepted in Russia is this—the more democratic and numerous the group is, the more their electoral power is limited. There are three "curias" in the towns and as many in the country; the least democratic, the moderate, and the most democratic. Thus, for the towns these are: (1) wealthy capitalists, (2) the middle class of citizens, (3) the working classes; and, for the country districts, (1) the large landed proprietors, (2) small landed proprietors, (3) the peasants of the Russian communities. The vote, except in six large cities like Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and so on, is not recorded by the constituencies themselves but by special electors chosen by the constituencies. The number of electors given to the various constituencies varies in opposite proportion to the number of the population. Thus for instance one-fifth of a million of landed gentry have the right to choose 2594 electors, one-half million of wealthy citizens choose 788

electors, eight millions of the middle class choose only 590 electors, twelve millions of working-men choose 112 electors, seventy million peasants choose 1168. It works out at one elector for every 230 of the landed gentry, for every thousand wealthy citizens, for every fifteen thousand middle-class citizens, for every sixty thousand peasants, and for every 125,000 working-men. The former Austrian system was more liberal, as it gave one elector for every 64 noblemen, 23 wealthy citizens, 3171 middle-class citizens and 11,555 peasants.

Now let us come to the highest electoral unit,—the provincial electoral assembly, where the electors for the Duma are chosen. There are about fifty of them in Russia.

TABLE V.

Composition of a provincial electoral assembly.



You see from this plan that in order to become an elector in that assembly one must pass through different stages of election, and the more democratic the voter is, the more stages have to be passed. The peasants choose their electors in the village, these electors are sent to the townships, in the township they elect to the district the second degree electors, who in the district choose the third degree electors, who finally go to the provincial assembly and elect members for the Duma from the province. There are three stages of election for small landed proprietors—the preparatory, the district, and the provincial assemblies, but only two for the large landowners, who choose their electors in the district to elect deputies in the province. It is the same for the wealthy class of the capitalists. They choose their electors, who choose the deputies in their provincial assembly. It is the same for the middle class of citizens. But for the working-men there are again three stages: they choose their electors in the factories, and these come to the district assemblies where they choose their electors for the provincial assemblies. Thus six groups of electors meet in the general assembly of the province, and they elect members of the Duma from their majority, which chiefly consists of landlords and capitalists, sometimes with the addition of small landowners and middle-class citizens. The influential group of large landed proprietors and capitalists, before electing members of their own class, is obliged to elect one peasant and one working-man member from each province. Thus neither peasant electors nor working-men within the assembly have the right to elect separately, whom they like best:

their vote is drowned in that of the majority. You can imagine the result. The landed proprietors, of course, elect such peasants as are likely to comply with their interests, which gives to the Duma the worst representation of the peasant class. This explains how it could happen in the third and fourth Dumas that the peasants entirely changed their position. They had been in the ranks of opposition in the first and the second Duma; they now sit on the benches of the Government parties. It is not quite so bad with working-men, because every representative of the working-men is invariably a Socialist in Russia. Thus it is quite impossible for the capitalists to elect a non-Socialist member. Russia is the only place in the world, I suppose, where the "bourgeois" and the "junkers" are obliged to elect Socialist members.

I must add, first, that every citizen who enjoys the right to vote may at any time, under this or that particular pretext, which are unhappily too many to be enumerated here, be struck off the electoral list; and, secondly, that if a majority in a District or Provincial assembly is not quite to the taste of the Government, the local authorities have the right to redistribute the voters, and in such a way as to secure artificial majorities. If you consider all these things, you may wonder how it happens that in spite of all there is still an opposition in the Duma, and that this opposition even formed one-third of the third and the fourth Dumas. The answer is, first, that the six large cities which have the direct vote have always elected opposition members; and, in the second place, owing to the peculiarly democratic composition of the population

in the extreme North and in East Russia between the Volga and the Ural Mountains, the deputies who are elected there always belong to the opposition¹. Siberia, on the other side of the Urals, has always belonged to the Cadet Party, and the Caucasus has always been represented by Socialists. On the other hand, Central Russia is represented in the Duma mainly by the parties of the landed gentry, chiefly by Octobrists. As to the Nationalists, the most conservative group, they regularly come to the Duma from the western frontier and partly from the south, where national antagonisms are more keenly felt. The deputies representing the Russian "dominating" nationality in these countries form a thin upper social stratum, and they always carry on a somewhat bitter struggle with the more ancient and sometimes more cultured members of the Polish gentry. That is why they bring with them to the Duma feelings of religious and racial hatred which unhappily sometimes find expression in the legislation of that body. The local peasant population is Russian, but, as we already know, the power of their vote is exceedingly limited. Such as come to the Duma invariably share the views of their landlords and sit on the same benches.

Now we come to the rights which the Duma possesses. The Duma has got the power to legislate, the power to vote the Budget, and the power to control the administration. Full power to legislate does not belong to the Russian Duma. Entire branches of legislation, and sometimes very important branches,

¹ In that part of Russia the landed nobility is mainly non-resident and peasants form the great majority of the population.

are withdrawn from its competence. Thus, the right to legislate in military matters has always been withheld, although the Duma did very much to improve the state of the Russian army and navy a few years before the war. The right to legislate in questions of church administration is also a subject of dispute, although the Duma claims nothing more than what the Government has always possessed in matters of religious legislation since the time of Peter the Great. Further, the Duma is thwarted by the indiscriminate use of Imperial edicts and orders in Council. There is one case in which the law expressly allows emergency legislation; this is when the Duma is not sitting. You can, however, hardly imagine how much this Article 87 is misused for matters not at all urgent, at times when the presence of the Duma is not desired. We even had a case of the prorogation of the Duma and of the Council of Empire for three days in order to carry through without the legislative assembly a very important law.

The curtailment of the control of the Duma over the Budget is, perhaps, even more serious. It is particularly here that the feeling of distrust toward the young representative body has guided the Government in the making of our constitution. In the first place, all the expenses which were customary before the granting of the constitution in 1905, were considered sacrosanct and not to be touched. They are specially "protected"¹ from the hasty influence of budget legislation. Doubly protected are the expenses for the

¹ This is the mock term borrowed from naval terminology ("armour-plated") by the opposition, and now in general use.

Court and Imperial Family, the yearly interest on the State Loans and so on. In the Budget of 1908, these protected items amounted to 1,164,000,000 roubles, i.e. they made up 47 per cent. of the whole of the Budget expenses. If you consider that out of the remaining 53 per cent.—the “non-protected” expenses—a large part cannot be exactly determined in advance, as they belong to different branches of the State economy and can only be approximately estimated at the beginning of the year, you will see how small the financial power of the Duma really is. But that is not all. Even if its members should try to use their rights in order to reject some non-protected item of expense—such an item as had already figured in the previous year’s Budget—in that case, the only result would be that the figure of the previous year’s Budget would be substituted. It is only entirely new and unprecedented expenses which can be struck out of the Budget with practical results. But the most important thing is that the permission of the Duma can be evaded altogether for all expenses necessary for war, and also for preparations for war, and even in all cases of urgent necessity. You can easily guess what happens when circumstances like the present occur. In such cases the regular Budget presented to the Duma does not at all reflect the real state of things. Also in such important matters as signing commercial treaties, giving concessions for the construction of railways, determining the details of a foreign loan and the tariffs, and so on, the Duma is not asked to give its help and consent.

We find the same thing when we come to the third chapter of the Duma’s rights, the control of the admini-

stration. It is a right which is especially important in Russia owing to the habit of lawless and arbitrary action inveterate in Russian administration. But the representative system is quite incompetent to tackle it. According to the law, the Duma has the right to interpellate and ask questions, and the Government is bound to return answers within a month. But even supposing that an interpellation on current events preserves its interest after a month and still draws the attention of the public, which is not often the case, and supposing that the answer of the Government has proved unsatisfactory, what is the result? It is no use carrying through the Duma sweeping orders of the day expressing strong disapproval perhaps of the whole administration. The Cabinet is not responsible to the elected Chamber. The question of ministerial responsibility is, I might say, the most delicate and the most burning question of the present day in Russia, for, while concerted action is a crying need, nothing except an occasional coincidence of opinion is possible, under the present system.

But however much these obstacles hinder the working of the representative system, there remains one more obstacle to be mentioned, and that is perhaps the most serious of all. I mean the composition and working of our Upper House, the Council of Empire. I know the alternatives proposed in England under similar circumstances—although I can hardly call them “similar.” “Mend it or end it.” Well, we cannot possibly “end” it. “Mend” it—that sounds all right, but the Lower House cannot apply this practical remedy in Russia, because the chief features of the

constitution—the Upper House is included—are “protected” by fundamental laws, and the initiative in every important change belongs to the Monarch.

What then does this Upper House represent? I am afraid it is a chamber unique in the world. Half the members are nominated by the Tsar, chiefly from former officials. I do not wish to be disrespectful. Many glories of the past are contained in our Upper Chamber. But as our historical life began late and develops quickly, one is startled to see under the peaceful roof of the Marinsky Palace men and names which remind one of political standards long since doomed to oblivion, and of political experiments proved inadequate by painful failures. Too much of the past surviving in the present makes one feel uneasy. Of course, it would be unjust not to mention that there are many excellent legislators amongst the Councillors, men of profound knowledge and very large experience, perfectly acquainted with the technicalities of legislation. But there is one circumstance which prevents them from being able to express their mind freely and independently and makes them bow to the average standard of the assembly. Every nominated member of the Upper House can be removed from the House by the simple process of omitting his name from the list published at the beginning of every year.

The elected half of the members of the Council of Empire represents by a large majority the class of large landed proprietors, the most influential part of the Russian nobility. The nobility is represented directly by eighteen members as well as indirectly through the representatives of the Zemstvos, who number fifty.

One may add to these 68 members representing the upper social stratum six dignitaries of the Church, which makes a solid majority of 74 out of the whole number of 98 elected members, on the side of Conservatism. There remain twelve representatives of commerce, a rather inadequate representation of capital if compared with that of the landed interest, and six intellectuals, representing the learned order of the Academy of Sciences and the Universities; and these generally form the extreme left wing in the Council of Empire. Six members for Poland, here as well as in the Duma, take an intermediate position between the two wings.

The activities of such an Upper House are directed as might be imagined. Not only the Duma, but even the Cabinet, even the Ministers, are often considered too Liberal by the Council of Empire. Every law which bears as they say "the stamp of the 30th of October"—the date of the constitutional manifesto—is sure to fall through, or to be relegated to the archives of the Upper Chamber. One must not forget that no Bills are able to reach the Upper House unless they have previously been approved by a majority of the Duma. You will see for yourselves what are the prospects of constructive and of Liberal legislation in Russia. As, on the other hand, the existence of the Duma does not admit of any *reactionary* legislation, the practical upshot is that *all* legislation of a constructive character is entirely paralysed: a state of things which cannot but be transitional.

Well, that is all now. But if you should think that with all these restraints, which are intended to hedge

round and prevent the free play of our young representative institutions, we are driven to something like despair of their future development, you would be very much mistaken. On the contrary, we are very hopeful, particularly when we consider how much has been done in the line of constitutional practice and the political development of large masses in the very short space of ten years, during which our representative institutions have existed. Not only have we kept them alive in spite of all attempts of autocratic conspirators to abolish them, but we have found a steadily growing support in the country for a system of Liberal policy. We have seen our political parties, even the more Conservative and those which had been artificially built up with the aid of the Government, one by one yielding to the claims of the country.

The present war did very much to reveal that hidden process and make the result clear to everybody. I have told you already that this war has united us in the general aim of victory. I must say now that the war has done more than that. It has really worked miracles. It taught the united fourth Duma the best means to obtain their general aim. It taught us that in order to be strong the nation must be thoroughly organised. In the fourth Duma, whose composition you know, there is now a strong majority, 315 members out of the whole number of 440, for a scheme of constructive policy on a Liberal basis. That is what is known under the name of the "Progressive Block." This majority, moreover, has not only talked and discussed, it has already begun to act. The session of the Duma that ended a month ago, on the 3rd of

July, has already enacted by way of Parliamentary initiative such measures as the prohibition of alcoholic drink for all time to come. This had been introduced by an Imperial Ukase for war-time, but it is now confirmed and extended beyond the war by the law of the Duma. They have passed another law for the equalisation of the rights of the peasants. In their committees they have prepared important drafts of laws extending the franchise and the functions of both Zemstvos and cities, and these will come before the whole house at the beginning of the next Session, i.e. in the autumn of 1916.

Lord Robert Cecil told you in his inaugural address at this Summer Meeting that British political conceptions of freedom and justice appealed to Russian ideas. Well, I am here to witness that they do appeal to the Russian representative assembly. I had personally to report to the Duma in the last days of its closing session the experience brought back by our parliamentary delegation from Great Britain two months before, particularly as to some national questions, and I can tell you that the Chamber was very much impressed by what we had to tell, and that this impression will be reflected in future legislation.

My time is up, ladies and gentlemen. Permit me again to quote the words of Lord Robert Cecil. "It may be truly said that freedom is as much admired in Russia as in England." Yes, ladies and gentlemen, it may be truly said that we worship freedom, we are worthy of freedom, we shall have freedom.

"Long live the Duma!"

PAST AND PRESENT OF RUSSIAN ECONOMICS

(Dedicated to Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, formerly Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who worked with zeal and wisdom to create the Anglo-Russian alliance.)

I¹

THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN ECONOMICS

I must ask your pardon for my bad English, but in deciding to accept the very kind invitation of Cambridge University to speak before you I was only impelled by the conviction that at a time like this, so fateful to the allied countries, there lies upon each one of us the obligation to promote, to the measure of our feeble powers, spiritual intercourse and friendship between our peoples. For, as was said by one of the most powerful English thinkers, "the distances of nations are measured not by seas, but by ignorances; and their divisions determined not by dialects but by enmities." Looking back on the intellectual history of the University of Cambridge and of its members, we

¹ I must thank my friends William Peters, M.A., and Dr Harold Williams for help in expressing my thoughts in English form, and my friend Professor Bernard Pares for encouraging me to address an audience in an unfamiliar language.

should not find it difficult to demonstrate how greatly even distant Russia is obliged to the work of your Cambridge men. But, personally, I feel just now especially urged to recall and to honour with you one name, the name of J. R. Seeley, that great teacher of historical insight and political wisdom. To this Regius professor of Cambridge University I myself owe very much, and that of great importance. And this led me a good many years ago to have his *Expansion of England* published in Russia, and every year I recommend my students at the beginning of their course to read this masterpiece, which makes it possible for every thinking man to enter into the spirit of English history, and to realise the political genius of the English people.

Now let me pass on to my special subject.

In the whole field of Russian economic history perhaps the most interesting subject of study is the relation between the native and the extraneous elements in the process of economic and social development. Russia is a connecting link between the Western and the Eastern worlds. This statement of Russia's position is vague enough to be incontrovertible, but, when applied to different historical periods, it means very different things. In the early days of the Russian State, the military intruders from Scandinavia, who are usually looked upon as its founders, were never more than a thin layer on the surface of the general population. Yet the Eastern-Slavonic elements which formed the bulk of that population stood far closer to the western world of culture than to the eastern barbarian periphery of Europe. Kiev and Novgorod were

at that time the uttermost outposts of western culture, turned to the East but facing the West, and themselves of western make. A very characteristic expression of this fact is to be found in the *Ecclesiastical History* of the famous mediaeval writer, Adam of Bremen, who, in speaking of the Russians of Kiev, distinguishes them from the barbarians by calling them Greeks, and describes Kiev as "Aemula sceptri Constantinopolitani, clarissimum decus Graeciae"—a rival of the sceptre of Constantinople and the brightest ornament of Greece¹. The Tartar invasion changes all this, isolating the Russian population from the West and plunging it into another, an Asiatic world. The distance between Russia and Western Europe increases, and Russia becomes if not a part of Asia at least a world by itself. This change is curiously reflected in the character of Russian historical sources. Russia becomes a wonderland, and travellers who visit it are afterwards able to tell things strange and incredible that strike the imagination. Travel literature, from the time of Herberstein in the sixteenth century up to the beginning of the nineteenth, bulks far more largely in the sources of Russian history than it does in the historiography of other European countries, a fact which has called forth many bibliographical and

¹ "Oddara flumen...in cujus ostio, qua Scythicas alluit paludes, nobilissima civitas Jumne celeberrimam praestat stationem barbaris et Graecis qui sunt in circuitu....Ab ipsa urbe vela tendens quartodecimo die ascendes ad Ostogard Ruzziae. Cujus metropolis civitas est Chive (Kiev), aemula sceptri Constantinopolitani, clarissimum decus Graeciae." Adam Bremensis in Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, vol. CXLVI, Parisiis, 1853, pp. 513-514.

historical studies on the part of Russian and foreign scholars¹.

It would be a tempting task to distinguish the various elements of Russian economic life as they lie before us at the critical moment when Russia became a great power and definitely entered the European world on equal terms with other nations. It has been contended that the economic evolution of Russia before Peter the Great did not lead to a development of town life in the forms characteristic of Mediaeval Europe. It has also been said that feudalism never existed in Russia. These and other statements of the same sort are at once too absolute and too vague. Now we see clearly enough that Russia had some rudiments of the feudal system, which in a marked manner embodied the principles of feudalism². Again, the town institutions and the regulation of commerce and industry had in Russia before the time of Peter the Great very conspicuous points of resemblance to the more developed forms of Western Europe³. We should obtain rather misleading results if we confined ourselves to contrasting the rude, primitive conditions of Russia with the complexity prevailing in Europe. What is really

¹ I mention here only the elaborate bibliographical work of Friedrich von Adelung, *Kritisch-literärarische Uebersicht der Reisenden in Russland bis 1700, deren Berichte bekannt sind*, St Petersburg, 1896 (1427, K. 6); and the well-known monograph of Vasily Klyuchevsky, *сказанія иностранцевъ о московскомъ государствѣ*, Moscow, 1866, 10291, f. 19.

² It is the merit of the prematurely dead Russian historian Pavlov-Silvansky to have shown this.

³ As I have shown in my Russian book on *Economy and Prices*, Part I (Moscow, 1913).

interesting is not the general contrast, but the determination and delineation of the far more subtle points of resemblance and dissimilarity. But that is not my task in the present lecture. I wished merely to allude to this and to emphasize its importance.

I shall now pass straight on to the period when Russia, becoming one of the European "Great Powers," forced an outlet to the Baltic. In order to appreciate Peter the Great's work one must bear in mind that at the beginning of the seventeenth century, at the epoch of so-called "confusion," Polish troops inundated large regions of Russia and that at this epoch there were plans, partly effectuated, to submit the region of Novgorod to Swedish domination; and there arose an even more strange project, to make Russia an English dominion under James I as Protector and Emperor. The documents concerning this project were recently examined scientifically by a learned Russian woman, Madame Lubimenko¹, who, I should like to remark, has made some valuable contributions towards our knowledge of earlier Anglo-Russian relations. From such a political downfall characterized by projects nearly annihilating Russia as an independent State, what an uprush under Peter the Great!

The moment when this occurred is, when regarded from the purely economic point of view, marked by no fresh departure. Changes occur only in certain methods and measures of state-interference with economic life, and the speed of the development of that life is ac-

¹ Cf. Madame Lubimenko, "A project for the acquisition of Russia by James I," in the *English Historical Review* for April, 1914.

celerated. The economic and political evolution of Russia, as indeed in no less measure the general cultural development of the land, is marked by one original distinguishing trait. In order clearly to understand this originality, one fundamental all-determining peculiarity of Russian history, and above all of her economic evolution, must be steadily kept in mind. Russia has never ceased to be a land which continues to colonize and be colonized within its own bounds. The word "bounds" must here be taken in the sense not of political but of geographical or sociological boundaries. In this connection the Tartar invasion is of little moment.

I have here pointed out the fundamental fact in Russian economic history. Russia is building up her culture not in a confined space already occupied and settled, but in a free colonial area which is continually expanding, and at the same time is constantly connected territorially with the centre from which it expands. When the Russian State was being formed, the Moscow region was such a centre. The process we have outlined was in the making of Russia as fundamental and as decisive for her destinies, as were for Great Britain the growth of her maritime power and her overseas colonial expansion, as was for France the creation of political and cultural unity out of the diverse forms and relations of the Middle Ages. For all other European countries the process of colonization either came to an end long ago, or has assumed the form of the foundation of overseas colonies. For Russia, on the other hand, colonization is still going on within her own bounds, somewhat after the fashion of the German

colonizing process between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, which created a great part of present-day Germany, and destroyed Slavonic peoples and Slavonic states which have now passed into oblivion. But it must here be noted that Russia has never destroyed other peoples, as the Germans, for instance, destroyed the Baltic Slavs, a brother-people to the Poles of the present day.

The making of Russia is at once a centripetal and centrifugal process. The most fertile provinces or governments of European Russia, those situated in the south, are called New Russia; for these are regions of steppes, of which agricultural colonists took possession only at the close of the eighteenth or at the beginning of the nineteenth century. While the Russian Lancashire is the centre of Russia, the region adjoining Moscow, the chief Russian coalfields are situated in new, colonial Russia. Moreover, the most thickly peopled governments of Russia (excluding Poland) bore and still bear the name Ukraina. This term is now often used in a racial or national sense. But the original and literal meaning of the word, that which, from the present point of view—that is to say, historically—presents most interest, is as follows: Ukraina or Okraina—i.e. “limits,” or, if one may borrow the old Roman expression, “Limes” Rossicus or Polonicus,—referred to colonial lands which were still in process of settlement, colonies and outposts at once of both states, Russia and Poland. *Now* these are the most densely populated governments of Russia. Still a few more examples: Odessa, the largest town on the Black Sea, which is twelve hours by express train from Kiev the

"mother of Russian towns," is far younger than New York. Saratov, the chief commercial centre of the lower Volga, acquired serious economic importance only in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The foundation of St Petersburg, or Petrograd as it is now called, also really bears a colonial stamp. Petrograd is not to be compared with other new towns which owed their origin to the wish or to the caprice of enlightened absolute monarchs. The artificiality of St Petersburg, founded in 1703, is quite different *in kind* from the artificiality of—shall we say, Karlsruhe, founded in 1715—quite apart from the impossibility of drawing comparisons in point of size between the Duchy of Baden and the Empire of Russia. Petrograd, considered both historically and economically, is a town colony on a gigantic scale, deliberately set down "on the banks of the desolate waters"—so run the words of Pushkin, the greatest of Russian poets, who sang the praises of the mighty founder of the Empire. St Petersburg was built in the midst of war by the methods of war. Few there are among those who admire the magnificent "Nevsky Prospekt," who know that this, the finest of the central thoroughfares of our capital, was laid down by the hands of Swedish prisoners of war, who, in the year of the conclusion of the Peace of Nystad, which brought to an end the great Northern War, had every Saturday to sweep clean the street they themselves had built¹. At present there is much

¹ Friedrich Wilh. von Bergholz, grossfürstl. Oberkammerherrn, "Tagebuch, welches er in Russland von 1721 bis 1725 geführt hat," in S. F. Büsching's *Magazin für die neue Historie und Geographie*, 19-ter Theil, Halle, 1785. Russian translation by Ammon (Moscow, 1902), pp. 28- .

talk of the artificiality and even of the harmfulness of Petrograd. Not long ago a well-known Russian writer wrote a striking article in which he contended that Petrograd was fated to disappear from the face of the earth. Nowadays talk of this kind is but irresponsible chatter, and comes either from people who have become absorbed in over-profound thought on the political themes of the past and of the present, or from those who have given their fancy too free a rein in the same political sphere of thought. But at the time of the foundation of Petrograd—Petrograd, which was not the result of organic growth but was created by the will of the State and of the Monarch—it was in very fact a matter of doubt whether the newly created city could continue to exist. On the occasion of one of Peter the Great's festivals there was erected a triumphal arch with two pictures representing respectively St Petersburg and its harbour. Under the one there was the inscription: "urbs ubi silva fuit" (the city where a forest was); under the other, in which Neptune was depicted standing before the harbour, there appeared the words: "videt et stupescit" (he sees and is amazed)¹. It was this that made so acute an observer as Vockerodt, the secretary of the Prussian Embassy, writing in 1737, twelve years after the death of Peter the Great, express, and not without good reason, doubts as to whether Petrograd would maintain its position²,—so artificial in a sense and so fragile

¹ Bergholz, *l.c.*, pp. 40-41.

² *Russland unter Peter dem Grossen*. Nach den handschriftlichen Berichten von Johann Gotthilf Vockerodt und Otto Pleyer, herausgegeben von Dr E. Herrmann. Leipzig, 1872. SS. 98-99. "In der Tat kann man der russischen Nation die

was this creation of Peter's. His doubts were based on solid economic grounds, but now Petrograd is the first commercial and industrial city of the Empire, with great and varied industries, and with an immense political, social, and economic past which no power can blot out from Russian life.

I have dwelt on the colonial character of Russian economic development. Russian economic culture,

Prädilection so sie vor die Stadt Moskau heget, nicht verargen. Wer die Öconomie eines russischen Edelmannes kennet, wird leicht begreifen, dass ihm der Aufenthalt in St Petersburg notwendig sehr ruineux sein müsse. Seine grosse Depense besteht nicht in kostbaren Kleidern und Meublen, oder in einer leckeren Tafel, und fremden Weinen, sondern in der Menge der Speisen und Getränke, die sein Vaterland produciert, einer grossen Anzahl Domestiken beiderlei Geschlechts, und Pferden. Alle diese Dinge hat er in Moskau entweder umsonst, oder doch um einen sehr geringen Preis. Seinen Bedienten, die insgesamt seine Leibeigene sind, darf er weiter nichts als Proviant geben, und dieses sowohl als die übrigen Provisiones vor seinen Tisch, und die Fourage vor die Pferde, liefern ihm seine nahe gelegene Landgüter im Überfluss. In so naher Nachbarschaft verrichten ihm seine Bauern die nötigen Fuhren ohne Murren und ohne Abgang seiner übrigen Einkünfte, und die Consumption seiner Vivres hat er um so weniger zu regrettieren, da dieselben, das Getreide ausgenommen, auf dem Lande fast gar nicht zu versilbern sind, allwo ein jeder so viel ziehet, als er zu seiner Haushaltung vonnöten hat. In St Petersburg hingegen, in dessen Nachbarschaft wenig oder nichts wächst, muss er allen seinen Proviant und Fourage von sehr weit entfernten Orten anführen lassen und dabei den Hazard laufen, dass die Bauern, wann ihre Pferde fallen, die Fuhren stehen lassen, und selbst flüchtig werden, oder Alles vor baar Geld und zwar in sehr hohen Preisen ankaufen, welches einem Russen, dessen Revenuen mehr in Früchten des Landes, als in Baarschaften bestehen, und der selten viel Contantenliegen hat, sondern seine Gelder lieber in Landgütern anlegt, ungemein schwer und widerwärtig vorkommt."

being colonial, must needs be "extensive." But this is not all. At one time the economic culture of the United States was very "extensive" and it remains so in part up to the present. But the special feature of Russia as contrasted with the United States in this respect is the peculiar combination in her "extensive" colonial culture of the new with the old, of a certain *freshness*, so to speak, with a certain *ancientness*. The famous dictum of Goethe which was originally used by him with reference to the United States—"America, you are better off than this old Continent of ours....In the pulsing hours of life you have no inner qualms of useless recollection or vain strife"¹—was once applied with great emphasis to Russia by the most brilliant Russian political thinker of the days of Alexander II, Alexander Herzen. Nevertheless, when applied to Russia the words are *historically untrue*. For in the development of Russia the Middle Ages and the Modern Period are so to speak simultaneously present, combining to form a strange amalgam. But this statement in its turn needs correction and limitation. The Middle Ages are less complex, more featureless and more colourless in Russia than in other European countries.

This combination of the colonial and the ancient, which has just been described as the peculiar feature of Russian life, may be traced through all fields of

¹ "Amerika, du hast es besser, als unser Continent, das alte....
 Dich stört nicht im Innern
 Zu lebendiger Zeit
 Unnützes Erinnern
 Und vergeblicher Streit."

(GOETHE.)

economic activity. As our first example, let us take agriculture. At the present day it may be taken as firmly established that the typical Russian village community, with its periodical redistribution of land to secure fair partition, is not an early or primitive institution, but a comparatively late adaptation of the peasant group on whose shoulders lay the burden of paying the taxes and performing the labour-services exacted by the landowner or the State. And if we are to assume that there was some *spontaneous* element in the life of the village community, the assumption can in general be admitted only for colonial conditions. But however that may be, there are two great facts in Russian economic history which, so to speak, lie side by side. On the one hand we have the colonial advance of the agricultural population ever seeking to reach *free land*. On the other, we have the institution of serfdom, the historical meaning of which consisted in part precisely in its *binding* to the land this mobile, continually escaping population. Russia is, too, the land where serfdom continued to exist after it had disappeared from all other European countries, and this in spite of the existence of free land to which the agricultural population could escape. Here we have an example of precisely that commixture of old with new which characterises the whole economic development of Russia. One naturally asks oneself the question: How could serfdom maintain its hold in Russia till 1861; serfdom, moreover, in the most extreme form known in Europe, in the form of slavery, existing within the confines of a single nation? In answering this question there is one fact which must be clearly

understood. The legal institution of serfdom was an envelope, and the actual relations which existed within that envelope were extremely varied. In particular, in so far as the serfs drew the greater or a considerable part of their income from industrial or commercial pursuits, serfdom meant for the peasant population chiefly dependence of a financial character, the obligation to pay sums of money or taxes to the landowners. A peasant in such cases paid the "obrók" as this money tax was called, but beyond that was free to do as he pleased. This is why there existed in Russia, long before the abolition of serfdom, a class of persons free to dispose of their labour although socially, and in the eyes of the law, slaves. The peasants, without ceasing to be serfs, not only built up the elements of a free working class but created from amongst their own ranks the elements of a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. In Russia of course there had long existed a class of town merchants and manufacturers, but the building up of Russian industry—of the domestic as well as of the factory type—was not the work of this ancient town class. The real builders of Russian industry were the *obrók* peasants of Northern Russia, who, in spite of the fetters of serfdom, were yet full of the spirit of industrial enterprise. This fact accounts for the peculiar feature of Russian industrial development which is common also to the industrial evolution of England. In England as in Russia industry is a child, not of the town but of the country. As a matter of fact the parallel drawn between the two nations is after all not so surprising. For England, looked upon as an industrial country, is as compared with other

European nations a young country, and one in which industrial evolution has been far less closely connected with town life than in Italy, Germany, and France. In Russia, as a country still younger industrially than England, this is perhaps even more clearly in evidence. Even the very foundations of industrial development in the two countries are alike. Adam Smith clearly saw the connection between the development of English industry and the commercial expansion of England. In the case of Russia, in spite of the prevailing system of "natural economy," the enormous size of the State, which readily divides itself into an industrial and an agricultural region, has long meant the existence of a very large and growing internal market. By supplying the needs of this market Russian industry is enabled to grow and to develop.

If it may be said that the Russian textile industry—in part too the hardware industry—is of country and of peasant origin, yet in the history of that industry the State, the landowners, and the town handicrafts all played a certain, and no unimportant part. The whole of the eighteenth century is marked by the attempt to create factory or large scale industry in Russia at a blow. Perhaps nowhere else could one find at that period so many units of the factory type of so large an average size as in Russia. At a time when the domestic system was still being developed in England, large factories were being founded in Russia both by the State and by private persons and based on *semi-compulsory* labour. What part is played by this factory-industry, thus artificially created, imposed on Russia from above and not built up from below? The part

it plays is that of a special system of technical training. The Russian peasants who followed industrial pursuits, before creating their own "domestic system" on the basis of which the true factory system was to develop, first of all passed through the school of the large factories which were based on Government privileges, on the utilization of serf labour, and on the industrial skill of other more advanced countries. On leaving these factories they took with them to their villages and communicated to the masses of the people a considerable body of technical knowledge and skill. The same happens in the case of the town handicrafts¹. In the eighteenth century it was a common practice for landowners to apprentice young serfs to the town handicraftsmen, who were then mostly foreigners². Thus the foreign craftsmen in the towns, who had found their way into Russia as early as the sixteenth

¹ For the large factory-industry, this is shown by Tugan-Baranovski in his *Русская Фабрика*, for the small industry, by the writer in his *Крѣпостное Хозяйство*.

² Compare *Travels in Poland, Russia, Sweden and Denmark*, by William Coxe. (Fifth edition, London, 1802.) "The mode adopted by many landholders with their peasants, reminds me of the practice among Romans. Atticus, we are told, caused many of his slaves to be instructed in the art of copying manuscripts, which he sold at a very high price, and raised a considerable fortune. On similar principles some of the Russian nobility send their vassals to Moscow or Petersburg, for the purpose of learning various handicraft trades: they either employ them on their own estates, let them out for hire, sell them at an advanced price, or receive from them an annual compensation for the permission of exercising their trade, for their own advantage." (Vol. III, p. 157.) William Coxe (1747-1828), fellow of King's College, Cambridge, died as Archdeacon of Wiltshire.

century, exercised an influence on Russian industrial development.

In the industrial life of the Moscovite State foreigners in general occupied relatively speaking a very prominent position. Most of the foreigners were, however, in those days persons in the service of the Tsar, invited by him to manage his industrial undertakings. Some of them afterwards left the service of the Tsar and themselves founded private industrial establishments. Finally, we occasionally find foreigners who were allowed to enter Russia for the special purpose of carrying on some commercial or industrial venture. In this last-named group the pioneers were the English with their Moscow or Russian Company. The notable historical fact that the first private factory in Russia was founded by the English is little known in England, or indeed even in Russia. The factory in question—the rope factory established at Vologda and later transferred to Kholmogory (Colmogro)—provides one of the first recorded cases of observations being made regarding the relative productivity of the labour of workers of different nationalities, and regarding the relation between wages and labour productivity. Observations of this very kind have in recent years been generalised into an entire scientific theory¹. Thus Gray, the Company's agent, reports in 1558 that, according to his observations, the work of five Russians corresponds to

¹ This theory is mainly associated with three names: (1) of the great English "captain of industry" Thomas Brassey (1805-1870), (2) of the well-known German economist Lujo Brentano, and (3) of the American economist Jacob Schoenhof, author of *The economy of high wages* (1892).

that of three Englishmen, but that five Russians require less wages than a single Englishman¹.

Look at the map of Europe. European Russia lies between the Baltic and the Black Sea. The whole economic history of Russia from the beginning of the process which led to the formation of a single Russian State is determined by this fundamental geographical factor, and, in considerable measure, consists in the advance of Russia towards those two seas. The two movements—advance to the Baltic and advance to the Black Sea—were parallel, nor can we say that one of them was more important than the other. All that can be said is that the cultural and political importance of the process is more evident in the northern movement than in the advance to the Black Sea. But on the other hand, this southern movement is of enormous economic importance. The European shores of the Black Sea, consisting of the most fertile provinces of European Russia, are in the economic sense the genuine creation of the Russian people, conquered by them from nomads and Nature. The relation which exists between the part of Russia which economically gravitates towards the Baltic and that which gravitates towards the Black Sea may be roughly compared to that existing between the Eastern and the Western States of the great American Commonwealth.

¹ "Master Richard Gray...to Master Henrie Lane at Mosco, written in Colmogro the 19 of Februarie 1558:

"Therefore I would have three Russians at the least to spinne; five of them will be as good as these three, and will not be so chargeable all, as one of these would be.'" In Hakluyt's *The principal navigations, voyages etc. of the English nation*, Edinburgh, 1887, vol. III, p. 179.

From the time of Catherine the Second, the Russian State clearly conceived and consistently strove to carry into effect the policy of advance towards the South. Catherine, by securing the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, made Black Sea trade possible. The colonisation of the shores of the Black Sea laid the foundation of the agricultural production of the region, the free outlet of agricultural products to the sea being again the necessary consequence of the colonisation.

Often when one speaks of the traditional struggle carried on by Russia with Turkey, the conqueror of the Byzantine Empire, it is forgotten that this struggle has been waged in reality not by armies, not by the fleet, but by the agriculturist, who has turned steppes periodically laid waste by nomadic invaders into an extremely rich agricultural region, with a large Russian population. Without any offence to our gallant army, we can say that not by her infantry and artillery, but by her agricultural colonisation followed in the nineteenth century by the industrial development of the colonised area, has Russia defeated Turkey on the Black Sea. And in consequence Serbia was freed from the Turkish yoke and Bulgaria was called to life—this is a fact which must be borne in mind—by the Russian peasant as well as by the Russian soldier. This fact is a striking confirmation of the deep saying of your Ruskin: "The true history of a nation is not of its wars but of its households." The Russian peasant in less than a century built up a great Russian settlement on the Northern Pontus, whilst centuries of Turkish dominion in parts of Pontus still more blessed by

Nature have yielded almost nothing in the shape of economic culture.

It is a remarkable fact that apparently no one has described with such power and insight the great cultural work which has been done here by the Russian people and the Russian State, as one German writer, Kohl, a traveller and geographer of some merit. Kohl (1808–1878) travelled in the Ukraina and in New Russia in the thirties and forties of last century and afterwards related the results of his personal investigations. He tells how in the space of 60 years Russia changed a land of Scythians and Cimmerians—"the Siberia of the Greeks and Romans," to use his apt expression—into a temple of Ceres, "denomadised" and civilised it¹.

¹ "Vor 140 Jahren hatte das Schwarze Meer ausser den Booten der Kosacken noch kein russisches Kriegssegel gesehen. Die ersten russischen Kriegsschiffe liess Peter der Grosse von Voronesch aus den Don hinabschiffen. Jetzt dagegen beherrscht eine imposante russische Flotte mit siegreicher Flagge den ganzen Pontus, und der russische Pavillon ist der allein respectirte in diesen Gewässern. Vor 70 Jahren besaßen die Russen noch keinen einzigen Punct an der Küste des Pontus. Jetzt haben sie hier—das Azow'sche Meer nicht einmal eingerechnet—250 Meilen Küste gewonnen. Zieht man von den Mündungen der Donau bis zu denen des Phasis eine gerade Linie, so theilt diese Linie den Pontus gerade in zwei Hälften. Die eine Hälfte ist jetzt ganz russisch, die andere gehorcht kaum noch den türkischen Paschas. Freilich besitzt Russland einstweilen nur erst die rauhesten Provinzen des Pontus, doch macht es schon jetzt mit diesen minder wertvollen mehr als die Türken mit ihren herrlichen Ländern. Die trefflichsten Anlande des Pontus bleiben den Russen noch zu nehmen und werden für sie eine leichtere Beute sein als Taurien und der Kaukasus. Die Russen werden ihren Periplus um das Eirund des schwarzen Meeres

It is for this reason that the memorable period which ushered in the reign of the Emperor Alexander the First is, from the Russian point of view, notable in the field of foreign relations, not only for the struggle with Napoleon, but also as carrying on Catherine the Second's policy of Russian organic expansion towards the South. The Ministry of Commerce, which was then founded, first of all directed its attention to New Russia, to the development of its trade and its general economic life. Generally speaking, this was a period when new economic ideas—ideas coming from different sources and widely differing in character—penetrated

vollenden, wie Dschingis-Chan den seinigen um das Kaspische Meer.

In den Steppen gährt, treibt und gestaltet es sich still, aber gewaltig. Die Seidenwürmer spinnen, die Bäume erheben ihr Haupt, das Getreide wächst und greift um sich. Alles drängt und ringt nach Luft und Licht. Das einzige Fenster, wodurch diesen Gegenden Beides zufällt, ist der Bosphorus von Konstantinopel. Die Steppen können es nicht wünschen, dass ein Anderer, wenn es ihm einfällt, ihnen dieses Fenster verschliesse. Sie müssen danach streben, selber den Schlüssel zu dieser Tür, durch welche ihnen ihr Reichtum, ihre Lebensluft, alle ihre Nahrung zuströmt, in die Tasche zu bekommen. Von jeher waren diese Gegenden dem Bosphorus in politischer Beziehung eng verbunden und ihm entweder untertan oder gaben ihm die Herrscher, und dies wird so lange so bleiben, als die geographischen Gestaltungen der Länder und Meere dieselben bleiben. Gegen diese still, aber unwiderstehlich wirkenden geographischen Verhältnisse, gegen diesen Naturdrang der Bevölkerung ist die jetzt scheinbar friedliche Politik der russischen Kaiser für nichts zurechnen. Selbst die unumschränktsten Autokraten werden auf dem Strome der Ereignisse mit fortgerissen und ihr Wille hält nur schwachen Stand gegen die Bestimmung des Schicksals." T. G. Kohl, *Reisen in Südrussland* (second edition), Dritter Teil. Dresden und Leipzig, 1847, S. 306.

Russia and penetrated with great force of impact. At this time Adam Smith's famous work was by Imperial Command translated into Russian, and in St Petersburg there appeared a French translation of the work of the Spanish free-trader Jovellanos. Then too under French and American influence the foundations of Russian protectionism were being laid, and in the same first decade of the nineteenth century, along with the translation of Adam Smith's masterpiece, there appeared a Russian translation of Alexander Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures*, the manifesto of American protectionism, written many decades before the beginning of Friedrich List's propaganda.

At this time too there appeared at St Petersburg—and in German—a review, with the special object of bringing Russia into closer relations with the Near East, and with the characteristic title *Konstantinopel und St Petersburg. Der Orient und der Norden*¹. This review, written in the tongue of our present foes, set before Russia very definite political and cultural aims. Subsequently the armed resistance shown by Germany to the realisation by Russia of these very aims was in no small measure responsible for the present great European War. The Near Eastern question would perhaps have been finally solved at the time of the struggle with Napoleon, if the Russian Emperor had not considered it necessary to continue the struggle on foreign soil, after the enemy had been driven from the Russian territory he had invaded. Many Russians,

¹ *Konstantinopel und St Petersburg. Der Orient und der Norden*, eine Zeitschrift herausgegeben von H. von Reimers und F. Murhard. St Petersburg und Penig, 1805–1806. There appeared of this curious periodical four volumes, P.P. 4848 (Press-mark of British Museum).

it is well known, including the Chancellor Rumyantsev and the famous soldier Kutuzov, then considered the Emperor's decision a mistake. However that may have been, the Napoleonic period brought forward for solution the same problems with which Russia has now once more a full century later been brought face to face, through the combined German-Austrian and Turkish attack on us and on our Allies, and for which a solution is now demanded with all the inexorable force of historical necessity. Germany allied with Turkey decided to throw Russia back from the path we have been treading for the past two centuries, in the course of which we have settled and called into life a whole enormous region. At this solemn moment, so critical for Russia, the position of Russia in the struggle which foes have forced upon her is based upon a living historical right, that is to say, on an historical right which is combined with real strength and living necessity. The historical right in question is the great civilizing work, chiefly economic in character, which has been accomplished by the Russian people on the shores of the Black Sea. The real strength is embodied in the enormous Russian population which lives in that region, and which desires, in order to be able to breathe freely, to receive into its own hands the keys of its own house. This Russian population of Russian lands, which economically gravitates towards the Black Sea, is probably at least twice as great as the combined population of Asiatic and of European Turkey. Not in vain did the fathers and forefathers of that population create out of "the Siberia of the Greeks and the Romans" a new Temple of Ceres: their work it was that won for them the right to breathe freely in their own home.

II

THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF THE
RUSSIAN EMPIRE

In my first lecture I endeavoured to give an historical account of the colonial character of Russian economic life. I shall now try to sketch, as before, in the most general outlines, what this colonial character means, when considered, not historically, but from the point of view of the present day. Every State of any size represents a considerable variety of natural and historical conditions. This variety it is which determines the division of a nation into different economic regions. The extent, however, to which such individual regions differ from each other is different in different countries. It perhaps reaches its maximum precisely in the case of Russia. Here the population, while under one government, and while the predominance of the Russian element, in point both of numbers and of culture, is overwhelming—and I am leaving out of account such regions as Poland and Finland which constitute entirely separate entities from the cultural point of view¹—the population, I say, lives on an enormous

¹ In passing I should like to state that in the matter of Russian-Polish relations I agree almost entirely with Mr Dmowski, just as I did when both of us were members of the second Duma of the Empire.

territory which presents the utmost variety as regards the fundamental conditions which determine economic life. Forming for customs purposes a single territory—with the exception of Finland, an exception which is really an anomaly, to be explained by purely historical reasons, simply because at the time of the annexation of Finland it was impossible to establish a proper customs control over the long coast line of the new territory—and with a population the vast majority of which lives under the same code of civil law, Russia is yet a complex of territories in different economic conditions and in different stages of economic development. It is just this which makes Russia at the present moment an Empire from the economic point of view, no matter what the aims of her State policy may be, and quite independently of any "Imperialism."

The building up of this enormous State was no matter of chance: it is no chance that in that State there should be a single national nucleus to which the hegemony naturally belongs. It was the consequence of the fact that only as a politically united whole could the land make progress in all respects, and that only a single ethnical element—that which formed the Muscovite State—possessed the political talent required. But this political structure,—a complex of widely differing economic regions united in the form of an Empire,—and the predominance of the Russian element, impose, and particularly in the economic sphere, an enormous burden of responsibility. To whom much is given, of him will much be required.

And much has been given. In the first place, as regards the more important of the cereals which are

used for food by the inhabitants of the temperate zone who belong to European culture, Russia produces more of these—speaking absolutely and not relatively—than any other country in the world. In respect of maize, which is mainly used as fodder, Russia, of course, falls short of the United States. In respect of potatoes, Russia again takes second place to Germany. But in any case Russia is responsible for more than one-fifth of the world's total production of wheat, rye, barley, maize, and oats. Russian agriculture, being distinctively extensive as opposed to intensive, offers possibilities of enormous further development, starting from its present enormous absolute dimensions. I shall note only three more facts in this connection.

1. Russia is the greatest flax-producing country in the world;

2. Russia is one of the world's greatest producers of sugar-beet, although her climatic conditions are less favourable for this branch of agriculture than those prevailing in Central Europe;

3. The forest wealth of Russia is undoubtedly greater than that of any other country.

Taking these facts into account, even without any exhaustive survey of the agricultural production of Russia—a survey which I cannot give at present—it is evident that Russia occupies a very important place amongst nations producing food-stuffs and vegetable raw material, standing in this respect, generally speaking, on a level with the United States and in many cases even in advance of that country.

There is, however, one peculiarity of Russian economic life, which, although it is almost certainly of

a temporary character, is yet extremely important for the present day and for the near future. The period in which we live is in one respect a direct contrast to that in which our forefathers lived a hundred years ago. In those days, under the influence of contemporary facts and of the doctrine which we associate with the name of Malthus, people dreaded a large population and its rapid increase. In the intervening century mankind has found out how to rationalise reproduction on purely individualistic lines, and now all are more alarmed by the danger of a stoppage in the growth of population, which threatens the most highly civilized part of the world to-day. Russia is the only large country where the birth-rate has in recent years shown practically no tendency to diminish. Since, too, there is abundant room in Russia for a diminution in the rate of mortality, a very considerable growth of population enters into any estimate of the economic prospects of Russia as a very essential factor. This is a fundamental fact of our present economic position, and, in no less measure, of our political, social, and economic future. We in Russia have not yet been gripped by the individualistic rationalism so typical of countries of older economic culture, which, though in another form, was recommended by Malthus, but which as a real potentiality entered so little into his calculations.

We are going on multiplying, and if we succeed—and evidently we are already beginning to succeed—in lowering the death-rate through the increase in material well-being which accompanies the spread of education, the rate of growth of the population of

Russia ought to continue to show an upward trend for a considerable time to come, or in any case not fall below the fairly high level at which it stood in the years immediately preceding the war.

In Russia there are large resources of human energy, and we are now well aware that the existence of so large a quantity of energy stored in the form of human beings is not due to some inexorable law of nature, but is historically determined by definite psychological factors. But we economists also know that the *quality* of the constituents of a population is of enormous importance to its economic life. Further, there is such a thing in human beings as "economically essential quality," if I may be permitted to use the phrase.

If one were to believe certain representations of the Russian people which have recently been given currency in England, such economic qualities are entirely foreign to that people. In these representations the Russian people is depicted as a religious anarchist caring nothing for the things of this world, as an Eastern people of contemplators, with no aptitude for the "bourgeois" life and conduct of Western peoples. I must say that it is impossible in any way to agree with such hasty generalisations which ignore the actual facts alike of the past and of the present. The Russian people in its Great Russian branch—the most prominent, I think, both politically and culturally—possesses very decided economic gifts. Our late great historian, Klyuchevsky, showed—to my mind in very convincing fashion—that the Russian State was itself in considerable measure of commercial origin and bears an evident commercial stamp at the very beginning of

its history. The peasant of Northern Central Russia is, one might say, a trader and industrialist (manufacturer) to his finger tips. His history and his own nature have made him what he is. No one who travels and is in the least observant can help noticing that not only in the Baltic Provinces, but even in Finland, certain branches of trade (namely, small retail trade in all kinds of food products) are to a considerable extent in the hands of Russians, who have made their way hither from Yaroslav, Tver and other "trading" provinces of Old Russia.

None the less it cannot be denied that at present the Russian is on the average inferior to the Western European in respect of "economic qualities." His labour is less intensive, the economic virtues (power of constant application, thrift, and a sharp sense of the distinction between *meum* and *tuum*) are less developed than among Western peoples. What is the explanation of this fact? The sole explanation which most people are inclined to give is that the national defects in this respect are due to the insufficient spread of education (i.e. of schools and other forms of educational instruction) in Russia. I will not attempt to deny the importance of this circumstance, but the cause we are seeking lies deeper, and at present our understanding of the historical process goes far enough to enable us to determine the historical causation of the phenomenon in question. The qualities which impart to the modern European his special economic strength are the products of a complicated historical process. The changes which produced these qualities were somewhat as follows. The Reformation and the so-called counter-reformation,

so far as the latter aimed at overcoming the dogmas of the reformers by adopting as its own the strongest points in the reforming movement, meant—and this constitutes their importance from the point of view of economic history—the wide spread of certain religious ideas in their direct application to daily life; and these ideas took firm hold of the masses of the people. Now these ideas as applied to morals and manners have to a large extent become detached from their roots in religion, have become quite profane, if one cares to use the term, and have been, so to speak, secularised by bourgeois morality¹. This has been the case least of all, I think, with the Anglo-Saxon race. I regard it as a great happiness for Great Britain that in this country more than in any other country of Western Europe religion has retained its power over the mind of the nation.

In Russia the Church exercised no influence in such a direction and in such a sense. The Church has in Russia played a very important part in the development of Russian culture, but such work she has hitherto accomplished only to a quite insignificant extent. The deeply permeating religious education which serves, so to speak, as a subconscious primary foundation for economic culture, and which has been so important a factor in the economic development of the West (in Russia this statement would include Finland and the Baltic Provinces; Poland shared Russia's fate in this respect), is lacking in the present economic equipment of the peoples of Russia. You will understand now

¹ This has been demonstrated by Max Weber in his acute and well-known essay on the spirit of capitalism.

why it is so important for Russia to increase what I have once named the "personal fitness," that is, to improve the "form" of the average working man, which is the foundation of economic efficiency in the whole nation. And you will understand, too, why for the sake of the war it was necessary to prohibit the sale of alcoholic liquors and of what enormous importance that prohibition is for the whole future of a country like Russia. It means the preservation and the elevation of the chief agent in economic life—of man himself.

Once again we find here illustrated that combination of backwardness and ancientness with a certain impulsiveness and freshness, to which I referred in my first lecture. Without the heroic effort that was implied in the full and decisive renunciation of alcoholic liquors, which proceeded from the moral will of the whole nation, Russia could not have overcome her backwardness, that low level of the individuals who make up the mass of the nation which is our historical heritage. The progressive and collective impulse embodied in the command of the State overcame the backwardness and inertness of a multitude of weak individuals.

And in this connection I should like to touch on the tremendous revolution in the sphere of agrarian structure, which took place in Russia after the political revolution of 1904-1905. Allow me once again to speak of contemporary life as a historian. When in my lectures on economic history I speak to my students of so-called enclosures in England, a fact and a process of which you have of course a far better knowledge

than I or my students, I say to them: "Imagine Stolypin's agrarian reform stretching over whole centuries, so to speak, split up into a great number of separate local measures and carried to a large extent by the initiative and in the interests of the landlord in each particular case." And in the same way, ladies and gentlemen, I would say to you: that which in England in the form of enclosures came about in the course of several centuries, and which expressed itself in elemental economic processes, at times of a cataclysmic character, happened in Russia—or rather is being evolved—as an integral reform or revolution systematically carried through from above.

This revolution, moreover, was effected within the peasantry without any participation of the landlord, and altogether without any bearing on his interests. By this process the land of the Russian peasants comes into agricultural use under full individual control.

The sentence I have just spoken, is, with the exception of the words "Russian peasants," taken nearly literally from the preface to Professor Gonner's well-known book on enclosures in England. You understand that this process, although in certain cases it may be painful, is of enormous *positive* importance to the whole economic and social development of Russia¹. Russia is becoming more and more a country of peasants, that is, a country of small land tenure, which is growing invincibly at the cost of big estates. And this

¹ The well-known political aims, conservative or even reactionary, of Stolypin's agrarian reforms matter little in comparison with their significance for the economic and social development of Russia.

agrarian reform creates the conditions for transforming these small holdings from the mediaeval form of "common," or "common cultivation," into a new form of independent and rounded-off individual holdings. Thus are being laid the economic foundations of that Russia which must by its nature be a great peasant democracy, based on free co-operation of a multitude of small cultivators, working on their *own* land.

It is a country of a peasant democracy growing in all respects—both in quantity and in quality—and at the same time it is a whole world in itself. I shall simply note a few points. Russia may calculate on solid grounds that she will be able to produce within her own borders a sufficient quantity of cotton for herself, and now she produces nearly all the amount she needs. For this purpose irrigation is necessary, and the execution of this work is only a question of time.

Russia throughout her territory has an enormous deposit of coal. Some geologists hold that the Kusnezki coal area in the Altai Region is the richest coal-field in the world. And this wealth is as yet almost untouched. Further if we remember that in Siberia and in the Urals Russia possesses a practically inexhaustible supply of iron ore, you will realise what a great economic future awaits her as a whole. In speaking of the economic future of Russia, it should never be forgotten that Russia should be taken as a whole, that is, European and Asiatic Russia together. For instance, European Russia, in the matter of coal supplies, stands lower than Great Britain and Germany, but it is just in this respect that Siberia is an inexhaustible store; and that many-sided Russian genius of

the eighteenth century, Lomonossov, of whom you have heard from my colleague, Dr Lappo-Danilevsky, with marvellous sagacity predicted that "Russian power will receive its plenitude from Siberia and the Arctic Ocean." That the expansion of Russia would also attain to Central Asia (Turkestan), our great scholar of the eighteenth century did not anticipate.

All this means that Russia, taken economically, is an empire which may become self-sufficient within its own borders on the largest scale. But this self-sufficiency or *αὐτάρκεια* does not in the least exclude the most animated exchange with other countries. It must be borne in mind that various countries stand at any given moment on various planes of economic evolution. And these differences, which are historical but daily perpetuated through all changes, make it inevitable that various countries should be in need of one another at any moment. Thus, a certain international division of labour has a tendency to strike deep roots and to establish firmly certain special functions. Even Russia has such specialities in the field of industry. All countries can manufacture rubber galoshes, but in Russia an enormous number of people use galoshes, and Russians are so accustomed to wear them, that Russia, having created a large production of this article, has also been able to develop a considerable export of galoshes. Before the war the only sight in the streets of Berlin that gave some encouragement to our pride in our national industry was the display in the shop windows of Russian galoshes, which occupied a place of equal honour with Russian caviare, a natural speciality of Russia.

But in old industrial countries there must be many more industrial specialities. And thus the economic self-sufficiency of Russia does not mean her economic isolation from the rest of the world, just as such self-sufficiency does not mean isolation for the British Empire or for the United States of America.

Russia and England can very well supplement each other, and, given the requisite energy on the part of the English, the importance of Russia as a market for English goods may very greatly increase.

It is twenty-five years ago since I maintained that the economic development of Russia is in essence like that of the United States. Now this is acknowledged clearly enough in Russia herself and in other countries. With great insight this thought was recently put forward by an American economist, who wrote: "In an economic sense Russia and the United States are more alike than any other two great countries of the world. Underneath their wide differences of language, government and religion, these two countries show fundamental similarities. Russia includes the eastern portion of the great plains area of the northern hemisphere; America the western portion. Both have had a history of agricultural pioneering. Both have great natural resources of fertile land, forests, and mines, which have been drawn upon with the pioneer's inevitable prodigality. Russia and America are the two wings, so to speak, of the great movement in economic development, which originated in Western Europe a little over a century ago, and thence has spread eastward and westward. They both borrowed from this centre the new technical equipment of machinery and

power for production and transportation, and adapted it to their similar needs¹."

I will summarize. Russia is a country of immense agricultural forces and possibilities. And this place occupied by agriculture in the economic life of Russia at the same time secures her industrial development. The agricultural Russia is that steadily growing market on the basis of which Russian industry will develop. The Russian peasant democracy is still in swaddling clothes, and its development in the atmosphere of economic independence and political freedom will mean the growth of industrial culture throughout the Empire. In spite of the many defects inherent in us Russians, there are in Russia no signs at all either of degeneracy or senility.

All our energies must be directed to one end: to the elevation of the masses of the people through the improvement of the "personal fitness" of the individuals composing these masses. This is the task, in the execution of which the paths of economics, ethics, and religion, meet and cross. For man is the chief agent in the economic life. Economic fitness can only rest on moral qualities, and moral qualities as living energy issue in the long run from the religious consciousness. Your great thinker once said that it is open to serious question whether among national manufactures that of souls of a good quality may not at last turn out a quite leadingly lucrative one.

¹ Edwin Francis Gay, Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Business-Administration, in *Russia, America's Greatest Export Opportunity*, May, 1916, p. 5.

I at any rate am firmly convinced that the production of souls of a good quality is the most lucrative national manufacture. And therefore the favourable external conditions under which, as I have explained, Russia lives, are from my point of view important above all as conditions of the production of that which Ruskin again called "human worth."

Terrible are the sufferings and the sacrifices of war, but, if amidst this horrible bloodshed any consolation is possible, it is the faith that sufferings and sacrifices will yet lead to the uplifting of human nature and so will provide a basis for true welfare in every respect, in economic life as in everything else.

POLAND, OLD AND NEW

I

The present War has brought into prominence the name of Poland and the fact of the existence of the Polish nation, a fact which during the last two generations had been gradually sinking into oblivion. During the period preceding the outbreak of the War the people of this country would occasionally meet with some Polish name; would read a novel by Sienkiewicz, the author of *Quo Vadis*; would go with pleasure to Paderewski's concerts and enjoy his interpretation of Chopin's Polish music. To many of them these things did not even suggest the fact that somewhere, in a distant part of Europe, there existed a national life, a civilisation, whose literary and artistic products thus reached them in fragments. They were like fishermen who, having caught a fish close to the surface of the sea, were satisfied with it and did not even ask themselves what sort of life it was beneath the surface that had produced the specimen they caught. In the years just prior to the War the papers brought them occasional news about a desperate struggle for existence going on in German Poland, about the unheard-of measures

employed by the Germans for the purpose of destroying the Polish nationality, about the law to expropriate Polish landed estates, about the Polish children being flogged because they insisted on praying in their mother tongue, and so on. But they knew very little of the nation engaged in the struggle and failed to realize what the contest meant for Europe. It was only after the outbreak of the War, when the Polish problem reappeared and when the idea of re-uniting the partitioned Polish territory was put forward in the proclamation issued to the Poles by the Grand Duke High Commander of the Russian Army, that questions began to be asked: what was the Polish problem, what was Poland herself, what her frontiers, what the number and strength of her people and what the rôle of this nation in Central Europe? It was not easy to find answers to these questions. Outside Poland itself, literature concerning that country, still pretty rich as late as fifty years ago, particularly in French and English, became in time worse than poor. The few modern books on the subject are very far from being exact and are accordingly unable to give a true picture of Polish reality. The average educated man, therefore, knew that in the past there existed a great Polish kingdom, that towards the end of the eighteenth century it disappeared from the map of Europe and that later the Poles tried to reconquer their independence by means of a series of insurrections. But what became of the nation afterwards, what was the life it lived and the rôle it played, he did not know. The Polish problem had apparently become an internal problem of the three empires which possessed Polish lands, of Russia,

Germany, and Austria, and it therefore interested scarcely anybody outside those countries.

It falls to me to give the first of a number of lectures on Poland at this meeting and I therefore consider it my duty to begin by giving some elementary notions concerning the country and its people.

The territories on which the three empires have faced the Polish problem in recent times may be grouped into three categories:

(1) The provinces of the ancient Polish Kingdom where the bulk of the population is of Polish stock and speaks Polish. They stretch from the Carpathian Mountains to the Baltic Sea and comprise nearly the whole of the Vistula Basin as well as the Basin of the River Varta, the Oder's chief confluent. This territory is divided up between Russia (Kingdom of Poland), Austria (Western Galicia) and Germany (Posnania and West Prussia). The total area of these provinces is about 75,000 square miles and their population exceeds 20,000,000, its density approaching 260 inhabitants per square mile (a very dense population when it is remembered that France has only 190 per square mile).

(2) The provinces to the west and north of Poland proper which did not belong to the Polish Kingdom at the time of its partition but where a large majority of the people are of Polish race and speak the Polish tongue. They belong chiefly to Germany (Upper Silesia and the southern part of East Prussia) and to Austria (Austrian Silesia or Teschen) and they represent an area of about 9,000 square miles with almost 3,000,000 inhabitants.

(3) The provinces to the east of Poland proper which belonged to the Kingdom of Poland but where the bulk of the population is of non-Polish origin and speaks either Lithuanian or White or Little Russian. On this territory, only a small part of which (Eastern Galicia) belongs to Austria, while the chief portion (the so-called North- and South-western provinces) is in the possession of Russia, and which represents an area of about 200,000 square miles with 30,000,000 inhabitants, the Poles form only a more or less considerable minority—25 per cent. in Eastern Galicia, and a very small percentage in the easternmost districts belonging to Russia—but there are no reliable statistics concerning nationalities. This vast stretch of territory, whose inhabitants are non-Polish by race, is nevertheless to a certain degree a country with a Polish civilisation.

The national religion of Poland is the Roman Catholic, only a certain percentage of the nation being Protestants of either the Calvinist or Lutheran confession. Compact groups of Polish Protestants are to be found in the southern part of East Prussia and in some parts of Silesia (particularly in Teschen, Austrian Silesia, where Polish Protestants initiated the national renaissance in the nineteenth century). In the Eastern non-Polish part of historical Poland the Lithuanian population is of the Roman Catholic faith; the White and Little Russian population had belonged to the Eastern Church since the tenth century. In the seventeenth century, when the Uniat Church was established, the majority of the White and Little Russians went over to the Roman Church, but in the nineteenth century the Uniats were incorporated

into the Eastern Orthodox Church of the Russian Empire.

In the economic respect, German Poland is an agricultural country. Polish Silesia, however, which possesses the richest coal-fields on the European continent, is one of the most important mining and industrial districts in the German Empire. It is the country of the richest coal-fields in Europe, and produces coal to the amount of fifty-one million tons per annum. Those industries are wholly in German hands, the Poles supplying only the labour.

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Galicia (Austrian Poland) lived exclusively on its agriculture, being a country with the densest rural population in Europe. Latterly it began to develop industrially notwithstanding the fact that it has a very dense and poor rural population and that the country had to struggle not only against the competition of other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy but also against the policy of the Austrian Government, which in the past destroyed the country's industry and which even at present hinders its industrial development by means of taxation and differential tariffs on transport.

Industries have the most favourable conditions in the Kingdom of Poland, which has an open market for its industries in Russia and in Asia. This part of Poland may be called half-agricultural, its industry and commerce supplying the half of its revenues.

Polish civilisation developed under Western influences. At first they were those of the Roman Church, then those of Mediaeval Germany, later those of the Italian Renaissance (fifteenth and sixteenth century).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there came strong French influences through close intellectual relations with France and the introduction of French institutions by Napoleon. Napoleon's Civil Code is the law of the Kingdom of Poland to the present day.

When compared with the neighbouring civilisations, viz. with that of Germany to the West and that of Russia to the East, Polish civilisation is prominently distinct in character. It had two great and flourishing periods. The first was in the sixteenth century, at the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation, when Poland was one of the most active participants in the intellectual life of Europe, when she gave Copernicus to the world, when she produced her own distinct movement of the Reformation, and when, the Polish Protestants having supplanted Latin by the vernacular, Polish literature reached a high degree of beauty and power. This great period was called the Golden Age. Its second great period came in the nineteenth century, after the partitions, when Poland, in the period of Romanticism, produced a poetry which ranks with the greatest in history, but which is unfortunately little known in the West of Europe where only a very few people learn Polish. In spite of most unfavourable conditions this Polish civilisation lives and progresses at the present moment, and contemporary Polish literature and Polish art can by no means be classed with the poorest of Europe.

In her political constitution and in her social structure Poland developed in the past characteristics quite different from those of other countries, some of which

were the cause of the decline of the Polish State. Those characteristics must be accounted for by the geographical situation of the country and the part played by it in European history.

In the tenth century, when Poland appeared on the historical arena, there were two Europes, the Roman and the Byzantine. The Roman Church had conquered all the West and centre of Europe, all the Latin and Germanic countries, some Western Slavs, and even the Hungarian Kingdom founded by the Turanian invaders in the Danube Valley. The Byzantine Church had spread its teaching all over the Balkan Peninsula, among the Greeks and Southern Slavs, and was converting the Eastern Slavs of Russia, whose great centre was Kiev.

Of all Slavs the Poles were the most distant from Rome as well as from Byzantium, and therefore the most isolated from the influence of ancient civilisation, either Roman or Byzantine. This is also the reason why of all Slav countries Poland was the least known to contemporary chroniclers and why even now we know nothing certain about the origin of the Polish State. Concerning the beginnings of Poland we have only legends preserved in Polish tradition and transmitted to us by the Polish chroniclers of the twelfth century. It appears that Poland, before coming into contact with other European nations and adopting the Christian faith in the tenth century, had had a long existence, perhaps of some two centuries, as a small kingdom isolated from the life of contemporary Europe, both Western and Eastern. At least, legendary history gives the names of a long series of rulers of two

successive dynasties which reigned prior to the adoption of Christianity by the Poles in 965.

The chroniclers of other countries first mention Poland in the tenth century when she is carrying on wars against her neighbours, at first against the German Empire and its Eastern Marks, and later against the Russian rulers of Kiev; that is, against the Roman West and the Byzantine East.

This situation between two mediaeval civilisations determined the whole course of Poland's evolution. It may be mentioned here that the most recent investigations into the beginnings of Polish history show that these wars were preceded by those against the Norsemen, and especially against the Danes. They represent the first stage of Poland's struggle for the Baltic. Hints about them are found in the old Norse and Icelandic Sagas. It may be mentioned, too, that Shakespeare was somehow acquainted with the Scandinavian tradition of these wars; for when describing the vision of the dead King in the 1st Act of *Hamlet*, Horatio says:

So frowned he once when in an angry parle
He smote the sledded Polacks on the ice.

This passage has long been the subject of contention, but the recent investigations show that in the first half of the tenth century the Danes were the most dangerous enemies of the little Kingdom of Poland.

These wars, however, end very early, in the middle of the tenth century, because of the expansion of the German Marks towards the East. The German Empire became the only great danger to Poland in the

West, and her struggles against it represent the chief moments of Poland's mediaeval history.

It is a great historical truth that nations trying to cope with their enemies submit to the strongest influences of the most dangerous neighbours whom they are obliged to fight. And so mediaeval Poland, after adopting the Roman faith introduced there from Bohemia, develops pre-eminently under the influence of German civilisation and German institutions.

When she appears in European history, Poland represents a primitive kingdom under the despotic rule of the Piast dynasty. She is a country of forests and marshes, with large oases of denser agricultural population scattered among the forests. The population consists of free husbandmen and slaves. Above them there is a class of warriors, very strong numerically, from which the ruler chooses his officials. There is no trace of feudalism in the country, the only important people in it being the king's officials who gradually accumulate wealth and give origin to a series of great families, rich and therefore powerful, which, however, remain legally on an equal footing with the mass of poor warriors. This military class was subdivided into clans, the members of each clan being bound together by strong ties of solidarity. Each clan had its name and crest. The Polish nobility, which sprang from this military class and which derived its family names from its landed properties (in the fifteenth century), had no family crests, of which there was only a limited number. Each of these bore a name which had been the old word of call of the clan. In many instances, one crest belonged to more than a hundred

families. The clan system survived in this way throughout the whole of Polish history. It is evident that the warrior class in Poland had quite a different origin and a different legal and social position from that of the feudal nobility of Western Europe.

Owing to the adoption of the Roman faith and the struggle against the German Empire, which led the rulers of Poland to interfere in the affairs of Bohemia and Hungary, Poland entered into close communion with the West, particularly with the German Empire, and this resulted in the gradual penetration into the country of Western ideas and Western institutions. Thus among others the mediaeval custom of dividing the country among the sons of the ruler on his death was adopted in the twelfth century. It was most disastrous for a kingdom like Poland, which was surrounded by powerful enemies and which had not yet quite reached its natural frontiers and had not sufficiently strengthened its position on the Baltic.

The Slavonic populations on the Baltic coast, west of the Vistula, had only recently been incorporated into the Polish State, while to the east of the Vistula a Lithuanian tribe of Prussians had remained independent and pagans, the missionary work carried on among them from Poland having proved unsuccessful. Divided Poland was unable to complete the task of conquering the Baltic coast, and in this way the field was open for the Teutonic Order. The Knights of the Cross established there a German stronghold which later on became one of the foundations of German Prussia and the greatest danger to the independence of Poland.

The election of kings, which played so unfortunate a part in the later history of the Polish kingdom, was also a mediaeval institution introduced from Western Europe, which in Poland attained to a stage of extreme development.

The influence of Western ideas and institutions was shown chiefly in the formation of the Polish nobility and its political rôle. Towards the end of the mediaeval period the close communion of Poland with feudal Europe resulted in undermining the despotic rule of the Piasts. The wealthy magnates began to regard their position as being similar to that of the dukes and barons of the feudal West, and they opposed themselves to the power of the princes. On the other hand, the very numerous and mostly poor military class succeeded in securing in Poland the position of Western knighthood. The division of Poland was very favourable to these changes, for weak princes, waging wars against each other, were obliged to reckon with the powerful lords in their dominions. When Poland, in the fourteenth century, was again re-united under the last rulers of the Piast dynasty, the kings, in spite of their despotic tendencies, did not attain to the unlimited power of the early Piasts: they were obliged to consult the great lords in state affairs. In the end of the fourteenth century the last Piast died childless and the successor to his throne, Louis d'Anjou of Hungary, wanted to assure the crown of Poland to his daughter. The law did not admit of succession in the female line, and he succeeded in accomplishing his plan at the cost of great concessions to the magnates and of renouncing the most essential attributes of the crown.

Poland then became more similar to the west-European feudal monarchy though she lacked a feudal organisation of society and though the primitive clan system still survived. Here lies the chief source of the degeneration of her political institutions. The kings, in their struggle for power against the magnates, could not, like the sovereigns of the West, look for support to the middle class, for that class was very weak in Poland. They therefore tried to find it in the powerful class of the knighthood or gentry (*szlachta*). But between the gentry and the magnates there was only a difference of wealth and culture. Both belonged directly to the same class of the community, both were members of the same clans, and the gentry by its social character was destined rather to co-operate with the magnates than to struggle against them. And, as both those elements occupied the same legal position, the power wrested from the king by the magnates became legally an acquisition of the whole of the nobility, the rich and advanced as well as the poor and uncultured. For a country like Poland, which had no feudal hierarchy in her social structure, the destruction of despotic rule meant gradual transformation into a democratic republic.

The end of the Middle Ages, when those constitutional changes are taking place in Poland, is at the same time a great landmark in Polish economic history. In the fourteenth century, when the sea-routes to the Levant, being harassed by the Turks, became very unsafe, trade with Asia was carried on in great measure by continental routes leading from Western Germany through Poland to the Greek settlements on the

Northern coast of the Black Sea. In this way Poland became a commercial country, and the merchants of her cities, particularly those of Cracow, were famous for their wealth. With the conquest of Constantinople and the Black Sea by the Turks, those continental routes were cut and the trade of Poland was ruined. The cities, which had been rapidly gaining political power, lost it very soon. At the same time the great geographical discoveries then made opened up new sea-routes and gave a strong impetus to the commerce of the Western sea-faring nations. This commercial growth, and the industrial development of England and Flanders, produced a rapid increase in the population of the countries of North-western Europe, which became a great market for Polish grain. Thus Poland, having lost her commercial importance, gained very favourable conditions for agricultural development. The fifteenth century is in Poland a period when agriculture and landed property are organised on a large scale. Till that time she was a country of small husbandry intended only for local consumption. With the opening of foreign markets, large agricultural units were rapidly formed by means of clearing the forests, of internal colonisation, of the amalgamation of small units and of expansion towards the South-East to the fertile territories of the ancient Grand Duchy of Kiev, which had been depopulated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by the nomads of the Steppes, and which, under the protection of Poland's military power, were now again colonised. All this work was done by the Polish gentry, which, availing itself of its newly-won political power, grasped the entire profit made possible

by the new conditions of agricultural development; they became a class of prosperous large and middle landowners. A large portion of that class, especially in Mazovia, where it was most numerous, remained poor and sat on small lots of land, many being even landless, but the majority became wealthy landed nobles. Economic prosperity strengthened the power of the nobility: they excluded from the Diet the representatives of the cities and reduced the free husbandmen to serfdom with the object of securing labour which they needed very much in the new conditions. From this time onwards the whole of Polish history is practically the work of the Polish landed nobility. They made the laws, they decreed the wars and they elected the kings, the election being limited throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to the Lithuanian House of Jagiello, and becoming in the second half of the sixteenth century quite free. The nobility were free to choose from among foreign princes as well as from among themselves.

This ancient class of warriors which developed into the landed nobility had many great qualities, above all, chivalry, courage, a very severe code of honour and duty toward the country, great family virtues and a sense of decency in private life. But in the new conditions of prosperity they gradually lost their energy and their aggressiveness, lost to a great extent their ability for sacrifice and gradually substituted the cause of individual freedom for that of country. In the mass they were very ignorant. It is true that, after power and wealth had been acquired, there appeared a craving for enlightenment. In the fifteenth and sixteenth

centuries western universities, particularly those of Italy in the period of the Renaissance, were crowded with young Poles who were more numerous there than other foreigners. The University of Cracow, founded in the year 1400, became a great centre of science and intellectual culture not only for Poland but also for neighbouring countries. This movement, which rapidly raised the intellectual level of the ruling class, which led to refinement of manners and which gave birth to the Golden Period of Polish literature in the sixteenth century, came to a stop at the end of that century under the influence of new factors in Polish life.

Owing to her geographical situation and her social and political conditions, Poland was obliged to absorb many alien elements. The primitive kingdom of the Piasts was founded and expanded on a territory inhabited by kindred Western Slavonic tribes of Polish race. Only on its south-eastern border, in Red Russia, the Piasts had incorporated some eastern Slavs into their dominions. In the twelfth century, during the period of division, nearly the whole country was raided by the Tartars and to a great extent depopulated, a fact which caused the subsequent German immigration into the country. The princes encouraged German settlers, granted them privileges in the towns and in the country settlements and even gave them the right to be ruled according to German law. During that period Polish cities were organized on the basis of the Magdeburg law, and they even enjoyed the right of appeal to the High Court at Magdeburg. After the reunion of Poland in the fourteenth century the last king of the Piast dynasty, Casimir the Great, who gave

Poland a great code of laws, the Statute of Wislica, based upon the principle "one king, one law, one coinage," abolished the right of appeal to Magdeburg and created conditions under which the German element was quickly absorbed by the Polish community. The end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century is the period during which German influence in Poland comes to an end and the expansion of Germanism towards the East is stopped for centuries. By the defeat of the Teutonic Order at the battle of Tannenberg (Grunwald) with the subsequent Second Treaty of Thorn, by which the Western possessions of the Order, including the mouth of the Vistula and the city of Danzig, were again incorporated into Poland, Germanism was even pushed back where it remained within the same frontiers till the second half of the eighteenth century—till the partitions of Poland.

In the second half of the fourteenth century Poland had two powerful and dangerous neighbours, the Teutonic Order, which barred her access to the Baltic and extended its conquests into Polish territories, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whose rulers, of the Giedymin dynasty, extended their dominion over Western Russian principalities at a time when Great Russia was still under the Tartar yoke. The Lithuanians were engaged in a struggle with the Teutonic Order, but they also frequently raided Polish possessions and struggled against Poland for the acquisition of Russian South-western territories. Poland was too small to fight both those enemies, and in these circumstances the Polish lords displayed a great genius for statesmanship. They married the heiress to the Polish throne, Hedwig,

daughter of Louis of Hungaria, to the Lithuanian prince Jagiello, elected him King of Poland, and in this way realised a personal union between Poland and Lithuania. Lithuania proper, i.e. the Northern part of Jagiello's empire, which was still pagan, was baptized by the Poles, converted to the Roman Catholic religion and exposed to the influence of Polish civilisation. At a great meeting of Polish and Lithuanian nobles an Act of Brotherhood between the two countries was signed and a solemn oath taken by both parties. Thenceforth the hereditary grand dukes of Lithuania, of the House of Jagiello, were by principle elected to the Polish throne up to the reign of Sigismund Augustus, who died childless but during whose reign the Union of Lublin was concluded (1569), whereby the two countries were fused into one State and by virtue of which Lithuanian deputies began to be sent to the Polish Diet.

By the union with Lithuania the Polish State was more than doubled in territory and in population. That population was Polish neither by race nor by civilisation. In the north of the newly acquired country lived the Lithuanians, recently converted from paganism and still semi-barbarous. The southern and larger part of it was inhabited by West-Russian Slavs (White and Little Russians), Christians since the end of the tenth century, but belonging to the Eastern Church and to the Byzantine civilisation. The close union with Lithuania in the second half of the sixteenth century was bound to lower the general intellectual level of the Polish State. And after that time Poland was a very heterogeneous country in race, in language,

in religion, and in civilisation. The Lithuanian nobility, which had obtained equal rights with that of Poland, and whose representatives took their place at the side of the Poles in the Diet, were far inferior in ideas as well as in customs and manners to the Polish nobles, refined pupils of the Italian Renaissance.

Polish civilising influences spread very rapidly over those Eastern territories, but this success was paid for very dearly by the checking, and even the retrogression, of intellectual development in Poland proper. On the other hand, the union with Lithuania opened a new period in Poland's foreign policy. The destruction of the Teutonic Order and the internal disintegration of the German Empire gave Poland comparative safety in the West. But the new frontiers of the State in the East and South-east were very troublesome and a source of frequent wars against Muscovy, the Tartars, and the Turks. In this new period Poland has more and more intercourse with the East, and eastern influences become strongly felt in the country. In the sixteenth century Poland was a great European country, closely associated with western life and taking a very active part in western intellectual movements, among others in the Reformation.

In the seventeenth, she gradually withdraws from Europe, becoming more and more isolated in her life as well as in her institutions. In the seventeenth century also there comes into the life of the country a new alien element in a large mass. The Swedish invasion and the long period of wars caused by it in the heart of the country, resulted in a considerable depopulation and opened a field for immigration. Then a great

Jewish wave came from Germany. Their settlement in the country was opposed by the middle class which was however very weak and had no influence. On the contrary, the ruling class of landed nobles favoured the new settlers, who, unlike the Polish middle class which had never reconciled itself totally to the new order of things, did not struggle against the exclusive rule of the country by the nobility. Poland had had Jews since the Middle Ages, but their numbers were no larger than in other European countries. They were Polish Jews speaking the language of the country, but now she became the home of the largest Jewish population in the world, and the new settlers brought with them and preserved a German dialect, called Yiddish, which they speak to the present time.

II

Such were the factors which contributed to the formation of the Old Poland of the second half of the seventeenth and the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century—of the Poland which was going to lose her independence towards the end of the eighteenth century. Territorially she was one of the largest countries in Europe. Politically she had the most democratic constitution: the gentry, her ruling class, formed eight per cent. of the population and represented all degrees of wealth, from the great magnates, whose properties were like kingdoms, down to the small landholders and even the quite landless and poor gentry. That gentry was nearly all Polish in language and ideas, for the nobles of Lithuania and the West Russian

countries gradually adopted the Polish language, Polish manners and customs, the love of Polish freedom and of the Polish commonwealth. The weak middle class was also Polish, not only in Poland proper, but also in the Eastern territories. Only in the north-west, on the borders of Germany, the larger towns contained a considerable percentage of Germans. In the towns, side by side with the Poles, were the Jews, their numbers increasing from west to east. The chief mass of the population, the peasants, were reduced to serfdom, of different races, Polish in Poland proper, Lithuanian, White and Little Russian in the east. In her religion Poland was Roman Catholic. In the sixteenth century, the Reformation had spread powerfully among the nobility throughout the country in the form of Calvinism and Socinianism. But towards the end of the century, with the reign of Sigismund the Third of the Swedish House of Vasa, there came a Catholic reaction, drawing its strength chiefly from Lithuania where Catholicism was confronted by the Eastern faith and was therefore more fervent. Lithuania proper was also Roman Catholic, having been converted from paganism by the Poles. The West Russian provinces belonged in the beginning to the Eastern Church; but in the seventeenth century the larger part of their population was brought within the fold of the Roman Church by the Brest Union by which the Uniats accepted the Roman dogmas, acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope and retained only their ritual. There developed a struggle between the Uniats and the Dis-Uniats, i.e. those who remained in the Eastern Church.

Situated on the borders of the Western world and containing countries of both Roman and Byzantine civilisation, with the former gradually absorbing the latter, Poland represented very different stages and types of civilised life. While in the West they lived on a more or less European level, in the south-east, on the fertile plains of Ukraina, frequently raided by the Tartars, the Poles carried on their pioneer work amidst constant warfare with the Nomads. A most adventurous, wild life, and most troublesome types of citizens developed there. And there arose great magnates who, like kings, had their own armies which they employed against the invaders, but sometimes also in the intestine troubles of the Republic. There also, in face of constant Tartar danger, a peculiar military organisation of Cossacks appeared on the Dnieper which, growing in strength and independence, itself became a great danger to the Republic.

The economic life of the country was very simple. Its commerce and its middle class having been ruined, the country lived almost exclusively on agriculture and on the export of grain through Danzig to North-western Europe. The community was composed practically of two classes: of free nobles and peasant serfs, its structure being thus simplified and reduced to a more primitive state. National education had at the end of the sixteenth century fallen into the hands of the Jesuits and its level had been gradually lowered. The mass of the gentry were brought up in ignorance and in very backward ideas. The ruin of the cities, which are everywhere productive centres of civilisation, contributed to the general abasement. The gentry had

preserved many virtues in private and family life, but they were not enlightened enough to have the right ideas concerning the needs of the State and the methods of public life. In this way the constitution of the country was doomed to degeneration. From the sixteenth century till the fall of Poland more enlightened minds tried to forward ideas of reform and produced a very rich political literature on the "Amendment of the Republic" as well as a long series of active attempts at improvement. But all those attempts were powerless against the ignorance of public opinion.

Meantime to the east and the west of Poland there arose two great military powers. Peter the Great, being a despotic ruler, had transformed by force the Old Muscovy, with her growing anarchy, into a modern, strongly organised, bureaucratic and military power. On the other side the absolute kings of Prussia had organised their state and their army, and this army became, under Frederick the Great, the first military force in Europe. Because of their absolute rule neither of those powers needed any preparation of public opinion to introduce reforms. Quite different was it in Poland with her liberties and with her democratic rule by the gentry. There intended reforms had to be passed by the Diet, and it was necessary to overcome not only the conservatism of ignorant public opinion and the opposition of powerful magnates, who were often led by personal and family ambitions, but also the foreign intrigues which worked in the country.

Nevertheless, after the first partition, a strong reform party appeared. It began its work by reforming public education in the modern western sense and it

gradually formed a majority for the new constitution (of the 3rd May, 1791), which gave political rights to the middle class and admitted their representatives into the Parliament, took the peasants under the protection of the law, introduced a hereditary monarchy, a modern organisation of government, and a standing army.

There was no time for the completion of the great work. Taking advantage of the French Revolution which engaged the western and eastern European powers, Prussia and Russia, with the collaboration of Austria, completed the destruction of the Polish State. But the reforming movement of the eighteenth century was the beginning of a New Poland that lived, struggled and progressed after the partitions.

• This movement strengthened the ties between Poland and other European nations and laid the foundations of new national life. The reformed schools of the second half of the eighteenth century produced a new generation of enlightened men standing, in their knowledge and in their ideas, on the highest western level. Those men led Poland through the Napoleonic era, and they ruled her in the Duchy of Warsaw founded by Napoleon, and in the Kingdom of Poland established by the Congress of Vienna—which kingdom, in spite of its difficult conditions, was one of the best governed and most rapidly progressing countries in Europe. The first decades of the nineteenth century are a period of the greatest upheaval, not only as regards Polish political efforts, but also in the intellectual life of the nation. Outside of the Kingdom, the Polish university of Vilna, the capital of Lithuania, becomes

a great centre of learning and intellectual activity, and its pupils open the greatest period of Polish literature, a period when Polish poetry, in the era of Romanticism, reached summits accessible only to the richest literatures of the world. After the insurrection of 1830-31, when the constitution of the kingdom of Poland was destroyed and Polish educational institutions in Lithuania were suppressed, there appeared new centres of Polish thought, one abroad among the emigrants, chiefly in Paris, another in German Poland in Posen. The continuity of this intense and independent intellectual life of the nation was never interrupted. In the second half of the nineteenth century Warsaw became its centre and holds its place till the present time in spite of most unfavourable conditions, as the Polish University and Polish schools were suppressed, and public education, in Russian and by Russians, was forcibly introduced into the whole country. The change in the political situation of Austrian Poland in the second half of the nineteenth century, the introduction there of Polish public education, with two Polish universities, in Cracow and Lwow, gradually gave the Austrian Poles a prominent place in the intellectual life of the nation. But Galicia throughout the whole preceding period of 100 years was the most backward part of Poland and, in spite of all her progress in the last fifty years, she could not surpass the Kingdom and Warsaw with all their traditions of the reforming movement of the eighteenth century, of the Duchy of Warsaw and of the half-independent Kingdom of the Congress, and with their modern spirit, developed chiefly under French influences which were potent in

the country throughout the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.

The same elements gave national strength to Posen which found itself in a very dangerous situation under Prussian rule. That part of Poland participated in the reforming movement of the eighteenth century as well as in the life of the Duchy of Warsaw, while Galicia, annexed by Austria at the first partition (1772), stood apart during the period of the greatest activity of Polish thought.

Thus it happened that the weakest part of the national body, Austrian Poland, lived throughout the last fifty years in conditions most favourable to the progress of national culture, which it needed most. But, on the other hand, being the poorest part of Poland, with the densest agricultural population, it found itself in very difficult economic conditions, had no chance of industrial development, and was exploited by other more advanced countries of the Hapsburg monarchy. Nevertheless, the existence of national institutions and Polish schools raised the level of intellectual life and strengthened the national spirit. Galicia has in the most recent times been less and less Austrian, and Polish ideals have dominated the political life of that province more and more.

In the last century the greatest danger threatened the national existence of German Poland, exposed as this country was to the direct attacks of Germanism carried out methodically by the Government with the collaboration of the German nation. To Prussia the destruction of Polish nationality in her Polish provinces presented itself as a national necessity. With

Polonism strong in Posen and Royal (West) Prussia, provinces annexed at the partition of Poland, her German territories in East Prussia and Silesia were partly isolated and exposed to great danger in case Poland should recover her national strength and reconquer her independence. To ensure retention of those territories Prussia is bound to aim at the destruction of Polish nationality, not only in her own provinces but also in a large part of Russian Poland.

That is why the Prussian State spared neither efforts nor funds in the work of exterminating the Poles and did not hesitate to adopt measures which provoked the indignation of the whole civilised world. Fortunately for the Poles, Posen was the oldest part of the national body, the cradle of the Polish Kingdom, with the Polish civilisation deeply rooted in the mass of the population, with the national character most developed and tenacious. They rapidly learned German methods of work and adopted them in defence of their nationality, of their ideals and of their mother language, as well as in the economic struggle, in the defence of Polish landed property, and in industrial and commercial competition. In their economic progress they equalled and in some respects even surpassed the Germans of the country. In agriculture, they reached the level of most of the progressive countries of Europe, and at the same time they developed a strong middle class and to a great extent Polonised the towns where the Germans and Jews, the latter supporting Germanism, had been very strong. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the percentage of Germans in their country was considerably reduced (to 38 per

cent. as against 45 per cent. in 1867), while the Jews, pushed out by Polish traders, emigrated to Germany and have nearly disappeared from the country. They now form only one per cent. of the population (as against seven per cent. in 1815). The energy, solidarity and discipline of the Poles in the legal and political struggle, as well as in economic competition, astonished the Germans and proved to them that the Slavs, when properly trained, are their equals and in some respects may even prove their superiors.

The country which, under the name of the Kingdom of Poland, was united to Russia in 1815 and which had its own constitution, government, and army till 1831; which, incorporated afterwards into the Russian Empire, was nevertheless governed by Polish officials till 1865, has since that date been subjected to a system of anti-Polish policy in which the Russian Government imitated Prussian methods. But the Kingdom of Poland was a large country, with a homogeneous Polish population, with fresh traditions of its modern and progressive State (from 1815 to 1831), with its solidly organised social and intellectual life, with its French laws (Napoleon's Code), and any attempt at the destruction of its national life was doomed to failure. In the last fifty years the Kingdom found a new source of strength in its industrial progress. With the abolition of the customs frontier between the Kingdom and the Empire in 1850, a large market in the Russian Empire was opened to that Polish country, rich in coal and minerals, with a fairly dense population composed, after the belated peasants' reform in 1864, chiefly of a strong and healthy class of small landowners and of

a numerous proletariat representing cheap labour for the industries. Textile and metallurgic factories grew rapidly, and there arose large mining and industrial centres living mostly on their export to the East. At the same time Warsaw, because of its geographical situation on the route from the West to the East and at the crossing of the lines from Vienna to Petrograd and Berlin to Moscow, at a point where the Western narrow-gauge ends and the Russian broad-gauge begins, became a commercial city of great importance. The Polish community, which had been exclusively agricultural for centuries, was not prepared to profit by the new favourable conditions, and the growth of great industries and commerce was in the beginning chiefly the work of the Germans and the Jews. At first the Poles supplied only the unskilled and part of the skilled labour. Gradually, however, the progress of technical and commercial education enabled them to appear in the field of competition and they began to gain ground rapidly. In this way the Kingdom produced a very numerous and well-to-do middle class—recruited from remains of the ancient town populations, from the gentry, and from the peasantry—which to-day is already the foremost social force in the country.

The nineteenth century brought with it great changes and these resulted in the fundamental social reconstruction of Poland. In Old Poland the great mass of the population consisted of peasants who were chiefly serfs and owned no land; these the Napoleonic era made free. Later, at first in Prussia and Austria in the first half of the nineteenth century, then in Russian Poland in 1865, they were endowed with land

and became a class of independent small landowners. This great peasant reform was not carried out solely to satisfy the social needs of the times. In German and Russian Poland particularly the reformers were inspired by the political purpose of breaking the power of the Polish landed nobility, which in the eyes of the governments represented the Polish national tendencies and which could not be reconciled with foreign rule. The ignorant peasant had no national aspirations, and it was hoped that, satisfied with his economic condition, he would prove a loyal subject and might even be employed against other sections of the nation. In a sense, therefore, the reform was carried out in a manner very favourable to the peasants; and it produced a strong class of small landowners, a class which, with the progress of education, with the improvement in the methods of land culture, and with the internal colonisation of the country (in all parts of Poland during the last decades), gradually grew still stronger. Many large landed properties disappeared, having been sold out to peasants in small lots.

This reform proved most beneficent to the Polish nation. The healthy, industrious and thrifty class of small landowners became the strongest foundation of Poland's national existence. It manifested its qualities best in German Poland where education has made the largest strides, where everybody can read and write and where the industrial development of the empire and the protection of agrarian interests by the State produced a most prosperous situation for the agriculturists. The small landowners of German Poland are a very prosperous class. Their savings supply the

Polish banks of the country with money. In the cultivation of land they rank with the most progressive farmers in Europe. At the same time, as education among them progressed, they became conscious members of the Polish nation, got inspired with the Polish national idea and with Polish patriotism. They became a well-organised and disciplined army of citizens struggling against aggressive Germanism for the cause of Poland. It may be said that it was the Polish peasant who stopped the progress of Germanism in the country and frustrated all the efforts of the Prussian Government to dispossess the Poles of their land, to buy it out of Polish hands through the Government's Committee of Colonisation and to settle Germans on it.

The peasants in Russian Poland developed in the same direction, only there the progress was much slower. Their economic condition is not bad, yet it is not as favourable as that of the peasants in German Poland. Russia is a great agricultural country and Russian grain competes the more easily with that of the country even on the Polish market, as it is favoured by special tariffs. With respect to the education of the masses, on the other hand, Russian Poland is the most backward of all the three parts of the country. Even to-day nearly half the population of the country is illiterate. But in Russian Poland also it is the rule that with the progress of education the peasant becomes an ardent Pole attached to the national cause and ready to struggle in its defence.

The peasant class of Austrian Poland found itself in the worst conditions. Even before the peasant reform Galicia had a denser agricultural population

than any other part of Poland, and this reform left the peasants owners of abnormally small lots of land. As late as forty years ago Galicia's population was also the most ignorant in all Poland, though it must be said to the credit of the Galician Land Diet that during the last fifty years of the country's autonomy it made the fostering of the education of the masses its chief aim. Two-thirds of the country's expenditure throughout this period were applied towards the improvement of public education, particularly of the primary schools which were Polish in the Polish and Ruthenian in the Ruthenian part of the country. In this way Galicia out-distanced Russian Poland in the education of the masses as far back as twenty years ago. But in spite of considerable progress the unfavourable economic condition of the small landowner in this over-populated country remained a very unhealthy source of political fermentation. The peasant reform produced not only a class of small landowners but also a very numerous landless proletariat. Here lies the reason why the number of emigrants from Poland has been so great in recent times. Emigration in large masses began in German Poland in the seventies and was rapidly followed by emigrations from the Russian and Austrian parts of the country. As a result the Polish population in the United States to-day numbers some three-and-a-half millions, to which total must be added some hundreds of thousands of Poles in Southern Brazil and other oversea countries. The rapid development of German industries attracted a large portion of the emigrants from German Poland to the German mines and factories in the west of the Empire, particularly in

Westphalia, where in some localities the Polish population to-day forms a majority.

Recent decades have developed a system of temporary emigration. Polish peasants go for a time to the States, to Germany and even to Denmark, England and France. Many of them buy land in Poland with their savings and become farmers. This temporary emigration is financially of great importance, especially to Austrian Poland where the country's budget is made solvent only by the earnings of the emigrants.

The Kingdom of Poland alone, with its rapidly growing industries, was able to absorb a considerable part of its rural proletariat into the mining and industrial centres, thus transforming it into an industrial working class. This class, very strong in numbers but mostly very ignorant and badly organised because of the backward institutions and the bad administration of the country, became not only a very important element of the community but also a source productive of trouble. In this respect the system of administration introduced by the Russian Government, with its extensive methods adapted to the vast and sparsely populated territories of the Russian Empire, proved most fatal when applied to an industrial country with a very dense population and situated in the centre of Europe where it is directly exposed to Western influences. The condition of the working class in Russian Poland is certainly the most unhealthy in all Europe.

One of the chief changes in the structure of the Polish nation was the rapid growth in the second half of the nineteenth century of a strong middle class. In German Poland this class developed in the midst of the

bitterest struggle against the Germans for the control of the local market, and it produced a very numerous class of Polish tradesmen and small industrials who proved so successful in competition with the Germans that they drove many of the latter from the country and again Polonised the towns which to a great extent had already been Germanised. They also organised a very extensive system of Polish co-operative banks which an eminent German economist called "a State within the State," a system which is one of the model organisations of its kind and which is also the chief foundation of the economic independence of the Poles in German Poland.

In Russian Poland the Middle Class represents all stages of wealth, from the great industrials and merchants down to the small traders and craftsmen, and includes a very numerous class of people of liberal professions. Here the Polish commercial and industrial class feels cramped, particularly because of the herding together in cities with the Jews who, driven out of Russia by anti-Jewish laws, gather in Poland. This explains such facts as the commercial boycott of the Jews in Poland, which is partly a manifestation of the economic energy of the Polish middle class and partly of the tendency of the whole community to strengthen the Polish element in the town populations. The Jews in Poland, it must be mentioned here, in their mass do not belong to the Polish nationality: their language is Yiddish, a German dialect, and they are organised as a separate Jewish nationality against the Poles. In these conditions the struggle against the Jews is a national struggle. It must be firmly stated here that

this commercial boycott is carried out without any manifestations of violence on the part of the Poles, and that everything written about the use of brutal force by the Poles is pure invention.

One of the results of these fundamental social changes is the limitation of the social *rôle* heretofore played by the great landowner class. In the past the nobility in Poland constituted the nation itself. It ruled the country without competition on the part of any other class, the middle class being small in numbers and wealth, and the peasants being serfs. In the second half of the nineteenth century the area of great landed property was considerably reduced, at first by the peasant reform and afterwards gradually reduced still more by the selling out of bigger units in lots to peasants. This process of internal colonisation progressed rapidly down to the most recent times, and it is to be expected that after this war, owing to destruction and financial ruin, a great part of the large landed properties will disappear and be colonised by peasants.

Thus on the one hand the class of great landowners lost very much of its power and on the other hand new social elements appeared on the arena and developed great strength. In this way the Polish community lost its old character, and became like other European nations.

III

With regard to the political situation of Poland, there are three divisions of the country. First, there is Austrian Poland, which enjoyed until the outbreak of the war some national freedom and had national

institutions. Its schools were Polish and so on. Here the chief struggle was for a position of influence in Austria. This struggle became more and more intense and the position of the Poles in Austria became more and more threatened, first, because of the development of the Ukraina nationality in the Eastern part of the country, whose language is the Little Russian dialect, and then by the alliance of Austria with Germany. The Austrian-German alliance gave the Germans more and more influence on the whole of Austrian affairs, and the new tendency was to reduce the importance and influence of the Poles in the Empire.

In German Poland, there was a desperate struggle for national existence against the German system which is very well known. The Polish community here had a position of great strength. For instance, the banking corporations of German Poland had been developed to such perfection that the famous German economist called them a danger to the State. The position was strengthened also by some territorial acquisitions of the Poles, who had acquired parts of the country which did not belong to the Poles at the time of the partition, but whose population is Polish by origin and speaks Polish. All the force of Poland was directed to penetrating that part of the population with Polish ideas, and to a great extent it has succeeded. Silesia began to send to the German Parliament Polish members who belonged to the Polish Club some fifteen years ago, and even in the south of Eastern Prussia, where they were most isolated from the Polish influence and, owing to their religious confession, because they are Lutheran, all their clergy are Germans and the

work in the schools is done in German—even in that country Polish ideas gradually developed, and so long ago as 1900, in the elections to the German Reichstag the Polish candidate got 6000 votes against his German opponent who obtained 8000.

In Russian Poland the struggle was neither for a position in the Empire, because there was no chance of getting any influential position, nor for national existence, because the national existence of the Poles in Poland proper was not threatened by Russia. It is true that the institutions were Russian and the schools were Russian, but they were unable to Russianise the Poles. The Polish culture showed great vitality against the Russians. The struggle in Russian Poland was for the progress of national civilisation, which was stopped by the policy of the Russian Government before the present war.

All three parts of Poland had their own political struggle, but a close analysis of the political situation of the whole of Poland revealed to the Polish leaders the following facts: first, that the greatest danger threatening the national existence of the Poles came from Germany; for the German view was that, if they wanted to assure for themselves their position on the Baltic coast, they must destroy not only the Poles in German Poland but must look to the future destruction of the kingdom of Warsaw. That means the total destruction of the Polish nation, and that struggle between Poland and Germany is a struggle for life and death. The Germans knew of the renascence of Polish civilisation and realised that, if Poland kept her power to struggle against Germany, sooner or later they must

lose their position in the east. The second fact realised by the Poles is this: the German policy is the only policy which considers the Polish problem as a whole, which has some logical solution of the Polish problem. Neither Russia nor Austria has such a system, but the Germans have, and German statesmen have already realised that their Polish problem is not limited to the frontiers of the German Empire. Their Chancellor in one of his speeches in German Poland said, "We are struggling not only with our Poles in German Poland, but with the whole Polish nation." The third fact realised by the Poles is that Germany to a certain extent controls the Polish policy of the other two Empires. The German tendency in Austria has the effect of reducing the Polish influence in Austria. In Russia, German influence works strongly in the anti-Polish direction. Germany seeks to destroy Polish nationality. She knows that it would not be sufficient to annex a large part of Poland, because that would only strengthen the position of the Poles in Germany. It is much more convenient to keep them as they are and gradually to destroy them, to assure that on neither side of the frontier shall Polish civilisation flourish. So she employs every possible influence in Russia to destroy any policy which supports Polish progress. I may remind you that, when the Polish members in the second Duma brought forward a Bill for the introduction of Polish teaching in the schools of the kingdom of Poland, all the organs of the German semi-official Press published articles in which they said quite openly that Polish teaching introduced into Russian Poland would be a provocation against Germany.

When the Poles realised that political situation, they employed all their force to come to a reconciliation with Russia. They saw their only salvation was in the defeat of the German power. But that work of reconciliation with Russia was not easy, especially after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when it was evident that a war between Russia and her western neighbours, the Central Empires, was inevitable. So the Poles were in a hurry to organise as quickly as possible Polish influence in Russia against the Central Empires. But there was a very great difficulty because of the Poles and because of the Russian Government. The Poles had the long-standing tradition of a struggle against Russia. Between the Poles and the Russians there was a sea of blood shed in secular struggles, and fresh memories of insurrection followed by oppression did not favour the movement of reconciliation. A yet stronger difficulty was the policy of the Russian Government, which was anti-Polish until the outbreak of the present war. There was a curious contradiction between the foreign and home policy of the Russian Government in the period preceding this war. The foreign policy was anti-German, because Russia in her foreign interests was threatened by Germany; but the home policy was pro-German, and, in Poland on the western frontier, supported the Germans against the Poles, owing to the peculiar situation of the Polish Protestants. The Russian authorities, represented chiefly by men with German names, considered the Polish Protestants Germans, and enforced the German language in their schools. The Poles were obliged to fight desperately for the retention of the Polish language in

their schools, and then came the occupation of Poland by the Germans in this war. The Germans published an order that German teaching should be introduced into the schools because the Protestants were assumed to be Germans. I was told an interesting story about that. The Protestants of Warsaw sent a deputation to the Governor-General of Warsaw. At the head of them was a Doctor of Protestant Theology of a German University. The deputation told the Governor-General, "We are Poles and we want Polish teaching in our schools." Then the Governor-General said, "Allow me to say, my Government consider all Protestants in Warsaw as Germans," whereupon the Doctor of Protestant Theology answered, "Oh! if that is so it will be very easy for us to become Roman Catholics"; and the German governor made the concession asked for. On that struggle for the organisation of Polish civilisation, public opinion against the Central Empires was at one. In this war, four-fifths of the public opinion of the Poles is on the side of Russia and against Germany and Austria, as can be proved by the experience of the Russian army in Poland. The Poles understood, first, that their national existence is threatened by Germany and that the only chance for their future is the German defeat, and, secondly, that their national *rôle* is that of a barrier against the progress of Germany in the east. The power of Germany comes not from the west but from the east, from Prussia, from the country built nearly on the Slavonic side, and every progress in the east means a new increase of the German power, and the first thing for Europe to do in the future if she wants to have Germany

less dangerous is to stop the progress of Germanism in the east.

By what means may it be stopped? In the country of Polish civilisation, that Russian civilisation which is such a great progressive force in the east—it is sufficient to mention its work in the Caucasus and Central Asia—has no constructive power. Therefore, if the country is to be saved from German conquest, if Poland is destined to present a barrier against German progress, Polish civilisation must be given freedom to develop, and that this civilisation is able to fight against German aggression is proved by the struggle of the German Poles. The truth is understood by many enlightened and thoughtful men in Russia, and at their head we see the august person of the Russian Emperor, who gave his approbation to the ideas of the Grand Duke's manifesto addressed to the Poles.

THE NATIONALITIES OF RUSSIA

I

It would not be right to say that the Nationalities of Russia are entirely unknown in England. During the last few years especially a great deal has been said and written about a number of the nationalities under Russian rule. The Finnish, Polish, Armenian, Jewish and Georgian questions have all been discussed in England. But there is one disadvantage in the mode of discussion that has hitherto prevailed in this country. These questions have been viewed not as a whole, but in segments. They have been seen as moments, as phases in some great dim struggle of which the full meaning is hardly realised. Most of the questions have been dealt with from a purely political point of view. The sufferings of Finns, Armenians, and other nationalities of Russia have been loudly proclaimed. We have heard of their grievances, we have heard the voice of their complaint, but we have rarely heard the voice of their joy or the accents of their daily life.

Now I do not think we can fully understand the meaning of any one of these questions, if it is wrested entirely from its context. Appeals have been made to our human instincts. The generous sympathies of English men and English women have been enlisted on

behalf of many causes. But if we were to put some of these causes side by side and compare them, we should find ourselves confronted by perplexing anomalies. Consider together, for instance, the Finnish and the Jewish questions, or again the Armenian and the Georgian questions. You will discover strange contradictions that are at first sight startling and perplexing. You will ask questions and will probably arrive at broader and more general conclusions. Your humane instincts will be vindicated. The impulse of sympathy will still be strong, but it will be intelligent and clear.

When I think of the nationalities of Russia, I do not think first of all of political struggles, of debates in the Duma, or of newspaper articles. I think of certain more intimate aspects of the lives of these very numerous and varied peoples, of certain episodes which show the way their thoughts are tending, without regard to the vicissitudes of political conflicts. Politics are necessary, whether we like or dislike them. But politics are a system of relations, and we cannot understand relations unless we first of all realise what bodies they are between which the relations subsist.

I remember reading two or three years ago a book by a Tartar mullah, named Musa Bikiev, who is called by many admirers in Russia the Luther of Islam. The book was on a very technical subject, the subject of fasting when the days are long. As you know, during the month of Ramadhan the Mohammedan must fast from sunrise to sunset, and this particular theological question was discussed by Musa Bikiev in this book. But the work is not wholly a dry theological treatise. The writer describes a journey he took in Finland. He

had interesting conversations with a Finnish professor of the Mongolian language. He visited Tammerfors, the Manchester of Finland, and records his admiration for Finnish education, Finnish institutions, and Finnish industries. Then he took a journey further north still, to Tornea, not very far from the Polar circle, at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, and there with a party he ascended a hill and saw the midnight sun. The sight of the midnight sun evokes from Bikiev a very fine passage on the majesty of God, and then he returns to his difficult theological question—how can Mohammed's precepts on fasting that had in view a hot country like Arabia, with its long nights, be observed in the land of the midnight sun? Bikiev was born in the Russian empire at Kazan on the Volga. He saw the midnight sun also in the Russian empire, and the fact that impressed me was, that it was the extreme diversity of social and geographical conditions prevailing in the empire that quickened in him this interesting process of thought, that stimulated his fruitful work of theological inquiry.

Then I think of a young Buriat scholar, a member of a semi-nomad tribe in the east of Siberia. One evening in Petrograd I walked with this young Buriat along the banks of the Neva, and he described to me a very interesting visit he had made to the great Buddhist monastery of Lhasa in Tibet. He told me of the wonderful library of Buddhist works and of the magnificent image of Buddha Maitreya in the monastery, and then he went on to tell me of his very interesting attempt to transliterate his Buriat-Mongol mother-tongue by means of Roman characters. That again

was a curious instance of the varied mental processes that are going on among the nationalities within the Russian empire. On the one hand a keen interest in Tibet, the home of that type of Buddhism which the Buriats profess, and on the other a hunger for Western civilisation that led to an attempt to adopt the Latin alphabet to the Buriat language.

I recall, again, a young Georgian who lived and studied in Petrograd, and in order to earn a living he secured a post as proof-reader on a Russian newspaper. But the chief interest of his life was to translate Sophocles from Greek into Georgian verse. These are the things I like to think about when I think of the nationalities of Russia.

The number of languages spoken within the Russian empire is something over a hundred, and the number of languages spoken will give some idea of the very great variety of grades of culture and of civilisation there are within the empire. There are almost as many grades of culture and civilisation as there are grades of climate upon that great plain. If you take, for instance, the alphabets of the various newspapers published in the Russian empire, you will see what an extraordinary variety of forms of culture are intermingled there. You have the Gothic letters in the German, Swedish, and Finnish papers. Then you have the Roman characters in Polish and Lithuanian. You have the Hebrew alphabet in the Yiddish and Hebrew press and literature. You have the black square Armenian characters, and you have the beautifully rounded Georgian characters, you have the Arabic alphabet for the Tartar and the Kirghiz languages, you

have the Mongol characters for the Buriat language, you have Russian characters for Great Russian, Little Russian, and White Russian. Each of these alphabets represents a very different type of culture. The Russian alphabet stands for the old Byzantine culture. The Gothic characters stand for the Germanic culture of the north-west of Russia. The Armenian and Georgian alphabets represent the ancient civilisations of Transcaucasia. The Arabic alphabet stands for the great Mohammedan culture which dominated the middle east and still has great power there. The Mongol alphabet, which is ultimately derived from the Syriac alphabet, shows how the Semitic culture of Mesopotamia impinged at one time on the ancient civilisation of China.

Then you have an extraordinary variety of forms of speech. Several great families of languages are represented. You have the Indo-European family, including Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Lettish, Swedish, and also German, so far as it is spoken in Russia. Then you have what is called the Finno-Ugric family, including the Finnish of Finland and the Finnish languages of the east of European Russia, and also the languages related to Hungarian on the borders of European Russia and Siberia. You have the Tartar or Turkish languages, represented by Kazan Tartar, Azerbaijan Tartar, Crimean Tartar, Bashkir, Sart or Uzbeg, Kirghiz and Turkoman. You have the Mongolian family, including Buriat and Kalmyk, which latter is spoken near the mouth of the Volga. You have the Manchu family, represented by the languages of Tunguses and other tribes in Siberia. You have the

strange and curious languages whose origin and connections are yet hardly known in the far east of Siberia—some languages apparently related to the languages of the North American Indians and others to the language of the Esquimaux. Then in the Caucasus you have those extremely interesting languages related to Georgian, and also to Armenian, languages which are believed by the scholar who knows them best, Professor Marr, of Petrograd, the son of a Scotch father and a Georgian mother, to form what he calls a Japhetic group, which is a kind of cousin to the Semitic group of languages. Thus the languages of the empire represent an extraordinary variety of linguistic tendencies and of lines of linguistic evolution. Within this broad expanse of Russian territory men have elaborated various forms of speech, which mean various ways of thinking, various ways of looking at the world, various efforts to rise to a spiritual consciousness. All these tendencies have gone their own varied ways in the course of history. They have come into conflict, they have influenced each other, and now we find this wonderful variety of forms of speech and forms of thought, of spiritual reaction, all linked together in the vast territory of the Russian empire, all linked together in one complex Imperial organisation.

I think if we realise this we shall realise one very important fact. I wish we could at last get out of the way of thinking of Russia as a huge piece of the map, as something flat, and given, and static, and solid, and stationary. Russia is not that. Russia is a process. Russia is one huge process of evolution, in which all these various nationalities play a very important and

very hopeful part. We hardly realise, I think, that Russia is only beginning to be. Russia has been forming. Russia has during the centuries of her long struggle on the great plain been gathering together the materials for a great existence, for some great new experiment in human life in this world of ours. The materials have been gathered together by a long series of conquests, by a long series of struggles, by great efforts in trade and colonisation. And now, as far as we can see, this part of the work is done. The materials are there and they are waiting for their elaboration. Russia has made her notes, she has outlined her plan, and now has come the time for her to write the great volume which she is destined to write in history.

I have said there are over one hundred languages in the Russian empire, but that does not mean that there are a hundred nationalities. A great many of these languages are spoken only by what we may call ethnic units which still linger in the region of mere folk-lore, which have not obtained any grasp upon civilisation, which are liable to assimilation, which will probably in process of time disappear as separate ethnic communities. In this way, in the north-west of Russia, Finnish tribes are being assimilated and are gradually disappearing. Many of these tribes are extremely interesting in themselves, and few parts of the world are so interesting for the ethnologist as is Russia, with its great variety of local customs, its myths, its religions, the wonderful traditions of many of the tribes in the Caucasus, the many strange customs, going back to ancient times, leading back to all kinds of strange and unexpected connections with older civilisations, so

that in the far north of Siberia you may find curious reminiscences of the wisdom of the Ganges, all kinds of curious relics of customs, half familiar to us and half unknown. But on the other hand there are several ethnic units which have by various means in various ways grasped the apparatus of civilisation for themselves and have attained the rank of nationalities, and it is with these nationalities that I particularly wish to deal in these lectures.

The position of the nationalities of the Russian Empire is not quite so strange, not quite so foreign, as it seems at first sight to Englishmen. After all, there is a very close analogy with our British Empire. Take the ordinary Russian University, such Russian Universities as those of Petrograd and Moscow. You will find there in certain respects a very close analogy even with Cambridge; I mean so far as the character of the students goes. Here in Cambridge there are, or were, English students from various countries, there are Scotchmen, Irishmen, South Africans, English and Dutch, there are Indians from various parts of India, there are French Canadians and British Canadians, there are many from the Straits Settlements, from Australia and New Zealand. You will find something of the same kind of thing in Petrograd or Moscow: you will find not only Russian students there but Poles, Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and lately even Turcomans, who in a work published in England about thirty years ago were called, quite rightly, "the man-stealing Turcomans." The difference between the British Empire and the Russian Empire is that in Russia there are no dividing oceans. If we could

think of the British Empire as being all of a piece, with all its great variety of people jostling each other on a great plain, we should realise more clearly the national problems of the Russian Empire. Russia has, as it were, its Irish problem, its South African problem, its French-Canadian question, its colonial question; and all these questions are juxtaposed and intermingled very closely and are all entangled in a most extraordinary way with the question of the Russian population which is spread all over the Empire and very often cuts through the territory occupied by other nationalities. You have this great plain which is in a sense a sea, with the Russians as the great colonisers, with the nomad tribes as the pirates who in the long run were subdued and tamed to Russian rule.

How did this very complex organisation, called the Russian Empire, with its great varieties of nationalities, come to be what it is?

I don't want to tell over again the story of Russian history, which has been very ably set before you in several lectures during the week, but there are two or three points to indicate which have a bearing on my subject. If you will remember, first of all a number of loosely organised Slavonic tribes coalesced and formed at Kiev a State which for a time flourished, and was then swept away by the Tartar invasion. Then these Slavonic tribes who by this time were known as Russians transferred their centre to the upper Volga and the Oka river, and afterwards established a new centre in Moscow where they began to collect the scattered fragments of the Russian people. The Russian ruler at Moscow subdued the various Russian principalities

around him, and gradually formed a strong national unit. Then using Moscow as a kind of fulcrum he began the great work of expanding over the great plain, a very curious expansion which apparently by a strange historical necessity could not stop until the limits of the plain were reached. The Moscow rule extended southward, and subdued the Tartars. Then it began to extend westwards, and came into contact with the Poles. There was a great crisis. There seemed to be a danger of the Russian state disappearing entirely under the blows of the Poles and the Swedes. There was absolute anarchy and absolute disorganisation, and the Russian state was saved by the heroism of the Russian people who took the work of evicting the invaders into their own hands. Then the work of building up began again. It continued throughout the seventeenth century, continued slowly, with a tendency towards the west, towards the Baltic, and with a steady tendency towards the Black Sea, and then finally Peter the Great, by a stroke of genius, decided upon a new capital. He wanted a new fulcrum for the more critical leverage of the century that was to come. He founded Petrograd, and using Petrograd as a lever Russia continued her work of expansion along the Baltic seaboard. First of all the Baltic provinces were secured. Then the northern shore of the Black Sea was secured by the annexation of the Crimea in the reign of Catherine the Great. Next the kingdom of Georgia became annexed to Russia by the voluntary act of its own ruler. That was the beginning of the conquest of the Caucasus. Then after the shock of the Napoleonic wars, during the nineteenth

century, Russia completed her great work of expansion by extending out to the far east of Siberia and by conquering Central Asia. Just before the Napoleonic wars there happened that very tragical and very strange and mysterious thing, the partition of Poland, the three partitions of Poland, which placed a very large territory in the west and south-west under the rule of Russia.

During the nineteenth century Russia became a very active participant in western civilisation, and there was an extraordinary development of civilisation in Russia, expressing itself in a very great variety of ways, in literature, in art, in economic and social life and in the development of political forms. This new and energetic and growing Russia, that was for the first time conscious of her great power and her great resources, that threw itself as a people heart and soul into the work of civilisation, had around it a great variety of nationalities, and it is a very remarkable thing that during the nineteenth century in Russia there was not only a very great and very brilliant Russian national movement, but several other national movements were either revived or began their work on the territory of the Russian Empire. You have heard of the magnificent Polish revival that gained its power and its pathos from the intense suffering of the Poles who had lost their inheritance. The nineteenth century saw the beginning and the rich development of the Finnish national movement. In the Caucasus, the ancient civilisations of Armenia and Georgia, which had sunk into decrepitude, which had lost their vigour and their power, were revived very largely because of

the contact of this old stream of civilisation with the new stream of Russian civilisation. Then, little by little, through the force of example, or the force of local conditions, there arose other national movements. Russia became the centre of the very interesting and very manifold Jewish movement. Then there came the Lettish and Esthonian movements, and in the Baltic region farther eastward arose a Mohammedan or Turkish movement. Then finally even some of the tribes of Eastern Siberia were touched, and there appeared the faint beginnings of a national movement among the Mongol Buddhists.

All these movements are very varied. Some are very strong. Some have a very clear perception of their objects. Some have already produced very definite results, and can show a record of bright achievement. Others are weak and feeble. Some of the movements draw their vigour from sources of their own. Others are dependent almost entirely upon Russian civilisation, drawing their material from Russian civilisation translated into their own tongue, and using it as a stimulus of the national force of their own people. Some are independent of Russian civilisation. Some are more or less dependent. Some are dependent partly on Russian and partly on Western civilisation. Some are dependent exclusively on Russian civilisation for the material with which they are building their new national home.

There is an extraordinary variety in these movements, and where there is movement there is conflict, there is conflict with the dominant people, with the Russians, or rather less with the people than with the

policy of the Government. Then there are fierce conflicts of the various nationalities amongst themselves, and the quarrels between the nationalities are very often much more violent than the conflict between Russia and any of the nationalities. There is conflict, there is movement, there is progress, there is disappointment, there is hope, there is tragedy. In the vast process that is Russia, we find as it were cosmical forces at work, tremendous cosmical forces of good and evil, on a scale that we in our quieter empire are hardly able to realise. And in this cosmical struggle there is tragedy, deep tragedy, and I think the note of tragedy will never be entirely absent from Russian history, because of the greatness of Russia, because of the tremendous task that lies before this group of peoples on the vast plain that stretches between the Baltic, the Black and the White Seas, afar to the Pacific and the frontiers of the Chinese Empire and the borders of Persia. There is tragedy in this. We cannot eliminate the tragedy, but at the same time, in spite of conflict, which comes from movement, in spite of suffering, which is due to participation, in the very great, very complex, historical process, in spite of baffling enigmas and crushing disappointments which we find ourselves unable to explain, in spite of all this there is joy in Russia, the joy of all these peoples of various origins, of various hopes, of various faiths, uniting on that vast expanse to create new types of rich human lives, to produce some new manifestation of the power of the human spirit which shall bring wealth and power and happiness to the world. For the sake of that great joy the pain and the tragedy can be borne.

THE NATIONALITIES OF RUSSIA

II

After the outbreak of the war, there was a wonderful scene in the Russian Duma. One after another, deputies representing various nationalities of the Empire arose to declare the devotion of their peoples to the great cause for which Russia had gone to war and their determination to make every effort and every sacrifice in order that Russia with the allies should secure the victory over Germany and Austria. It was an amazing scene. To me it was a revelation. Through study I had come to the conclusion, the fixed conviction, that underlying all the divergent interests of the nationalities there was a sense of unity. For years we had heard of suffering and oppression, for years we had heard of protests from all sides of the Empire against police and government measures of all kinds, and it appeared on a superficial view that there was no general interest at all, that the various nationalities were simply waiting for an opportunity to break away from Russia, that Russia at the first shock might fall asunder. That I could not believe, but these declarations in the Duma showed me as I had never realised before that Russia with all her variety was one, and that in a great moment of history, when she realised her purpose and her

destiny, her sons felt suddenly, and with a great joy, that they had a common aim. Much has happened since then, many sad things, many disappointing things. In some cases the enthusiasm is not so strong as it was then, but the fundamental fact remains, the fact that we have to take account of to-day, that all these various nationalities, in spite of their divergencies, constitute a unity.

In what does this unity consist? First of all, in all this apparent chaos and welter of things and races there are certain harmonising facts. There is a certain proportion. There are definite regions which are mutually complementary, economic regions, geographical regions; the basins of the great rivers, the mountains, and various parts of the plain, all constitute separate regions which in a curious way balance each other or interlace and supplement each other. But the chief factor in the unity of the Russian Empire is the Russian people, first of all, because of its numerical preponderance. Of the 170 millions of inhabitants of Russia, nearly one hundred millions are Russians of one kind or another, and this fact constitutes one of the great differences between Austria and Russia. In Austria there is no one nationality that very largely outnumbers the others, whereas in Russia you have this tremendous numerical preponderance of the Russian element. The influence of the Russian element is felt everywhere, because of the activity of the Russians, because the administrative organisation is in their hands, because their language is spoken in all the ends of the Empire. It is the language of administration. It is the main language of trade, of intercourse between

the various nationalities, and you will find that the Russian language influences very deeply the present-day languages of nearly all the nationalities of the Empire, just as English strongly influences present-day Welsh. Then again, most of the nationalities of the Empire are very largely led by Russian civilisation. They get their knowledge of modern European civilisation through Russian channels. The civilised values that they handle are derived very largely from Russian sources, are very often direct translations from the Russian. And this powerful combination of physical and moral factors in a very curious and subtle way binds these nationalities together in spite of their great divergencies, and in spite of features of Russian administration that very often arouse irritation, indignation, and protest. On the one hand, you have Russian administration, a very complex organisation, a very deep-rooted organisation, which is now undergoing a change, is very slowly and with great pain adapting itself to new economic and social conditions, is being loosened so as to allow greater space and room for economic and national development. This administrative organisation does, as a matter of fact, hold to a large extent the nationalities together. On the other hand, partly aided by this administrative organisation, partly thwarted by it, you have the extraordinary energy of Russian civilisation, which has very quickly outrun the political organisation, which has developed by leaps and bounds, which by an innate vigour of its own does most constantly affect every inhabitant of the Empire, and catches all the nationalities in the sweep of one great historical tendency.

Then again, Russian civilisation, while it has an assimilating effect, while it seems to mould the various peoples of the Empire after one type, has at the same time the effect of creating a new variety. First of all, you have an apparent assimilation. You find the old customs disappearing and people becoming simply modern. You find a dreary monotony in dress, in habits, in amusements. You see the cinematograph in all corners of the Empire, flashing out the same pictures that are shown in Paris, and London, and New York. The gramophone in the Urals drones out Tartar songs, and it all looks very melancholy and very depressing. But at the same time, under this appearance of assimilation there lie stimuli which provoke to new action all the elements of variety. The first stage is the new fashion. The second stage is the new initiative, in each region and in each nationality. There is first of all mere imitation, and then a growing realisation that these new civilised values can be adopted by the particular nationality, can be made their own by the various nationalities of the Empire, and can be used as elements of entirely new creations. That is the marvellous fact, that while the old varieties are disappearing a very wonderful new variety is arising, taking up into itself all the most vital elements of the old variety, and carrying them on to an entirely new era of civilisation. The Russian people, then, constitutes the chief factor in the unity of the Empire.

Now I have a very difficult task before me. I have to describe in the very short time that remains at my disposal some of the nationalities that compose the Russian Empire. I must admit that this Summer

School has filled me with deep admiration. During the past week I have seen you, ladies and gentlemen, taking in a knowledge of Russia in rapid deep breaths, and the keen interest you are displaying in a country to which I am deeply attached has touched me enormously. I may say the same on behalf of my Russian friends who have come here to lecture to you. Still the task I have before me is very difficult, and the number and variety of the nationalities of Russia is so great, that I cannot hope to do more now than to note some of the leading features in a few typical national questions.

Look first of all at the Russians, of whom there are nearly one hundred millions in all, of all types, the Great Russian, the Little Russian, and the White Russian, the three great divisions of the Russian people. You have heard in other lectures the history of the elements that made up the Russian people, of the wandering Slav tribes which gradually assimilated a great many of the peoples of the plain. Thus in the north and centre, in Great Russia, there is a very large admixture of Finnish blood, whilst in the south, among the Little Russians, there is a large admixture of Turkish blood. The White Russians of the West are considered by many scholars to be the purest specimens of the Slav race now living. I shall not dwell at length on the Great Russians, of whom a great deal has been written and been said, but I should like to say something about the Little Russians. You have perhaps heard something of the Ukraine movement. You know that the Austrian Government, during this war and before it, has published maps indicating that

as the result of a German victory they hoped for the creation of a Ukrainian State, comprising a part of Galicia and a very large part of Southern Russia. I have seen pamphlets written by Little Russians, or Ruthenians, or Ukrainians, as they are variously called, which advocate plans very much of the same kind. I must admit that the Ukraine movement is a very puzzling movement, because if you look at the Great Russian and Little Russian languages you will see that practically there is hardly more difference between them than between English and Scotch. When I was in Galicia last year, I spoke with Ruthenian peasants. I spoke Russian with slight modifications and they spoke their own language, and we understood each other perfectly. I had much more difficulty in understanding a cabman in Newcastle the other day than I had in understanding these people, although their language is declared to be a distinct language from Russian and a distinct literature is being created in this language. The fact of this difference in language is used as an argument sometimes by extreme Ukrainians for the establishment of a separate Ukraine State, and sometimes by the more moderate Ukrainians as a plea for the establishment at any rate of a separate administrative region for the whole of the Ukraine, or the greater part of Southern Russia. It is a very difficult question. There are certain differences of tradition, very powerful differences, between the Great Russians and the Little Russians. Their folk-songs are different, their music is different, and their temperament is different. In some respects the Southern Russian is the Irishman of Russia. Then, again, there

are differences of historical tradition. There never was an actual distinct Little Russian State in the complete sense of the word. In the Middle Ages, when the tide of Tartar invasion began to recede, the Southern Steppes were overrun by Cossacks, some of whom were Great Russians, and some of whom were Little Russians, that is, they spoke the Southern Russian dialect. They formed a military organisation whose allegiance swayed between Muscovy and Poland. They lived a very free and interesting life. They were altogether a most interesting people, but there never was a Little Russian State in the full sense of the word. There were differences in the development of civilisation. There were differences in the church organisation, which in Southern Russia was much more democratic. There were and are very great differences in land tenure, and there were certainly very great differences in spirit, and all these factors have created a marked distinction between the Great Russian and the Little Russian.

But again after the Southern Steppes had been conquered by Russia, and after the region had been gradually drawn into the general life of the Russian Empire, a certain unifying, a certain assimilating process went on, and the southern regions began to feel themselves more and more a part of a larger whole. Then in the early part of the last century arose a movement to promote the literary development of the Little Russian language, and the movement received a powerful stimulus in the work of a very talented poet, called Taras Shevchenko, whose poems have almost become folk-songs among the Little Russians of to-day. This movement did not constitute any danger to the Russian

Empire. It might have developed into a movement like the Provençal movement in France. But when reaction set in after the great reforms of the early sixties, the Russian Government took alarm, and the language movement in Little Russia was very largely suppressed. It was only permitted to print and publish in Little Russian fiction or poetry, and that not in the orthography chosen by the people themselves, but in the orthography of the Great Russian language. This aroused strong protest amongst the Ukrainians: the leaders of the movement were arrested and exiled. Then the movement passed to Galicia, where the eastern section of the population is Little Russian or Ukrainian. Lemberg became the new centre and Galicia became what the Ukrainians called the Piedmont of the Ukrainian movement. This development found favour with the Austrian Government, which saw in it partly a bulwark against Russia and partly a means of checking the growth of Polish power in Galicia. Then later on it was taken up by Germany as a means of impairing the unity of Russia.

In 1905, the embargo on the Ukrainian language was removed in Russia, great activity was developed, various works appeared, newspapers, novels, histories, poetry, translations, and so on in great quantities, and the Ukrainian movement gained a new life in Russia. Demands were presented for the autonomy of Ukraina, but the conception of the boundaries of the new state varied considerably. Moreover in the last fifty years the Great Russian language has made great progress over the whole of Southern Russia, and although the population of Southern Russia is now in

the bulk Little Russian, there is a big streak of Great Russian population amongst the Ukrainians. Sometimes there are islands of Great Russians, sometimes they are to be found in broad strips, and the language spoken in the towns is not the Little Russian but rather a variety of Great Russian with Jewish and occasionally Polish and Little Russian elements. It is a harsh language. It is a kind of new dialect of Great Russian, and you will find that as economical development progresses, as the industrial centres in Southern Russia increase, as the population migrates and mingles with other elements, the confusion will grow greater—you will find a sort of admixture between Great Russian and Little Russian, and the process of assimilation will develop more rapidly. And all this makes it difficult to determine how far any independent Ukrainian civilisation is possible in Southern Russia. I think the natural tendency is for the Russian literary language to gain the upper hand, even if all the present administrative restrictions were removed, because the removal of administrative restrictions would give Russian civilisation even greater power than it has now. At the same time it is perfectly obvious that if there is a genuine demand for instruction in Ukrainian in the schools, if it is found that Ukrainian children grow more rapidly into intelligent citizens if they receive primary instruction in their mother-tongue, if there is an increasing development of Ukrainian literature—it seems to me perfectly obvious that no administrative obstacles should be put in the way of the movement; and then my opinion is that ultimately, after very considerable vacillations, this Southern Russian language

movement might, in the great complexities of the Russian Empire, again assume largely a Provençal form; and as for the questions of administration, local government and so on, I think they might be solved in connection with the general tendency of decentralisation within the Empire. I do not wish to say anything absolutely definitive about the Ukrainian movement, because I am not entirely convinced by the very strong arguments of my friend Dr Struve; and at present I should like to leave the question open.

As to the White Russians, their dialect is so little different from Great Russian that it is hard to imagine that a White Russian movement of any considerable extent could arise. There is an incipient movement which is now being used by the Germans as a means of propaganda in Vilna, because the Germans wish to emphasise even minor distinctions within the Russian nation.

Coming to the non-Russian nationalities, in the north-west, we have Finland. I simply cannot discuss at length the Finnish question in the short time we have this morning, but there are two or three things I should like to say. First of all, Finland is mainly populated by the Finnish people, who are composed of three Finnish tribes, who, driven there by the northern movement of the Slavs, in their turn drove the Lapps to the far North. The Finnish people of Finland are not isolated. Their territory is geographically and geologically distinct from the neighbouring Russian territory, but they themselves as a people are by no means wholly isolated. In fact, they became a unity as the result of the competition between Sweden

and Russia around the Gulf of Finland. In the early days of Russian history, the Russians fought constantly with the Swedes, and the Finnish tribes passed sometimes under Russian rule, sometimes under Swedish rule, until finally Swedish rule was established in the whole of what is now Finland and over all but a certain portion of the Finnish people, who were left outside, in the governments of Archangel and Olonets; these were Orthodox, whilst the Finns in Finland were first of all Catholics and then when the Reformation came became Lutherans. Thus the main body of the Finns were almost exclusively under the influence of Swedish civilisation, and there was practically no Finnish movement until after the Finns came under Russian rule. The very peculiar conditions under which Finland became incorporated into the Russian Empire, with complete internal autonomy, with a kind of ring-fence separating the Finns from the rest of the peoples of the Empire, made it possible to develop within Finland a very interesting and a now very strong national movement, which first of all fought very hard against Swedish predominance. Swedish was the dominating language of the State, the language of the aristocracy, of the towns, of culture and of civilisation generally; and then, when the Finns suddenly discovered in the thirties, through the labours of the scholar, Elias Lönnrot, that they had a great national epic, there was a sudden uprush of national pride amongst the Finns, a great many people in the towns who had hitherto called themselves Swedes suddenly discovered that they were Finns, adopted the Finnish language and adapted it to literary purposes,

and then began the great contest for equal rights for the Finnish language within Finland. It was won by the Finns, and Swedish and Finnish gained equal rights in public life. The Finnish movement rapidly developed and during the last thirty years its progress has been most extraordinary, and so the Swedes, who were once predominant, find themselves being elbowed out of the land in which they were masters. The new Finnish literary language is in spirit, though not in structure or vocabulary, Scandinavian. It has produced literature, not great, perhaps, but very interesting, with a number of talented authors, of whom the novelists, Juhani Aho and Arvid Järnefeldt, are probably the best, some excellent poetry, some very interesting art, and also an extraordinarily effective scientific apparatus, an apparatus of learning of which the University of Helsingfors is the active centre. In the last few years, the autonomy of Finland has been limited in many ways. There has been a conflict between the Finns and the Russian Government. I cannot enter into the details of this conflict now, but I can only say that amongst the nationalities of the Empire the Finns occupy a very peculiar and so far distinct place, and as to their assimilation by the Russians or any other people in the world there is no question whatever, because there is no people in the world so tenacious of their nationality as the stubborn hard-headed Finns.

Then south of Finland you come to the Baltic Provinces, which include three nationalities, the Germans, who are in the great minority but hitherto have had nearly all the power in their hands, the Esthonians, and the Letts. The Esthonians and the Letts have in

common their general subjugation to the Germans who, by means of the Order of the Sword, a branch of the Teutonic Order, conquered them in the thirteenth century and after fierce battles subdued them and held them in serfdom until the beginning of the last century. But there is a great deal of difference between the Esthonians and the Letts in spite of the community of their historical experience and their long subjugation to German culture. The Esthonians are related to the Finns, and the common people of Esthonia and the Finns understand one another perfectly well, although the educated Finns and Esthonians understand one another with greater difficulty. The Letts are an entirely different people, and are akin to the Lithuanians who live farther south. The Esthonians and the Letts owe the beginnings of their own culture to their hard training under the Germans. There are no people in the world who hate the Germans more than the Esthonians and Letts do, because of the bitterness of their serfdom. The hatred is simply elemental. If you look into the past history of the Letts and Esthonians, you will find that occasionally the Barons were on excellent terms with their serfs, treated them kindly, provided education for them, and helped them in various ways; but the general effect of serfdom was so cruel that what it was can only be realised by seeing the vindictive hatred of the Letts and the Esthonians for their former masters. The hatred of the Letts was expressed in the most violent form in the Lettish revolution of 1905, which was followed by cruel repression in the early part of the following year. The new civilisation of the Letts and the Esthonians is partly

of German origin and partly Russian, but the intercourse of both peoples with the Russians is growing closer, and they are subjected more and more to the influence of Russian civilisation and culture.

Then south of the Letts, you have the Lithuanians, in the governments of Vilna and Grodno, and the Suwalki government in the kingdom of Poland. I wish I had more time to tell you about the Lithuanians. They are one of the most interesting peoples in the Russian Empire. Their language is extremely old, with forms as old as Sanscrit, and I have an idea that the Lithuanians have stayed near their original home during the whole course of their existence. There is a curious feeling about them. Their neighbours call them sorcerers and wizards. Up to the seventeenth century they worshipped their gods in groves and had an institution of vestal virgins, who kept the sacred fire burning. There were prophets and soothsayers, and there were curious manifestations of tree-worship. Then the history of Lithuania and its contact with the Teutonic Order is extremely interesting, but all that wonderful story I have no time to tell now. The Lithuanians, too, have lately developed their national movement, with its newspapers, novels, poems, and its apparatus of propaganda.

I have left myself hardly time to speak of one very important question, that of the Jews, but I must ask your very careful attention to this for just a few moments longer. I have not spoken of the Polish question for two reasons: in the first place it has been already admirably expounded to you by Mr Roman Dmowski and other lecturers during the week, and,

in the second place, the Polish question stands on a quite distinct plane from the question of the other nationalities of the Russian Empire. The question of which I have now to speak is one of which very much is heard in England: it is a burning question, and indeed I think it the most difficult question in the whole Russian Empire, and that is the Jewish question. The greater part of the Jews came into the Russian Empire with the partition of Poland, and the region they were compelled by law to inhabit comprises the western and southern provinces of European Russia, the so-called Pale of Settlement, which through the vicissitudes of the war has been abolished, I hope for ever. Now the Jewish question is so very difficult, it is such a tragic question, that it cannot be discussed only in terms of current politics; it cannot be understood if it is made the subject of invective on either one side or the other. It is too deep. It cannot be treated casually or flippantly, and one thing I should like to establish is that while the Jewish question is most acute in Russia it is not only a Russian question but a world question, and, even if the present political disabilities of the Jews in Russia are removed, the Jewish question will not have been finally solved. The Jewish question, constantly present and ever evading solution, is one of the very strange experiences by which the human race in persistent self-questioning is finding its way to a clearer knowledge of itself. It is a difficult question. The finest of the Jews realise this difficulty, and it has led some of them to adopt as their ideal Zionism, or the establishment of a Jewish centre of civilisation in Palestine. But in Russia the Jewish question is most acute, first of all

because nowhere else are there so many Jews in a compact mass, and in the second place because of the marked inadequacy of Russian administrative methods as they are brought to bear on the complex necessities of the case. These are the two elements which make the Jewish problem in Russia so acute and perplexing. On the one hand you have the cruel and intolerable oppression of the Jews. You have the perpetual humiliation and irritation of the Jews in the small towns, who have no room for expansion, who live poor and miserable lives; you have the long long tale of their bitter suffering, and at the same time you have such facts as the growing power of the Jewish element in finance in Petrograd and Moscow, in banking, and commerce, and industry, and the very powerful influence of the Jews in the intellectual life of the Russians. You have these two sides, and both these sides must be clearly borne in mind. But the interesting thing in Russia is that the very intensity of Jewish suffering in Russia stimulates the efforts of the Jews, and of those who understand who the Jews are and what they are, to find a real solution. These efforts go in various directions. On the one hand there is a constant fight to secure elementary rights of existence in Russia on a level with the other inhabitants of the great plain, and at the same time there is an effort, which is now largely crowned with success, to bring about a new Jewish national revival, and the inner life of the Jews in Russia is extremely interesting because of this conflict of aims and ambitions, and because in the long run this movement is illumined by a spiritual light. I believe that after the war, after the great struggle not

only with the enemy but with ourselves, with our own limitations, is fought through, after the war is won, not only will the Jews secure in Russia the conditions for a tolerable existence, but I believe that other nationalities, including many of whom I have had no time to speak, those twenty millions of Russian Turks, who are now awakening to a new national life, the Armenians, the Georgians, and all the rest, who are struggling towards a new civilisation,—that all these nationalities will secure liberty for themselves and liberty to co-operate to the full extent of their powers, and with a complete confidence in the value of their own contribution, in the great work which this enormous and complex Russian Empire is called to accomplish. In this strange adventure of spiritual discovery, in the great march of these manifold groups of men into the unseen future, I believe that all the nationalities of the Russian Empire will combine as a choir of many voices with many wonderful instruments, to sing a joyful song of conquest over the mystery which surrounds us all.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND LEARNING IN RUSSIA

Friendly intercourse, either between nations or individuals, cannot be achieved without mutual knowledge and appreciation of their respective moral forces: for moral forces prove to be powerful springs of action not only in times of peace, but also in times of war, when they reach, in certain cases, their utmost tension and incite men to great deeds.

Although moral forces are not all concentrated in thought, this principle has the greatest combining power of them all and exercises it both in peaceful and warlike activities: thought implies unity of cognition, constantly referred to an object other than the mental state itself, and brings men forward to some definite end, leading through the intricacies of life to a higher destiny¹.

These considerations prompt me to draw your attention at this Meeting, the main subject of which is the study of Russian civilization, to Russian thought, past and present.

The term "thought," as stated above, particularly in its methodic sense, is distinguished from "will" and

¹ W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, I, p. 186. Cf. Th. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, I, pp. 1-5; II, pp. 627-628.

"feeling"; but, even with this restriction, it is still too wide for our present object: I shall use it often to cover the leading principles and general movements of philosophy, science, and learning and apply it in this sense to the psychological and historic study of such development in Russia.

The solution of such a problem in its totality would be, probably, unattainable for any one man, even if he were familiar with all branches of human knowledge—science and learning. I have, of course, no such claims and intend to give you merely an approximate idea of what might be done to elucidate some general aspects of Russian thought, as manifested in the scientific and learned work, which is going on in Russia.

Thus conceived, the historical study of Russian thought implies, however, manifold problems: it must be considered not merely in its leading principles but in its characteristic features, and not only in its general movement but in its special development, which depends on local and temporal conditions of Russian life. I have therefore to deal with two sets of problems, concerning Russian science and learning: (1) the leading principles and characteristic features; (2) the general movement and special development. The two sets are, of course, closely connected one with another; in clearing them up I shall take into account this connection.

These problems are not easy to solve; and they grow even more perplexing, if thought be considered as part of a more complicated whole, namely consciousness, and be studied in its relations to will and feeling; if it be, moreover, observed in the process of

its realization and regarded as a leading factor in conscious activity. These new problems cannot be treated here at length; but I think I ought not to leave them out entirely, and I shall touch upon them slightly in some concluding remarks on Russian conceptions of consciousness as a whole and on their realization in Russian life.

I

Every thought which has a pretence to knowledge must be unified knowledge; not merely philosophy but every manifestation of science and learning aims more or less at such an end and tries to attain it in different ways.

This principle of unity of thought must be distinguished from the process of unification; it can be realized by different factors or modes of thought.

Two of these, which, in the main, do not exclude one another, deserve, perhaps, some attention: I mean intuitive and discursive thought. Intuitive thought is a spontaneous, creative and inventive power. Discursive thought is a controlling, methodic and orderly power. They can be associated in one person, and this combination is perhaps one of the most pregnant characteristics of genius; but they can be dissociated and represented by different persons belonging to the same or to different nations.

One of the best writers on the history of modern science has made an attempt to apply this distinction to different types of modern European thought: he identified two logically different factors or modes of

thought with two actual national types of thought and found these modes existing in different peoples¹.

Even if this scheme should prove to be true for the characteristics of the thought of some other nations, it would, probably, be too artificial to explain Russian thought. Russian thought can hardly be characterized by either of these modes, and eminent Russian scientific and learned men have been distinguished by the predominance of one or other of them. Besides, some peculiarities of Russian thought, at least, had a much more complicated and concrete origin: they were and still are, in a certain degree, dependent on local and temporal conditions which will be examined here from a historical point of view, mainly in connection with the process of unification.

The unifying principles of Russian thought can be perceived in its history and were formed at its different stages in a religious or secular spirit. Let us consider this in some detail and illustrate our statement by some examples.

I

Religious thought, whatever may be the factors of its evolution, gives, even at its lowest stages, a conception of the world, which tends to a certain unity. Even in heathen times we can trace such a frame of

¹ L. Duhem, *La Science Allemande*, Paris 1915, pp. 4 *sqq.* The author applies this distinction, already stated by Pascal, to the characteristics of French and German thought. Similar ideas have been expounded in the collective work edited by P. Petit and M. Leudet, with an introduction by P. Deschanel, under the title: *Les Allemands et la Science*, Paris, 1916, pp. v, 38-39, 48, etc.

mind. Although Russian mythology could not, of course, reach systematic unity, it contained some germs of unification, around which the varieties of heathen experience were gathered; although the Russian Olympus, even after the attempt of Vladimir Svyatoslavovich to restore the heathen cult, cannot be arranged in a strict hierarchy¹, yet its chief deity, the angry and jealous Perun, appears as a "centre of crystallisation" for various conceptions concerning the creative powers and processes of nature, connected with thunder-storms and thunder-showers, and even embracing some elements of culture: thus vivifying fire could be obtained, according to tradition, from the oak-tree, which was sacred to Perun; oaths were tendered in his name, and so on.

This unifying tendency became much stronger in Christendom.

Christian monotheism, of course, could not at once abolish polytheistic superstitions, and even in our own times some Russian peasants (for instance, in the government of Pskof) mention Perun in their oaths; but the baptism of Vladimir Svyatoslavovich and his people revealed to them the idea of an Almighty Creator and a benevolent Providence, and thus introduced a somewhat transcendental but harmonious conception of the world, which can be traced, for instance, in the precepts of Vladimir Monomach and other literary works of that time.

This unification in a religious and Christian spirit was, however, transformed by degrees into a dogmatic

¹ Е. Аничковъ, Язычество и древняя Русь, С.-Пб. 1914, pp. 308-328.

subordination. The Orthodox Church swayed the minds of mediaeval men and regulated the aims of their knowledge: it was thought necessary to elaborate the revealed teaching of the Church into a well-balanced system of concepts and to develop it in a chain of regular syllogisms.

This subordination enslaved science and produced scholastic learning. This principle is represented, for instance, by St John Damascene: his treatise on dialectics, in which he tried to adapt the logic of the ancient schools to the teachings of the Orthodox Church, was translated into "Slavonic," and circulated in Russian copies of the 15th century and later¹. Maxim the Greek, one of the disciples of John Damascene, formulated this theory in Russian as follows: "logic can be useful in so far as it is employed by us to glorify the Lord and stirs up our love for Him; but it cannot contradict His holy words and must endeavour to agree with them²." Zinovy Otensky, a pupil of Maxim the Greek, conformed to the same doctrine, though he admitted that reason must play a certain part in theological controversies³. A friend of Maxim the Greek—the monk Artemius, also expressed the same idea in one of his letters to the Tsar Ivan the Terrible: "true reason," he said, "is always confirmed

¹ Иоаннъ Дамаскинъ, Діалектика, Russ. transl. Моск. 1862, p. 9; cf. pp. 54-55, 67, 92, 97-98, 103, 104, 106-107, 108-109, etc.

² Максимъ Грекъ, Сочиненія, Казань, 1859-1862, P. II, p. 75; cf. P. I, pp. 246-250, 356-357, 462, 545; P. III, pp. 180 *sqq.*

³ Зиновій Отенскій, Показаніе истины, Казань, 1863, pp. 51, 53-54, 57, 357, etc.

by the Bible; and reason, when it contradicts the Bible, is false¹."

Thus the principle that reason must be subordinated to revelation was expounded by a father of the Greek Orthodox Church, was stated by a series of Russian writers of the 15th and 16th centuries, and prevailed even in the 17th in Muscovy.

From this point of view the Bible (so far as it was translated) supplied the place of scientific and learned works on nature and man; pious commentaries, e.g., those of Georgius Pisides on God's creation, took the place of treatises on natural science; and the lives of the saints, particularly the great collection of the Metropolitan Macarius, stood for monographs on moral and historical subjects.

Although Greek culture was much better fitted for such a rôle, Russian men of letters began to have recourse to Latin civilization and to study Latin books, particularly those which were of use for theological controversy and scholastic learning. By degrees some notions on formal logic, some dissertations of Aristotle on natural science, expounded in this spirit, some treatises of Thomas Aquinas on justice and other topics, and some works on history, for instance, the chronicle of Martin Byelsky, penetrated into Russia².

This movement developed first in Kiev, and somewhat later spread to Moscow.

¹ С. Вилинскій, Посланія старца Артемія, Одесса, 1906, pp. 44, 52, etc.

² А. Соболевскій, Переводная литература Московской Руси XIV-XVII Вѣковъ, С.-Пб. 1903, pp. 20, 44, 53, etc.

The enlightened metropolitan of Kiev, Peter Mogila, transformed the famous school at Kiev into a college in 1631; he himself had a humanistic conception of knowledge and education, but the place became later, under Polish influence, a centre of scholastic learning; the enlightened spirit of this college was well represented by Stephen Yavorsky, one of the professors who lectured there for some years before the college was transformed into a theological seminary.

The wise monk Simeon Polotsky, one of the opponents of the learned Epiphanius Slavinetsky, began, probably in 1664, to impart in Moscow the Latin learning, that he had got from the Kiev college and from the Polish schools in Vilna and other cities; one of his pupils—Silvester Medvedyev, was a zealous partisan of Latin learning and took a lively part in the contest, which arose thus early between the *zapadniki* and *vostochniki*, i.e., the partisans of "Western" Latin civilization and those who, like the monk Euthymius and the brothers Lihudy, maintained the "Eastern" Greek tradition¹.

These fears were not entirely unfounded. Men who applied themselves to Latin civilization were sometimes unable to preserve the Greek faith from

¹ The bibliographical notes of Рупин (Исторія русской литературы, С.-Пб. 1898, II, pp. 365–368, 419–423) should be supplemented at least by the following works: С. Голубевъ, Исторія Кіевской духовной академіи (періодъ до-Могилянскій, К. 1886). Н. Петровъ, Кіевская Академія во второй половинѣ XVII вѣка, К. 1895. С. Голубевъ, Кіевскій митрополитъ Петръ Могила, К. 1898, v. II. М. Сменцовскій, Братья Лихуды, С. Пб. 1899. Т. Моревъ, Камень Вѣры, С.-Пб. 1904.

contamination and to square with its principles all the ideas, more or less intimately connected with the Catholic or Protestant confessions and their sects. Thus Maxim the Greek was somewhat troubled by the ideas he learned during his residence in Italy; Silvester Medvedyev was accused of having expressed Latin rationalistic opinions on transubstantiation; and Matvei Bashkin was perhaps influenced by Protestant or Calvinistic ideas as regards transubstantiation and some other doctrines.

But the fundamental point of view, from which all this knowledge acquired some unity, continued to be religious. The Russian scholars of the 16th and 17th centuries were obliged to conform to the precepts of Russian Orthodoxy, as expounded in the "Profession" of Peter Mogila and the later treatises of Stephen Yavorsky and Theophan Prokopovich, though these were influenced to some extent by Catholic and Protestant ideas. Orthodoxy continued to subdue reason and to humble its independent creative power: for a long time it preserved among Russian scholars the dogmatic and traditional conception of science and learning, and produced such a view as might be expected of natural and historical phenomena. This point of view was conspicuous even in branches of knowledge which, apparently, had nothing to do with theology: thus, the results of arithmetical operations were considered as "miraculous"; different positions of the signs of the zodiac were "explained" by movements produced by angels; peculiar habits of animals were explained in accordance with Christian traditions; and historical facts were selected in

order to exalt our past history in the spirit of orthodoxy.

Orthodox conceptions predominated, moreover, at least in a speculative sense, in the scheme expounded in the "Domostroi" and in political theories acknowledged by the Muscovite government: the Tsar was regarded as the vicegerent of God, and his autocratic power as coming from a divine source. Moscow was represented as the "third Rome," which, after the decline of the first and the second Rome, i.e., Constantinople, was considered to be the principal centre of the Orthodox world. These theories, developed by the monk Philotheus and Joseph Volotsky, were acknowledged by the Tsar Ivan the Terrible and his successors. They had some influence on our political relations with other Orthodox Slavonic nations¹.

This unifying orthodox conception of the world was, however, a dogmatic construction: it suppressed the varieties of religious experience and fettered the development of Russian thought. This is the principal reason why the Orthodox system could not endure: it was crippled by the great Schism (*Raskol*), which embodied a protest in regard to some religious rites, and it was unable to stifle the growing power of secular thought in Russia.

¹ П. Миллюковъ, *Очерки*, С.-Пб. 1897, II, pp. 243-266. A. Lappo-Danilevsky, *L'idée de l'Etat*, etc., in *Essays in legal history*, ed. by P. Vinogradoff, Oxford, 1913, pp. 357-360.

The gradual rise of secular thought in Russia was due to many causes. If we consider these in order of their importance, which, however, does not always correspond to historical sequence, we must notice especially the consciousness of the meaning of truth: in its crudest form it manifests itself in that curiosity which men have about wonderful things; and this feeling was alive in Russians, in the time of the first monarchs of the Romanov dynasty; they interested themselves in "curiosities" that fell within their reach, together with some inventions and novelties which came from foreign lands. But this curiosity could only grow into love of knowledge by reason of its practical value: secular thought was particularly appreciated in its technical applications, and this conception was, for instance, duly expounded in a book on the military art printed by order of the Tsar Alexei Michailovich.

The practical usefulness of science and learning was really one of the essential causes of their development, and the consciousness of this is conspicuous in the popular encyclopedias of the 17th century, known as *azbukovniki*. Every man of course needed some knowledge of grammar for correct reading and writing, of arithmetic for reckoning, of geometry for measuring, of geography for travel and foreign relations, of history for politics, and so on. In view of these practical needs elementary manuals were composed particularly in the 17th century: thus Meletius Smotitsky wrote the first detailed "Slavonic" grammar in 1619¹; Basile Burzev

¹ This grammar was printed in Eviev' near Vilna in 1619, and reprinted with some modifications in Moscow in 1648.

compiled the first Russian arithmetic in 1645; Bogdan Lykov translated Mercator's Geography in 1637, and some of the manuscript copies contained additional Russian notes; Innokenty Giesel produced in 1674 an historical survey of the "beginnings of the Slavonic Russian people and of the first Russian princes, who reigned in Kiev."

In fulfilling these practical ends, secular thought had much more liberty to display itself: and this point of view became predominant in the time of Peter the Great¹. He was not without curiosity and even pure love of knowledge; but he appreciated chiefly the public utility of science and learning: thus he used science to build fortresses or ships and organize factories; he wished learning to justify his politics and to glorify his victories.

His reforms were to some extent facilitated by the influence that the Renaissance and the subsequent movements had already exercised on Russian thought, particularly in the 17th century.

The humanistic and individualistic spirit of the Renaissance was not quite unknown to the Russians of the 17th century. Peter Mogila, the enlightened metropolitan of Kiev, had an opportunity of learning something about it, and the monk Epiphanius Slavinet-sky, who came from Kiev to Moscow, was acquainted with some of its literary productions. For instance, Russian translations of the treatises of Vesalius on anatomy and of Mozhevsky on politics prove that this movement was beginning to penetrate into literary circles at Moscow.

¹ А. Лаппо-Данилевский, Петръ Великій, основатель Императорской Академіи Наукъ, С.-Пб. 1914, сс. 6-16.

The confessional type of culture which predominated in Europe even in the 17th century had also some influence on Russian literature: Krizhanich was one of the most fervent adherents of Catholic culture. But this type was obliged to give way to the Protestant atmosphere, which found a powerful supporter in Peter the Great and was fairly well assimilated by one of his adherents—the high-spirited Theophan Prokopovich. This influence promoted the development in Russia of the individualistic and rationalistic spirit which permeated, for instance, the conceptions of one of the friends of Protestant culture—Dmitri Tveritinov: he would have paid for his boldness with his life, if Peter the Great had not hushed up the affair (1711–1723).

Thus the growth of secular thought in Russia was to some extent secured by the Emperor himself: in 1725 he founded, for instance, the Academy of Sciences in order that its members might cultivate science and learning and thus refute the opinion according to which Russians were “barbarians.” But Peter the Great was much more anxious to propagate technical knowledge among his subjects: he entrusted, at least partly, this business to the Academy and invited some foreign teachers for the purpose; one of them, called Farquharson, edited manuals of geometry, algebra and trigonometry (1719, 1730); and these were supplemented by elementary books on geodesy (1708), mechanics (1722) and other subjects.

At the same time Peter the Great ordered translations to be made of some of the best works on geography, architecture, fortification and artillery, ship-building and navigation, jurisprudence, history and

other topics; the chief authors translated were Varenius, Vignola, Vauban and Braun, Allard and Manson, Puffendorff and Stratemann; the Tsar printed, moreover, a defence of his right to dethrone his own son, with quotations from Hobbes and Grotius: and he published a pamphlet, explaining the circumstances that provoked the Great Northern war.

The stream of thought, produced by these somewhat artificial and, in certain cases, violent means, continued to flow and received some new contributions in the 18th and 19th centuries, from German, French and English sources.

These influences, on which I cannot dwell at length, were of different kinds: German philosophy excited in Russian coteries a growing interest in the problem of unity of thought, of a systematic conception of the world, of a harmonious comprehension of nature and man; but it was often marked by its transcendent, metaphysical character, and exceeded the limits of positive science and learning which German scholars were introducing into Russia.

In this respect German influence was supplemented by other movements: French sensualism and English empiricism did much to promote the rise of secular thought and its development in Russia; and the culmination of French and English science which crowned the 18th century and inaugurated the 19th has contributed as much as German learning, and perhaps even more, to the growth of Russian thought in its secular aspect. These influences enriched it, moreover, with new and valuable contents.

The influence of Germany on Russian thought,

particularly during the 18th century and the first half of the 19th, must be stated without hesitation. The philosophical ideas of Leibniz and Wolf, of Kant, Herder, and others, penetrated into Russia chiefly through the Academy of Sciences of Petrograd, and the University of Moscow, founded in 1755. After the philosophers of the period of "Enlightenment" came the turn of idealism as taught by Fichte and especially by Schelling and Hegel; this had great vogue in Russian coteries between 1832 and 1848; and of somewhat later date is the temporary ascendancy of Moleschott's materialism, and the theories of Feuerbach, Marx and Engel, which were eagerly welcomed by socialistic groups.

Various branches of science and learning were also planted on Russian soil by German scholars: the great mathematician Euler assisted in the foundation of a Russian mathematical school; the famous historian Schloezer contributed to the formation of Russian historical studies; somewhat later and at different times Weierstrass, Bunsen, Liebig, Ritter, Grimm, Savigny, Ranke, Droysen and Mommsen, besides many others, trained Russian students in mathematics, chemistry, linguistics and folklore, and in history¹.

¹ П. Пекарский, История Императорской Академии Наукъ въ С.-Петербургѣ, С.-Пб., 1870, 1873, v. I, pp. lix *sqq.*, 74, 82-83, etc.; v. II, pp. 352, 360, 363-64, etc. С. Шевыревъ, История Московскаго Университета, М., 1855, pp. 31, 92, 134-135, 147, 148, 187, 188, 204-205. Словарь профессоровъ Московскаго Университета, v. I, pp. 5, *sqq.*, etc. А. Пыпинъ, Характеристики литературныхъ мнѣній отъ двадцатыхъ до пятидесятихъ годовъ, С.-Пб., 1890, pp. 245, *sqq.*

French and English influences were less organized: they made way into Russia chiefly through personal intercourse and literature, and were of somewhat later origin. These connections grew conspicuous in the times of the French *encyclopédistes*, Voltaire, Diderot and others; and the Frenchmen drew the growing attention of Russian readers to Locke and Hume and their followers.

From that time Russian cultured classes became familiar with some of the ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau, Mably and Raynal, Helvétius and Holbach; and somewhat later they became aware of the theories of Adam Smith, Blackstone and Bentham¹. It is clear that German influence was relatively much more exclusive in Russia in the first half of the 18th century than later on. A comparison between two enlightened Russian critics and historians of those times, Tatishchev and Shcherbatov, is enough to prove this. Tatishchev borrowed much from German sources, Shcherbatov was fairly well acquainted with French literature and had some idea even of English, though he could not read it in the original.

By degrees French and English influences encountered the influence of Germany and thus preserved Russian scholars from complete subjection to German thought: this is conspicuous, for instance, in the *Philosophical Propositions* of Kozelsky and in works of somewhat later origin².

Many of these were conceived under the influence

¹ E. Haumant, *La culture française en Russie* (1700-1900), Paris, 1910, pp. 104-118, 132-144, 156-157, etc.

² Я. Козельский, *Философскія предложенія*, С.-Пб. 1786.

of French and English ideas. The theories of the "idéologues," and particularly those of Destutt de Tracy, had made some impression on the reformers known as the Decembrists; and after the second half of the sixties, the ideas of Comte had some vogue among Russian cultured classes. The views expressed by Mill and Spencer on the Positive Philosophy appeared at once in Russian translations, and nearly all their principal works became accessible to Russian readers. Also modern French science and learning proved to be of great value for the development of Russian thought: Cauchy and Ampère, Dumas and Berthelot, Pasteur and Bernard, St Simon, Proudhon and Fourier, Guizot, Thierry and Michelet, Renan, Fustel de Coulanges and others exercised an influence, partly personal and partly literary, on Russian students. Contemporary English science and learning produced similar results: the great ideas and discoveries of Faraday and Thomson (Lord Kelvin), of Dalton and Maxwell, of Lyell and Darwin, the acute investigations and liberal opinions of Bentley and Gibbon, the brilliant narrative of Macaulay and bold generalizations of Buckle, the suggestive inferences of Tylor, Maine and other writers, could not pass unnoticed in Russia, and some of these writers exercised a considerable influence on Russian minds: for instance, Darwin's investigations into the origin of species were expounded by Kutorga at the University of Petrograd as early as 1860 and found many Russian supporters; and the diffusion of Buckle's ideas among the cultured classes astonished one of his countrymen, when travelling in Russia in the seventies.

These combined influences did much for the development of Russian thought: they relaxed the authority of Orthodox dogma and stimulated free thought. But this state of mind produced a reaction, which manifested itself in mysticism and in freemasonry, first introduced into Russia about 1830. One of the first Russian philosophers—Skovoroda (1722-1794)—was a mystic, who declared that “the invisible” was the essence of the “visible” and must be studied by means of self-knowledge which he combined with some degree of rationalism; one of the Russian freemasons—the well-known Novikov—organized the “typographic company” and the Russian book-trade in 1782.

Thanks to these influences the consciousness of the value of true knowledge deepened: it was expressed in a somewhat clearer manner by Lomonosov. He declared that “faith and truth are own sisters: they proceed from one Almighty Father and can never come into conflict”; and he supposed that the terms “religious action” or “holy action” could properly be applied, in a certain sense, to scientific thought, but that the latter must have its own separate domain. Thus Lomonosov acknowledged the absolute value of science, and this conception grew clearer in subsequent writers.

The variety of these influences must also be noted: it gave to the Russian cultured classes the opportunity of selecting knowledge from different sources and favoured the development of freedom from prejudice and tradition; it enlarged the sphere of their ideas and nourished in them a cosmopolitan and humanistic spirit; it acquainted them with many-sided manifes-

tations of science and learning. This can be traced, for instance, in the works of Radishchev, one of the most enlightened Russian writers of the 18th century, an outspoken critic of despotism and an irreconcilable foe to serfdom.

This variety of influences had, however, one serious defect: it was wanting in unity. And Russian secular thought could attain this unity only after growing independent and in this sense national. Such a unifying national thought was needed, in order to work out this second-hand knowledge and perfect it by discoveries of its own.

National spirit was already very strong in the Muscovite State; but, being intimately connected with Orthodoxy, it could not actively promote secular thought. In the next century this connection was relaxed and foreign predominance produced a national reaction, shown for instance in the animosity, which arose in the Academy between Lomonosov and his German colleagues: he firmly believed in his own creative powers and urged his countrymen to "display their merit." But it was only after the wars which freed Russia and other countries from the dominion of Napoleon, that this national spirit manifested itself in a corresponding doctrine. Byelinsky wrote in 1834: "Romanticism was the principle proclaimed in the times of Pushkin, nationality is the alpha and omega of our own times," and in the name of this "national spirit" Nadezhdin required from his countrymen appreciation of their national individuality, and proper pride in themselves. This doctrine was developed by the Slavophiles—Kiryéevsky, Homyakov, and Aksakov,

and later by Danilevsky, the critic of Darwinism, by his friend Strachov and others; some of the "Westerners" also, chiefly Solovyev and Kavelin, were inclined to accept it, but in a different sense. And thus independence of thought was reinforced, to a certain degree, by national feeling.

This independent spirit might have grown much more quickly and continuously, if it had been placed in suitable political conditions: but political circumstances were not favourable to it. I shall not speak of the times when Moscow was a fortified camp, rather than a centre of civilization; but even in later periods of Russian history, when thought was growing up, it was held under considerable restraint.

This occurred of course in times of reaction, for instance, in the last years of Catherine's reign, after the French revolution (1790-1796); under Alexander I, after havoc had been made in the Universities of Petrograd and Kazan, and, in a less degree, of Moscow (1820-1823); in the times of Nicholas I, after the execution of the Decembrists; and particularly after 1848, when philosophy was practically banished from Russian Universities for 13 years (1850-1863), when science and learning were subjected to the strictest supervision, when the Westerners and even the Slavophiles, for instance Herzen and Homyakov, were secretly watched by the police.

In fact, only under the reign of Alexander II, after the "great reforms" of the sixties, after the abolition of serfdom, the promulgation of the new code for the Universities in 1863 and the foundation of many schools for both sexes, the temporary lightening of the censor-

ship in 1865 and some other amendments, Russian thought began to develop more rapidly and to disentangle itself from foreign leading-strings.

Thus the rise of Russian secular thought, produced by the causes which have been considered above, began to manifest itself as early as the 18th century; but it grew more conspicuous only when the combined action of these causes coincided with favourable circumstances and the reforms just mentioned, and this occurred only in the middle of the 19th century: since then Russian thought has developed more independently and continuously, and this can be confirmed in various departments of Russian science and learning.

The process of development manifested itself in different domains of knowledge in Russia during the 18th and 19th centuries.

It can be studied either from a quantitative and statistical or from a qualitative and genetic point of view.

General statistical accounts of the growth of science and learning and of the nationality of its chief representatives in Russia hardly exist. Some approximate data, however, concerning the Imperial Academy of Sciences, are in this respect particularly characteristic. During the 18th century the Academy had 107 actual members; only 34 of them, that is 31.98 %, or, if we exclude three members from the Baltic provinces and three members from Finland, only 26.17 %, were Russians; of the

foreign members 65 % were Germans. During the 19th century and down to 1908, out of 189 members of the Academy, 139 or 73.96 % (or, if we exclude 16 members from the Baltic provinces and two members from Finland, 69.31 %) were Russians; of the foreign members most were still Germans, 64 %¹. Thus the percentage of Russian members of the Academy rose during the whole period from 26.17 % to 69.31 %.

The development of Russian thought in a qualitative or genetic sense manifested itself in different ways: in course of time it revealed much more creative power and became more continuous, thanks to the formation of scientific schools, institutions, and other mediums of communication; but this evolution can be illustrated here only by a few examples².

¹ И. Янжуль, Национальность и продолжительность жизни наших академиковъ, in Изв. Академии Наукъ, 1913, pp. 284-290. These data are not quite precise; 9 Russian members of the 18th century and 19 of later date are of unknown origin as regards province.

² A general survey of the history of different branches of science and learning, literature and art in Russia is given in the articles of the Russian Cyclopaedia of Brockhaus and Euphron; they were published in a separate volume under the title: Россия, ея настоящее и прошедшее, С.-Пб. 1900; see pp. 5-8, 128-30, 139-142, 423-425, 430-446, 581-859, 887-889. For some information on public instruction, see *ib.*, pp. 382-420. The modern general dictionaries of national biography are not yet finished; see Русский Биографический Словарь, издаваемый Императорскимъ Русскимъ Историческимъ Обществомъ, С.-Пб. 1896, *sqq.*, of which 23 volumes have already appeared; С. Венгеровъ, Источники словаря русскихъ писателей, С.-Пб., 1900-1914, vols. I-III (Ааронъ-Ломоносовъ); С. Венгеровъ,

In a certain degree this process can be noticed even in theology, for instance in the "Introduction" of Macarius Bulgakov to the Principles of Orthodoxy and in an analogous treatise of Philaret Yumilevsky, containing a criticism of German rationalism.

This development, however, is much more conspicuous in Russian philosophy, mathematics, and various branches of knowledge concerning Reality.

The prevalent influence of foreign, and particularly German, philosophy over Russian thought lasted a long while; but in course of time German idealism and materialism found some critics among Russian scholars of the forties and sixties.

From this point of view Sidonsky tried to connect "speculation" with experience, and the Slavophiles proved to be more original than the "Westerners": Kiryéevsky and particularly Homyakov refuted the rationalism of Hegel, whilst Ryedkin and particularly Chicherin remained more faithful to its principles. The Slavophiles had a wider conception of consciousness as a whole than the "Westerners" and hence were not inclined to agree with the rationalistic formulas of Hegelianism which failed to give a satisfactory explanation of reality; but even Chicherin tried to introduce some corrections in the logic of Hegel, and some other

Критико-біографическій словарь русских писателей и ученых, С.-Пб., 1886, *sqq.*, vols. I-VI. Further bibliographical information may be seen in the article of P. Simoni on Russian Bibliography in the Russian Cyclopaedia of Brockhaus and Euphron (new edition), VI, pp. 432-502, particularly pp. 492-497. Subsequent notes appended to these lectures contain only general references: I could not over-burden them with more detailed indications.

"Westerners," for instance Kavelin, were not entirely satisfied by Hegel.

Somewhat later the materialism of Moleschott, Feuerbach, Marx and others passed through a similar phase; Pisarev, for instance, turned from materialism to positivism, and the "anthropological principle" of Chernyshevsky was examined by Yurkevich.

The Positivism of Comte, though assimilated by Vyruhov and propagated by Lefevich before he exchanged it for "empirico-criticism," did not long hold the field: it was attacked by the archbishop Nikanor (Brovkovich) and by one of the foremost representatives of Russian mysticism: V. Solovyev, who was also much interested in epistemological problems, rejected it, and, in agreement with him, one of his intimate friends, Trubetskoy, gave himself up to "concrete idealism."

In modern times the critical philosophy of Kant also found itself challenged by a Russian philosopher, Karinsky: he criticised not only Positivism, but all the systems that were based on criticism; after having published some original views on inductive and deductive logic, he endeavoured to prove that intuitions of space and time can be considered as *a priori* notions, but that judgments on the laws of intuition (for example, mathematical axioms) proceed also from experience. Some of the ideas of Karinsky were, however, discussed by a consistent representative of Kantian philosophy—Vvedensky, the well-known critic of the metaphysical conceptions of matter, soul, etc.; his pupil Lapchin tried to prove that the laws of logic were not applicable to "things in themselves." Meantime the system of Kant encountered

further criticism from Russian intuitionists: Lossky, a pupil of Kozlov, developed comprehensive views on the intuition of the external "transsubjective" world; he formulated a theory concerning the original "coordination" between one's self and the content of this world, and applied it to different parts of philosophy¹.

The gradual rise of independent research in Russia can be observed even better in the evolution of mathematics, natural sciences and humanistic studies.

Mathematics have developed in a much more logical manner, than other branches of knowledge: for they were much more independent of exterior circumstances and had no need of expensive laboratories, complicated implements, etc.; nevertheless they turned out to be

¹ Я. Колубовскій, *Философія у Русскихъ*, in his Russian translation of Ueberweg-Heinze's *Grundriss der Geschichte der neuen Philosophie*, 1 ed., Petrograd, pp. 529-590; cf. J. Kolubovsky, "Die Philosophie in Russland," in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik*, vol. civ, pp. 53-103, 178-220. А. Введенскій, *Судьбы русской философіи*, М. 1898. Э. Радловъ, *Очеркъ исторіи русской философіи*, С.-Пб. 1912. О. Lourié, *La philosophie russe contemporaine*, Paris, 1905. Special works on the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyev: Э. Радловъ, *Владиміръ Соловьёвъ, жизнь и учение*, С.-Пб. 1913; Кн. Е. Трубецкой, *Міросозерцаніе В. С. Соловьёва*, М. 1913, vols. I, II; on the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyev and Prince Sergius Trubetskoi: Л. Лопатинъ, *Философскія характеристики и рѣчи*, М. 1911, pp. 120-235, and the articles of L. Lopatin, S. Kotlyarevsky and G. Rachinsky, dedicated to the memory of Prince Sergius Trubetskoi, in "Вопросы Философіи и Психологіи," vol. сxxxI, 1916, pp. 1-77.

of great practical value and inspired no alarm in the Government.

It is natural, therefore, that mathematics have continuously developed in Russia from the times of Bernoulli and Euler. The latter trained the first Russian mathematicians who were able to use mathematical analysis, particularly Kotelnikov and Rumovsky. Somewhat later Guryev demanded stricter method in mathematical investigations, and Ossipovsky tried to systematize mathematical knowledge; at the same time he bestowed his attention upon the rising genius of Ostrogradsky. After studying in Paris, especially under Cauchy, Ostrogradsky wrote some noteworthy papers, especially on the integration of algebraic functions and the calculus of variations. Together with Bunyakovsky, Ostrogradsky was one of the founders of the Russian mathematical school, which gained great distinction from the work of a famous mathematician of the second half of the century, Chebyshev, who discovered new solutions of many difficult mathematical problems. Chebyshev elucidated the theory of probabilities, elaborated a remarkable theory of numbers, wrote valuable papers on integral calculus and interpolation, continued fractions, and problems concerning maxima and minima, etc.; he started, moreover, new problems which were further investigated by his pupils. Markov, who studied also under the influence of Korkin, was particularly interested in the theory of probabilities and of algebraic numbers and continued fractions; Lyapunov, who gave himself up to the study of theoretical mechanics, guided the first steps of Steklov, and so on. This movement in

the domain of mathematics was supplemented by another, produced by the genius of Lobachevsky (1826): his "pan-geometry," which revealed an entirely new and comprehensive conception of space, eventually found some partisans among Russian mathematicians, for instance, Vashchenko, and Zacharchenko¹.

During the same period the evolution of independent Russian thought concerning the real world in its natural and historical aspect can also be exemplified. Such a knowledge supposes a theoretical conception of Reality as an object of experience, and experience, from an epistemological and even practical point of view, becomes a problem in itself.

The most scientific mathematical treatment of natural phenomena could, however, be applied only to some of them: it turned out to be particularly successful in mechanics. Following Bernoulli and Euler, some Russian scholars contributed to this subject: thus Ostrogradsky wrote papers on the propagation of undulatory motion in a cylinder and on the motion of an elastic body; and more recently Lyapunov solved the problem of the figures of equilibrium not very different from ellipsoids exhibited by a homogeneous and liquid mass with a rotatory movement.

Mathematics and mechanics were applied also to astronomical investigations: one of the colleagues of Bernoulli—the Frenchman Delisle—and Rumovsky a Russian pupil of Euler, began this work; but it was organized somewhat later, after the foundation of the

¹ Cf. p. 174, note 2. В. Каганъ, Математика, in "Исторія Россіи въ XIX вѣкѣ," изд. А. и И. Гранатъ, М., vol. VI, pp. 308–327.

Observatory at Pulkovo in 1839, by Struve and his pupils. In course of time Bredihin, a former student of the University of Moscow, became director of this institution: he was well known for spectroscopic and other investigations on the comets and shooting stars; and the recent Director, Backlund, very highly appreciated in scientific circles, was himself aided by one of the assistants of Bredihin, the astrophysicist Byelopolsky.

These various branches of knowledge received some new applications in the study of geodesy, which particularly concerned Russia. The materials collected by Delisle and Kirilov, an amateur of Russian cartography, proved to be of some use even for the Atlas of 1745¹; the determinations and measurements made by Vishnjevsky, Struve and others before the foundation of the Observatory of Pulkovo, and the subsequent triangulations of the military topographical department, made by Stebnitsky, Tillo and others, contributed largely to the improvement of Russian maps: the best of these were executed by Stryelbitsky and his assistants.

Mathematical treatment could not, however, overcome all the difficulties which such an investigation presented in respect to complicated natural phenomena, particularly in the early days of Russian science. In

¹ К. Свенске, Матеріалы для исторіи составленія атласа Россійской Имперіи, 1745, in "Записки Императорской Академіи Наукъ," vol. ix, 1866, Suppl. no. 2. Delisle highly appreciated the work of Kleshnin, one of the Russian geodesists (pp. 10, 14, 16, 24, 152). Kirilov published his *Atlas Imperii Russici* in 1734, but it was much less satisfactory than the atlas of 1745.

the 18th century Russian thought was still unable to state general laws and could only observe phenomena in part; but in course of time experiment produced a greater knowledge of scientific law, above all in the physical and chemical sciences studied at the Imperial Academy. Before Euler published his *Dioptrics*, Rihmann had already made some experiments in electricity in which Lomonosov had a certain share; this high-spirited Russian man of science wrote also on optics and formulated some fundamental propositions concerning the mechanical theory of heat. Somewhat later, in the first half of the nineteenth century, besides Lenz and Kupfer, Petrov, one of their Russian colleagues, acquired some renown in practical physics.

Theoretical physics were further elucidated by Umov and partly by Hvolson, famous as well for his actinometrical studies. At the same time the experimental spirit, further cultivated by Stolyetov and others, attained its highest point in the famous investigations of Lebedev on the pressure of light, and manifested itself in the valuable seismographic observations and inventions of Prince Golitsin.

In course of time the physical interpretation of natural phenomena was applied also to the study of weather: Kraft and Lomonosov had been aware of the importance of systematic meteorological observations, but these were not organized till much later, particularly after the foundation of the chief Physical Observatory (1849), by Kupfer and Wild; the materials collected under their direction, in different parts of the Empire, were studied by Veselovsky, Voyeikov, Klovsky and others.

Chemistry was even more fortunate: conceived in a quite modern way by one of the earliest Russian men of science, it was subsequently studied with great success in different Russian schools.

Some years before the foundation of the University of Moscow, Lomonosov expressed original views on this subject: as a believer in the "corpuscular philosophy," he tried to apply quantitative analysis in studying the physical properties of bodies: he thought it necessary to ascertain their measure, weight and proportions; he was "the father of physical chemistry"; in his inquiries he implied the principles of conservation of matter and of motion; he established fairly clearly some other propositions of this new science, concerning not only the mechanical theory of heat, but also the kinetic theory of gases, the continuity of the three states of matter, etc. And thus Lomonosov formulated the conception of a new science—physical chemistry, which has grown up only in our own days: "physical chemistry," he wrote in 1752, "is a science, explaining theoretically and empirically, by means of physical experiments, the causes of the chemical processes which go on in compound bodies¹."

¹ П. Пезарскій, *Исторія Императорской Академіи Наукъ*, vol. II, pp. 259–892. Б. Меншутинъ, *Михаилъ Васильевичъ Ломоносовъ*, С.-Пб. 1911, pp. 47 и сл. *Ломоносовскій сборникъ*, издание Императорской Академіи Наукъ, С.-Пб. 1911. *Труды Ломоносова въ области естественно-историческихъ наукъ*, статьи Б. Меншутина и др., С.-Пб. 1911. Празднованіе двухсотлѣтней годовщины рожденія М. В. Ломоносова Императорскимъ Мос-

These operations, however, could not be carried far at that period; even Lovitz still adhered to the phlogiston-theory, and only at the beginning of the 19th century Petrov and others tried to prove its inconsistency. Still later, after the discoveries of Kirchhof and Hess in the domain of catalysis and thermo-chemistry, Russian chemists began to make further original investigations: in 1842 Sinin arrived by means of experiment at some organic bases of chemical processes and obtained very valuable results with regard to aniline. He founded a famous school of Russian chemists: one of these, Butlerov, established a new principle of "chemical constitution" of matter, and had in his turn pupils, who worked under his influence—Markovnikov and Saitsev; Beketov began his investigations also under the direction of Sinin and developed original views on the affinity of chemical elements and on thermo-chemistry. Some years after the principal discovery of Sinin was made, Mendeleyev, a most talented supporter of the theory of "chemical types," discovered the periodic law of elements, and Men-shutkin founded a new centre of chemical inquiries.

Similar investigations in other branches of natural science developed during this period and were also made subsequently by foreign and Russian students, who began to state the laws which manifest themselves in different forms and processes of matter and life, and

ковскимъ Университетомъ, М. 1912. Б. Меншуткинъ, Ломоносовъ, какъ естествоиспытатель, С.-Пб. 1911. П. Вальденъ, Ломоносовъ, какъ химикъ, С.-Пб. 1911. В. Бернадскій, О значеніи трудовъ М. В. Ломоносова въ минералогіи и геологіи, М. 1900, etc.

tried to complete their observation by experiment. This conception, however, took time to develop: the views of Lomonosov on the physical and chemical processes by means of which the origin of different minerals could be explained (e.g., rock-salt, fossil coal and amber), on the natural uniformity of crystals, and on the phenomena of metamorphism, were too premature to be followed up by Russian students: even their foreign masters had then no clear ideas on these subjects, but confined themselves mostly to observation, and their Russian pupils began to practise it with some success. An assistant of the self-denying Gmelin-Krashennnikov, for instance, produced a substantial botanical survey of Kamtshatka; Lepechin a collaborator of the learned Pallas, the framer of Russian "zoography" and palaeontology, published an accurate description of the natural wealth and folk-roads of the northern provinces of the Empire; and some years later Osereshkovsky and Zuev recorded valuable observations made during travels in Russia.

This descriptive tendency assumed by degrees a more scientific and precise character: it is conspicuous in the first half of the 19th century, for instance, in the work of Severgin and Koksharov on Russian mineralogy, of Ledebour and Turchaninov on Russian flora, and of Brandt and Kutorga on Russian fauna¹.

In the second half of the century some general principles were stated by Russianised or Russian men of science and could be confirmed by experiment: and

¹ Л. Тарасевичъ, Научное движеніе въ Россіи въ первой половинѣ XIX вѣка, in Исторія Россіи въ XIX вѣкѣ, vol. VI, pp. 285-308.

more profound and comprehensive views on nature which gave a new direction to observation were at this time enunciated.

This movement manifested itself, for instance, in the domain of mineralogy. Gadolin, who perceived very clearly the value of mathematical formulae and geometrical figures in order to express the laws which regulate the symmetry of crystals, put forward the hypothesis of a homogeneous crystalline substance enclosed in them. Gadolin's work was continued and improved by Fedorov: he elaborated a vast scheme of all possible structures of crystals. Vernadsky studied, not only crystallography, but some of the physico- and geo-chemical processes in minerals and began to describe their types in a systematic survey.

Progress was made also in anatomy and physiology: Pirogov, the celebrated pupil of the Dutchman, Moier of Dorpat, made an important contribution to the development of anatomy: he anticipated the bacteriological theory of blood-putrefaction and used anaesthetics in surgical operations which were further improved by Gruber; Yakubovich, and, somewhat later, Bechterev made acute microscopical investigations concerning the anatomy of the nervous system; meanwhile Syetchenov became famous for his physiological researches, particularly on the cerebro-spinal reflexes, while Pavlov elaborated a lucid conception of the reciprocal action of the organs which play a part in the normal life of the body, and began his celebrated experiments on the circulation of blood, the secretory functions of the digestive glands, and the reflexes of the brain.

More complicated and concrete sciences, such as

botany and zoology, were also progressing during this period: Zenkovsky was one of the first to study the anatomy and physiology of plants, and contributed to the progress of bacteriological investigations. Famintsin also worked at the physiology of plants and explained the influence of light on them, and the phenomena of symbiosis; Timiryazev, a convinced partisan of the mechanical conception of physiological processes and a strict adherent of Darwinism, studied the composition and properties of chlorophyll, and other questions of vegetable life. Zoology and particularly embryology owed much also to Russian students: this new science was founded by Baer, one of the greatest embryologists; but Baer was not prepared to accept the theory of evolution in its phylogenetic sense; and this was done by Kovalevsky and Metchnikov, who contributed to further progress. Kovalevsky made very important investigations concerning the embryogeny of invertebrates (*Ascidiae*, *Amphioxus lanceolatus*, *Bonellia*, *Sagitta*, etc.), their secretory organs, lymphatic glands, etc. Metchnikov was, with Kovalevsky, one of the founders of the modern embryology of invertebrates: he proved that their embryonic layers develop in a way similar to those of higher organisms, as may be seen in scorpions and other types; he signalized himself moreover by his microbiological studies on intracellular digestion and on the struggle of amoebomorphous cells (phagocytes) against infectious microbes in animal organisms, for instance in the *Daphnia magna*.

Most of these Russian students of nature exercised a great influence on the pupils who continued their

work. Pirogov had many pupils; Syetchenov was the "father of physiology" in Russia; Pavlov organized the physiological studies in the Medical Institute; Zenkovsky guided the first steps of Famintsin, who, in his turn, moulded Palladin, Borodin and others. The assistance given by Kovalevsky and Metchnikov to younger men working in similar fields is testified to by the famous embryologist, Salensky; Bogdanov formed a school of Russian zoologists, represented by Shimkevitch, Nasonov and others. Many of these devoted themselves to the study of more special subjects¹.

The results of these studies were applied also to more complex domains of knowledge concerning geographical and geological phenomena, particularly those which had some relation to Russia.

The geographical explorations undertaken by the Academy of Sciences in the 18th century proved very fruitful in scientific results, particularly the "Great Northern expedition" of Gmelin the elder and Muller (1733-1743), and the travels of Pallas in different provinces of the Empire. Somewhat later similar expeditions were organized, chiefly under the patronage of the Geological Society (1845), for instance, those of Middendorf, Przsevalsky, Semenov Tyanshansky, Potanin, Pyevtsov, Syeverstov and many others. Geographical exploration was not confined to Russian Asia: Mikluha-Macklay, for instance, spent some years in New Guinea among the Papuans and in other places,

¹ К. Тимирязевъ, Пробужденіе естествознанія въ третьей четверти вѣка, in Исторія Россіи въ XIX вѣкѣ, vol. VII, pp. 1-30.

where he made valuable zoological collections and ethnographical observations¹.

In course of time these collections and observations were scientifically treated either by the travellers themselves, or by independent investigators, and were brought into connection with anthropological studies: one of the pupils of Bogdanov, Anutchin, well known also for his geographical works, began to deliver lectures on anthropology and organized the Anthropological Museum at the University of Moscow; he published his investigations on the tribe of the Ainu, comparing archaeological data with ethnographical observations on the bow and arrows, and on the use of sledges, canoes and horses in burial rites.

The rise of geological science in Russia was of later origin. Messerschmidt and other travellers had gathered geological data; and Lomonosov had anticipated some modern views on the gradual formation of successive strata in connection with the internal heat of the earth, and on the origin of subterranean minerals; but, even after the inauguration of the Mining School in 1774, geology was not studied as a separate science until Murchison made an attempt to give a general conception of the geological structure of Russia and the Ural Mountains, which had great influence on subsequent geological studies. Before Murchison's date, however, Helmersen began his travels: he made a study of the

¹ А. Пыпинъ, *Исторія русской этнографіи*, С.-Пб. 1890, vol. 1, pp. 78-112. П. Семеновъ, *Исторія полувѣковой дѣятельности Императорскаго Русскаго Географическаго Общества*, С.-Иб. 1896, pp. 1-III.

Devonian system and elaborated the first geological map of Russia; somewhat later Karpinsky entered upon his various geological, petrographical and palaeontological inquiries; Chernyshev set to work on the palaeozoic period, particularly in the Ural mountains, and Dokutchaeff devoted himself to the investigation of the Russian soil in the fertile southern provinces. The Geological Committee was founded in 1882, and some Russian geologists earned reputation by special researches in different parts of the Empire: Schmidt, in the Baltic provinces, Inostrantsev in the north and Pavlov in the middle of Russia, Mushetov in Turkestan, the Urals and the Caucasus.

Some of these geological investigations were more or less related to prehistoric studies, and the geologists themselves, for instance, Golovkinsky, Inostrantsev and others, were inclined to promote anthropology. Count Uvarov was one of the first to devote himself to this special study: he published a comprehensive work on the prehistoric antiquities of Russia, and this was supplemented by further investigations of Antonovitch, Anutchin and others.

In spite of this development in natural science, speculative philosophy continued to control some of the moral sciences in Russia. Thus for a long time philosophy was intimately connected with psychology. In 1783 Anitchkov, one of the adherents of the Wolfian doctrine, wrote papers on the immortality of the soul and on the connection between mind and body, which he explained, in the Aristotelian and scholastic spirit, by the doctrine of the *inflexus physicus*. This tie became weaker under the influence of the "empirical psychology":

Galich had become aware of its value, and some thirty years later Ushinsky had made an attempt to analyse the phenomena of feeling and will. The scientific study of nature had naturally much effect on psychology: Syetchekov tried to solve the problem of mind and body in this way and in his reply to Kavelin's pamphlet expressed the opinion that only physiologists can attempt a solution. Troitzky wished "to exclude metaphysics from psychology," and introduced English empirical psychology to Russians. This movement, partly supported by Vladislavlev, an adherent of Fechner, was however, exposed to some fluctuations. Grote, at the beginning of his career, was ready to accept it from a "positive" point of view, but later turned to metaphysics and terminated by applying the general law of conservation of energy to psychical processes. The metaphysical conception of psychology provoked, moreover, criticism in the modern scientific treatises of Orshansky and Lange, in the works of Chelpanov, Vvedensky and others¹.

In course of time further applications of physiology and psychology were made in the domain of linguistics: here, as in other departments, description of facts preceded their explanation. General knowledge of this kind was, of course, very scarce in Old Russia: but Messerschmidt and other travellers, particularly in the second half of the 18th century, had gathered linguistic materials. Backmeister made a great collection of such data, which were published

¹ Арх. Гавриилъ, Исторія русской философіи, Каз. 1840, pp. 74, 137, 140, 141. М. Владиславлевъ, Психологія, С.-Пб. 1881, vol. 1, pp. 180-183 (short notices).

in a great dictionary of "all known languages" under the direction of Pallas. The study of Indo-European languages began in the same century, from the time of Baier who took some interest in Sanskrit, and was directed especially to Russian grammar. Lomonosov made a valuable attempt to establish the principal groups of Slavonic languages; he distinguished also the Church-slavonic and Russian elements of our language, elucidated its "rational use" and sketched its probable development; and his views were adopted by Barsov and other Russian writers. Later on, comparative linguistics began to be treated in a much more scientific way: Korsh was well versed in European and even Oriental languages, but neither he, nor Böthlingk, the great Sanskritist, was able to found new linguistic schools in Russia: these arose, thanks to the learned activity of Fortunatov in Moscow and Baudouin de Courtenay in Kazan. The late professor Fortunatov made acute investigations concerning the comparative grammar of Indo-European languages and their dialectal peculiarities in the most ancient periods. The original representative of the neogrammatical movement, Baudouin de Courtenay, studied the physiology and psychology of language: he discovered the laws of reduction of the stems of words in favour of their terminations, and of phonetic change, and was specially interested in the Slavonic dialects. These distinguished linguists had pupils who continued their work. Sháchmatov, Ulyanov and others represented the Moscow school; Krushevsky, Bogoroditsky, Bulich and others, the Kazan school of linguistics. At the same time Potebnya, a follower of Steinthal, applied

psychological principles to the investigation of etymological and syntactical as well as semasiologic phenomena in the Russian language: he elucidated the relations of thought to language and studied the folklore of Little Russia; and his views were expounded by Ovsyanikov~~/~~-Kulikovsky and Sumtsov¹.

While psychology was dominated by speculative philosophy, it could not have much influence on the development of sociology: but social science was, especially at first, closely related to ethnography, which developed in connection with natural science and thus produced a corresponding conception of social phenomena.

The ethnographical study of the different nations and tribes of the Russian Empire was simplified by the ethnographical maps, anticipated by Kirilov and compiled by Koeppen and Rittich. The publication of materials collected by Georgi, Chulkov and others, began in the 18th century. In course of time this work became more specialized. Sacharov, Tereshchenko, Dal and others were particularly interested in Russian dialects and ways of thought and life, the study of which was promoted by Nadezhdin and enlarged by the expedition of Chyzhbinsky; Klaproth, Castren, Sjögren, Radloff and somewhat later Yadrintsev, Smirnov and others studied the languages, folklore and folk-roads of the Ural-Altaic peoples; while Miller, Uslar and others contributed to our knowledge of the ethnography of the Caucasus. In recent times old and new materials have been classified, particularly in the

¹ С. Буличъ, Очеркъ исторіи языкознанія въ Россіи, С.-Пб. 1904, vol. I (down to 1825).

ethnographical museums of Petrograd; and the late Professor Haruzin summed up the results of this work in his lectures on ethnography¹.

Sociological studies appeared somewhat later. They were inaugurated in the sixties by Lavrov, a writer who, at the beginning of his career, was considerably influenced by Hegel. Lavrov introduced the "subjective method" in sociology: he arrived at the conclusion that social facts cannot be merely counted but must be weighed also. This point of view was developed by Mihailovsky, Karyeev, Tuzhakov and others; they maintained, that the conception of human personality cannot be exclusively theoretical: it must be at the same time moral and therefore not only explained, but estimated; and social facts, being a product of the reciprocal relations of such personalities and acting on them, must be appreciated. Later sociological studies fell, however, under French and English influences—and chiefly that of Comte's positivism and Spencer's evolutionism. The positive philosophy of Comte became popular in Russia in the second half of the sixties, and Lavrov took an interest in it. Comte's sociology was also appreciated by Mihailovsky and De Roberty; Kovalevsky studied it when he was still a student at Harkov and applied some of its principles as well as those of Spencer's "genetic sociology" in his subsequent works on this subject; he tried to combine sociology with the comparative and historical study of institutions and their evolution. Besides many admirers, Spencer's sociological theory

¹ А. Пыпинъ, Исторія Русской этнографіи, С.-Пб. 1890-1892, vols. I-IV.

had, however, some critics; one of these, Mihailovsky, a believer in social psychology, wrote vigorous articles on the reciprocal action of the individual and society, on progress and other matters. At the end of the century some Russian admirers of the "economic materialism" of Marx and Engel, particularly Beltov, Struve and others, criticised these conceptions, and the psychological theories of Ward, Tarde and other writers which were easily assimilated by the Russian representatives of the "subjective school" and of genetic sociology: these critics ridiculed, just as their authorities did, the failure of most of the previous Russian sociologists to perceive that the "material powers" or methods and corresponding relations of production in material existence "determine social, political and mental evolution in general." This theory, contested by the "subjectivists," had some influence on the adherents of genetic sociology: Kovalevsky adopted it to some extent, and attempted, for instance, to prove a somewhat closer connection between the family and private property; but nowadays some of the Russian representatives of economic materialism incline to a different conception of social life, being manifestly influenced by the Kantian doctrine of ethics¹.

Meanwhile a more special statistical treatment of

¹ Н. Картевъ. Введение въ социологию, С.-Пб. 1897, 2 ed., pp. 297-342 (3rd ed. pp. 322-367). A complete list of Russian works concerning sociology is given in the 1st edition on pp. 393-418; it was printed separately with some additions, J. F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology. A contribution to the history of sociological thought and theory*. New York, 1915. Cf. K. Vorländer, *Kant und Marx*, Tübingen, 1911, pp. 104-106, 194-217.

social phenomena began to develop: its beginnings can be traced in the old books of Botero, D'Avity, Petty and others, some of which were probably known in Russia: Kirilov had compiled a description of the "flourishing state" of the Russian Empire in 1727. Somewhat later Schloezer, author of a treatise on the *Theory of Statistics*, and Herman and Storch undertook a similar task, and performed it in a more satisfactory way; but even they confined themselves to mere description, and this tendency was still conspicuous in the works of Arsenyev. But, in the second half of the 19th century, Janson started a more theoretical conception of statistics, as a science of social phenomena which can be studied in a great number of cases and consequently admits of exact mathematical reasoning; in this scientific spirit he organized the official census and arranged many statistical data, particularly with regard to rural economy. The late Professor Chuprov also made some valuable contributions to the general study of statistics and investigated railway-economics; he also contributed to the success of the statistical investigations into rural economy undertaken by the *Zemstvos*. The theory of statistics was further developed by Janson's pupil, Kaufman, and by Chuprov the younger, one of the modern representatives of the mathematical school of statistics; while practical applications were made in several *Zemstvos* by Orlov and other investigators¹.

¹ К. Германъ, Историческое обозрѣніе литературы статистики въ особенности Россійскаго государства, С.-Пб. 1817.

Statistics were, of course, closely connected, particularly in previous times, with economics. This science developed in Russia from the beginning of the 19th century: it was expounded by Schloezer (the younger) and Storch in the spirit of Adam Smith; the French treatise of Storch, however, was in a certain degree independent; it contained, for instance, dissertations on the principle of value and labour, on material and immaterial goods, and on free trade. After foreigners came Russians: one of the earliest Russian economists, Chivilev, was a pupil of the Dorpat school, who learned English in order to read English economists in the original; he explained the general laws of economics in his lectures. Vernadsky, his successor in Moscow, elaborated a more comprehensive conception of political economy as a "theory of labour" or a system of "economic activity," and demonstrated the influence of the material prosperity of a country on its finances; he also showed a turn for historical studies and a practical interest in the modern economic state of different European countries. The moderate liberal views of Vernadsky, in the main supported by Gorlov, provoked criticism: Chernyshevsky, one of the most active representatives of the socialistic movement, expounded its principles and was particularly anxious to elucidate the part which the Russian village community was to play in the subsequent evolution of the country; he tried to prove that the *mir* was able to develop collectivism—a conclusion which was later supported by Vorontsov ~~who~~ expressed the conviction that capitalistic production, considered in its historical aspect, was not possible in Russia.

The liberal school—Posnikov, Isaev and others—were inclined to accept rather than reject these views. During these controversies the historical school made further progress: to a certain degree Korsak manifested such a tendency in his acute investigations on "the forms of industry"; Yanzhul contributed to it in his studies on the influence of economic conditions on finance; many others maintained it in more special works. The evolution of the historical school was, however, visibly hindered by the vigorous expansion of Marxism in Russia. In his general treatise on political economy Chuprov adopted Marx's theory of value, although he was rather inclined to adhere to the historical school; besides railway economics, he studied the small farm industry and the various forms of cooperation necessary for its success, wrote articles on different questions, some of which concerned practical economics, trained many pupils, etc. Vorontsov and Nicolaion agreed with Marx's attack on capitalism. Plehanov, Iljin, and, for a time, Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky and many others became convinced adherents of Marx's doctrine and developed it to its utmost consequences. In course of time, however, a new tendency, partly anticipated by Sieber, manifested itself: Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky and some others began to appreciate the ethical principles of social organization and evolution; the manual of Tugan-Baranovsky, for instance, is written by an author who tries just now to apply Kantian morals to the construction of a socialistic ideal.

The study of law and institutions in Russia had a more remote origin: it developed under the influence

of "natural law," expounded, for instance, by Pufendorf, and accepted by Gross, one of the first members of the Academy. After the foundation of the University in Moscow, Dilthey began to deliver lectures there on natural law, and Zolotnitsky published a short survey of its principles; much later Kunitsyn examined them in an elaborate treatise, written under the influence of Kant. Meanwhile there arose a new tendency, due to a more conscious appreciation of Russian positive law. Dilthey tried to apply the system of Roman law to Russian statutes; but Polyenov, who had studied at Strassburg and Goettingen, and Desnitsky, a pupil of Adam Smith, had a much more historical conception of jurisprudence; Desnitsky wrote able essays on civil law and a project for a Russian constitution. Thereupon Speransky, author of a little treatise "on the study of law," elaborated his plan of 1802 also under English influences, though later he turned to French models; he also superintended the publication of the great collection of laws which have proved to be one of the principal sources of historical information for subsequent investigators; and he encouraged some young students of law: Nevolin, Ryedkin, Krylov, Meier, etc. Further steps were made by Russian scholars in the general knowledge of law, particularly in the second half of the 19th century: some of them, for instance the Hegelians Nevolin, Ryedkin and Chicherin, the positivists Korkunov and Muromtsev, the psychologist Petrazhitsky, acquired renown by their works on the general theory of law. Others cultivated special branches: Krylov, trained by Savigny, delivered brilliant lectures on Roman law

in its historical aspect; his pupil Duvernoy manifested a great aptitude for juridical construction, which he applied to Russian civil law. These general conceptions were somewhat neglected by Pobyedonostsev and even impaired in their value by his extreme conservative principles: but he studied Russian institutions in a comparative and historical way, closely connected, as in his dissertations on landed property and succession, with practical aims. Shershenevich turned to more theoretical investigations, breathing a liberal spirit, and expounded them in his manuals. This movement was supplemented by studies in a kindred domain: Sokolov, Pavlov, Gortchakov and others elucidated canon law. The "great reforms" of the sixties promoted legal studies, particularly those which concerned public law and institutions; they were undertaken by Andreyevsky, Romanovich/ Slavatskiy and some of their contemporaries. One of the chief of these was Gradovsky: he appreciated very highly the principles of legality and liberty in political life and studied their evolution in European constitutions; from this point of view he considered nationality as a basis of political development and investigated the part it had played in the formation of Russian public law and organization: in his famous treatise he elucidated, besides these principles, the rôle of public offices and of central and "local" institutions in Russia. Gradovsky had many pupils: one of these, Korkunov, conceived the State as a juridical relation, the subject of which is "all the (capable) population" and the object—the power of domination; from this point of view he treated of Russian public law and institutions. Some colleagues

and some pupils of Gradovsky, the adherents of the classical school, Spasovich and Tagantsev, contributed largely to the study of criminal law, and Foinitsky expressed original views on "criminality"; Martens wrote a systematic treatise on international law, conceived in a positive spirit, and trained some pupils: Pilenko studied this subject in a dogmatical spirit and in its connection with private institutions; while Nolde sought to make an historical appreciation of the public and private relations at present subsisting between nations¹.

This growing independence of Russian thought in the domain of natural and moral sciences was supplemented by an analogous process in historical learning.

The critical historical spirit began to appear in Russia in the 18th century. Baier, one of the first members of the Academy, had gained a reputation by his investigations into some unsettled questions of oriental and Russian history, particularly the origin of the Russian state and the Varyagheans. Somewhat later Schloezer expounded a comprehensive view of the history of Northern Europe and produced a very learned

¹ Н. Загоскинъ, *Исторія права Русскаго народа*, Каз. 1899, vol. 1, pp. 17-131. А. Лаппо-Данилевскій, *Собрание и Сводъ законовъ Россійской Имперіи*, etc., С.-Пб. 1898, pp. 1-56. Н. Коркуновъ, *Исторія философіи права*, С.-Пб. 1898, 2nd ed. pp. 274-350. А. Ставиславскій, *О ходѣ законовѣдѣнія въ Россіи*, С.-Пб. 1853. Г. Шершеневичъ, *Наука гражданскаго права въ Россіи*, Каз., 1893. Г. Фельдштейнъ, *Главныя теченія въ исторіи науки уголовного права въ Россіи*, Ярославль 1909.

work, containing a critical interpretation of the Chronicle of Nestor. Meanwhile Shcherbatov began to study general Russian history in a "pragmatic" way, and Boltin formulated some scientific views of the natural factors which determined its course, particularly as to Russian manners and customs, and of the consistency which is to be desired in their development.

This differentiation between universal and Russian history grew more conspicuous in course of time. The critical spirit applied by some of the German historians to the study of Russian history penetrated into a coterie formed by Rumyantsev at the beginning of the 19th century: he was supported by Krug and other learned men. The works of the eldest member of this group—the metropolitan Eugène Bolshovitinov, were distinguished by acuteness and learning and prepared the way for later synthetic surveys of Russian history. The first of these, Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*, was, however, mainly a brilliant literary production; and subsequent Russian historians, while availing themselves of the wealth of information which it contained, particularly in the notes, elaborated a more scientific construction of our past.

Further development of Russian historical thought manifested itself after the publication in 1835 of the new regulations for Universities. Since that time, universal history has received much more independent treatment, thanks especially to Kutorga in Petrograd and Granovsky in Moscow.

The learned "humanist" Kutorga studied, under the influence of Niebuhr's criticism, mainly ancient history; he gave considerable credit to Greek historical

tradition and made some valuable investigations in the constitutional history of Athens. Sokolov, one of his pupils, started the study of Greek epigraphy, which was continued by Latyshev and other pupils. But the main object of Kutorga's investigations was not abandoned: Buseskul worked on in this direction. Meantime Zyelensky began to elucidate the spirit of classical antiquity in connection with modern culture, indicating especially the value of Sophocles, Cicero and other writers for our own times, and his pupil Rostovtsev entered upon his learned investigations on the Hellenistic-eastern origin of the Roman colonial system, and on antique decorative art in South Russia.

The study of mediaeval history was considerably promoted by Granovsky, a disciple of Ranke, Thierry and other German and French historians: he expounded his humane views in a mild social spirit and with an eloquence which charmed his audience and called forth the historical works of Kudryavtsev and Eshevsky. The attempt of Granovsky to deliver public lectures on the Reformation could not, however, be carried out for political reasons, and modern history was not liberated until the second half of the century. Guerrier, formerly a student of mediaeval history, introduced sound historical method into Moscow University, and was particularly interested in the history of European culture in the times of Augustine and Francis of Assisi, in Leibniz and Mably, the French Revolution, etc. Some of his pupils turned from the study of ideas to social and economic history: from this point of view Vinogradoff conducted learned and acute investigations into the origin and development

of feudalism in Italy and England, where this process was correlated with the decay of the free village community and its subsequent enslavement, and with the growth of the manor. Another pupil of Guerrier and prolific writer, Kareyev, devoted himself particularly to the modern history of Europe, and, besides his voluminous work concerning the history of its civilization, wrote some original monographs on the history of rural classes in France and on the French Revolution. These historians formed in their turn new historical schools: following Vinogradoff, Petrushevsky and Savin studied social and economic history in England; following Karyev, Onu and Butenko elucidated the history of some institutions of modern France. The history of culture was not, however, quite abandoned: Korelin, who was under the influence of Guerrier, devoted himself to the study of Humanism in Italy. But social and economic history proved more attractive, as is shown by the scientific career of Luchitsky: after some dissertations on the religious and political relations between Catholics and Calvinists in France, he devoted his powers to investigating the history of the rural classes, particularly in France, before and during the Revolution, and the growth of their landed property.

These different tendencies revealed themselves, moreover, in other special domains of historical knowledge. The development of ideas was, for instance, elucidated by Bolotov and Glubokovsky in critical works on early Christianity; by Novitsky and Prince Trubetskoi in dissertations on the history of ancient philosophy; by Bobynin and Bubnov, Stolyetov and

Vernadsky in researches on mediaeval and modern science; by Guerrier and Karyeev, Petrov and Buseskul in treatises on former historical conceptions; by Korsh and particularly by Veselovsky in his noteworthy monographs on the genesis and expansion of literary subjects and on the evolution of poetical forms; by Stephani and Kondakov in monumental inquiries into the plastic arts; by Ryedkin and particularly by Chicherin in his voluminous history of political theories. The development of economics attracted the attention of those, who, like Vipper and Petrushevsky, were under the influence of Marxism, and was studied by other historians: Kovalevsky discussed, for instance, the growth of population and represented the economic evolution of Europe down to the rise of capitalism; Tarle attended to the history of the working-classes in its connection with industry in France during the Revolution, and to the continental blockade; Kaufman was interested in credit, currency and banking, particularly in England; Kulisher attempted a general historical survey of economics in Western Europe, and so on. The history of institutions was somewhat less studied: besides Gradovsky and others noted above, Kovalevsky explained the rise and development of political institutions in many European states and the origins of modern democracy; Ostrogorsky cleared up the political forces or parties, which put it in motion; and Ardashev investigated the history of provincial administration in France before the Revolution.

Meantime one of the best representatives of the criticism inaugurated by Kutorga, the learned Vasil-

jevsky, founded a critical school in Petrograd and applied its principles particularly to the study of Byzantine history and historiography: he elucidated the development of the Byzantine village-community and its decay, the tax-system of the Empire and its legislation, particularly in the times of the Iconoclasts, its relations to Russian affairs and barbarous tribes. Bubnov, one of his pupils, applied the critical method to the examination of mediaeval annals; others began to study Byzantine history, and Uspensky produced valuable works on its sources, on the religious movement and the village community in the Byzantine Empire, and endeavoured to give a general survey of its history; and this last task was undertaken also by Kulakovsky.

These investigations were, of course, closely connected with Slavonic studies, which made visible progress after the revival of letters and arts in Slavonic lands. Vostokov and Preiss contributed to this development and, with Grigorovitch, an original student of Slavonic languages and literature, exerted some influence on Sreznevsky: the latter collected a quantity of materials concerning the Slavonic languages, and Russian in particular—traditional beliefs, songs and writings, studying palaeographical peculiarities and explaining the meaning of many of them. The history of the Slavonic peoples, already studied by Bodyansky, was promoted by some former pupils of Sreznevsky: the most prominent of these—Lamansky, discussed the part that the "Slavonic world" had played in universal history, and had in his turn many pupils: one of them, Siegel, elaborated a comparative history of Slavonic laws; and Makushev investigated the history

of South-Slavonian communities. Meanwhile Kotlyarevsky, a pupil of Bodyansky, produced a learned work on the funeral rites of the ancient Slavonians, and explained the antiquities and ancient laws of the Pomeranian and Baltic tribes; while Leontovich compared Slavonic institutions and made valuable investigations concerning the history of Lithuanian law.

These examples prove the growing independence of Russian thought in the domain of universal history; and they can be, of course, supplemented by illustrations of what was done, during the same period, for the knowledge of Russia's past: Russian scholars became aware that "general human knowledge cannot be realized by a nation without self-knowledge," which is the chief factor of progress, and many of them turned their minds to the study of Russian history.

This idea was not easy of access to historians like Karamsin, who was much more interested in the fortunes of the Russian monarchy than in the history of the Russian nation; but it was one of the leading principles of Solovyev's great work. Solovyev at one time attended the lectures of Ritter and was a disciple of Guizot and an adherent of Ewers; but he was able to preserve his independence. He examined the geographical conditions of Russian life and gave a detailed survey of its "organic development," that is, of the gradual transformation of ancient patriarchal institutions into the Russian State of the 18th century.

This treatment provoked criticism from the Slavophiles. Kiryeevsky, Homyakov and Aksakov, accepting to some extent the principles of Schelling and Hegel, expressed their conviction that human and

even European culture can be conceived only in connection with nationality and that every nation represents one of its aspects; but they differed from Soloviev in their estimate of Western civilization, and insisted on its onesidedness and want of stability; they discovered, on the contrary, original and renovating principles of completeness and progress in Russian culture, based on "true equity," "внутренняя правда" which must be freely spoken out by the people; and they opposed to it the "external justice" of the state ("внешняя правда"). These views were applied especially by Aksakov to Russian history: according to him, the principle of "true equity" is incorporated in the community and manifests itself in the mutual love and solidarity of its members; these communities invited, of their own free will, the princes, who founded the Russian state with its external justice; and thus Land and State became the principal elements of Russian history; their relation was subjected, however, to some changes, by which Russian history can be characterized during the four periods of its existence, consecutively centred in Kiev, Vladimir, Moscow and St Petersburg; but this union between Land and State was not broken up till the last of these periods: even Moscow represented it, after having contributed to the unification of the State, and it was only Peter the Great who violently introduced the declining civilization of the West into Russia and thus created a growing divergence between the Russian people and the "cultured" classes—a divergence which must be removed.

This idealistic conception of Russian history could

not find favour with those "Westerners" who supposed a general uniformity in the evolution of nations and set a high value on the influence of Western civilization upon Russian life; under Hegel's influence and Savigny's direction they insisted on the part played by the State in national development and preferred to study the history of institutions, fixing the main epochs of Russian history in accordance with these. Solovyev, although not quite indifferent to the Slavophile tendencies, belonged to the opposite school. Kavelin enlarged his predecessor's scheme and introduced between his two principal periods an intermediate stage characterized by the ascendancy of civil patriarchal institutions. Chicherin showed the scarcity of information concerning patriarchal society and divided the subsequent times, like Kavelin, into two periods—the period of "civil union," during which individual will predominated, and the period of "political union," during which public will prevailed and organized social life. This theory was accepted by Sergueyevitch; he distinguished in Russian history the two periods of Chicherin almost in identical terms and expected a third period, during which the opposed principles of the two former will be reconciled.

These conceptions were formed, in the main, before the scientific movement and "Great Reforms" of the sixties; but they had a great influence on subsequent historical writers. One of them, Klyuchevsky, a pupil of Solovyev and Chicherin, highly appreciated some of their conclusions, but could not accept them entirely; he elaborated his own "sociological" conception of Russian history. Klyuchevsky was not inclined to

accept the theory of Solovyev and particularly the modifications of it which he introduced in the later volumes of his history: Klyuchevsky attached much more importance to material than to moral forces, which he appreciated in so far as they manifested themselves in social phenomena; besides, he could not content himself, as Chicherin had done, with the study of institutions considered merely as mechanisms which were bound to develop in a certain way: he was interested in the real "social stuff," of which they were made, and with the "vital forces" which put them in motion; he investigated the social and economic evolution of different classes, their enslavement and emancipation, and their influence on political institutions. Yet, agreeing to some extent with the Slavophile doctrine, Klyuchevsky insisted on the "originality" of Russian history and explained the part that the Russian nation had played, particularly the Great Russians, whom he characterized in a very vivid manner; and he tried to represent, in a genetic way, the "real" historical evolution of this nation and not the dialectical scheme of a series of mental concepts, only logically connected with one another. According to these views, Klyuchevsky held that the Russian nation had passed through different stages of evolution: he characterized ancient Russia, situated on the Dnieper, by town life and trade; mediaeval Russia, settled on the middle-Volga, by feudal principalities (differing however, in some respects, from the western type) and by free agriculture; "Great" Russia, formed at a later date, by the national State of Moscow, with the Tsar and the boyars at its

head, by military and agricultural institutions; and the Russian Empire, attaining its natural limits, by the autocratic régime, the ascendancy of the nobles, and enslaved agriculture and industry. Klyuchevsky presented this scheme in a brilliant picture of our evolution down to the 18th century, and formed a school of Russian historians. In a similar realistic and "sociological" spirit Milyukov explained the evolution of Russian culture, arranged in a homogeneous series, and with Kisewetter, Bogoslovsky and others entered upon definite investigations concerning the history of certain Russian institutions. This "realistic" conception of Russia's past could not, however, satisfy those who, like Pokrovsky, believed in Marxism: and he worked up again, from a materialistic point of view, the materials collected by the idealists.

The wide field of Russian history, surveyed in great detail by Ikonnikov, was of course cultivated in many other special directions: various historical problems concerning Russia's past were stated and partly solved by different historical schools.

The history of the Russian language, for instance, constituted one of these problems: Vostokov laid its foundation; Buslaev studied it in connection with the general evolution of Russian culture; and Shachmatov and Sobolevsky explained its evolution.

The critical school continued to develop itself in the works of Kachenovsky and other scholars. Krug had expressed his approval of the critical investigations of Kachenovsky's opponent, Pogodin, upon the Annals of Nestor; and Pogodin, in his turn, lent a helping hand to Kunik and Gedeonov at the beginning of their

scientific career, when they tried to elucidate, from different points of view, the origin of the Russian State and the Norman or Slavonic nationality of the first Russian princes. The critical school developed further in the works of Bestuzhev, who was to some extent under the influence of Pogodin and had some pupils, Platonov and others. Criticism manifested itself also in the acute investigations of Golubinsky, Shachmatov and others.

The comparative method of historical study was also used in different domains: in the history of Russian literature and art, by Buslaev and Tihonravov, Pypin and Veselovsky, by Kondakov, Azhmalov and others; in the history of Russian economics, by Nikitsky, Milyoukov, Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky and others; in the general history of Russian law and institutions, by Nevolin, Kavelin, Chicherin, Gradovsky, Sergueyevitch and others. One of these, Vladimirskey-Budanov, author of a comprehensive history of Russian law, applied the comparative method to the study of similar institutions of Eastern and Western Russia, showing, by the way, their originality in comparison with those of other European states; subsequent historians, Lyubov'sky, Lappo and others continued this comparative study of Russian and Lithuanian institutions. In opposition to Vladimirskey-Budanov and some other investigators, Pavlov-Silvansky insisted, from a "sociological" point of view, on the similarity of the mediaeval institutions of Russia with the corresponding feudal institutions of Western Europe, particularly in the period, when the manor began to subjugate the ancient village community.

Many scholars were or still are working in the same field: some of them, particularly about 1861, were strongly impressed by the idea of nationality or even of the different nationalities constituting the Russian Empire; it had an influence on Šabyelin, Kostomarov, and Antonovitch; others studied the history of local government, very much improved by the "great reforms," for instance, Andreievsky, Gradovsky, Lochovitsky; many took a strong interest in the emancipation of the rural classes and entered into investigations on their past, among others, Byelyaev and Sokolovsky; the history of their gradual enslavement, begun by Klyuchevsky, was continued by Dyakonov and others; and those who were devoted to the people's cause and followed socialistic theories have contributed to the elucidation of these problems, particularly Semevsky in his well-known works on ~~/slavery/~~ in modern times and the social movements which determined its abolition¹.

Meanwhile the scientific principles and methods implied in these investigations were applied to Oriental studies: though much less differentiated, they facilitated the understanding of the complex civilizations of the eastern world. These inquiries were affected in Russia, at least in great part, by its intermediate

¹ В. ИЕОННИКОВЪ, Опытъ русской исторіографіи, т. I, Кіевъ, 1891-1892 (in two volumes); т. II, Кіевъ, 1908 (in two volumes). М. Кояловичъ, Исторія русскаго самосознанія, С.-Пб. 1901 (3rd ed.). П. Милуковъ, Главныя теченія русской исторической мысли, т. I, М. 1898 2nd ed. К. Бестужевъ-Рюминъ, Біографіи и характеристики, С.-П. 1882.

position between Europe and Asia and by practical aims.

Oriental studies were inaugurated in Russia by Baier and the Orientalist Kehr, but made little advance until the publication of the *Dictionary of all known Languages*, in 1786 or 1787: this work proved to be of some use for Klaproth's *Asia Polyglotta*.

Soon after a centre of Oriental study arose in Kazan, where a representative of European scholarship was invited, especially in order to promote the practical knowledge of Oriental languages. Fraehn was very well versed in these; but he studied specially Mahomedan coins and Arabic writers, the accounts of ancient Russia, its inhabitants and their customs, given by Ibn Fozlan and others; he made, moreover, arrangements for the further development of these branches of knowledge in Russia. The Turkish and Tartar languages and texts, to which Fraehn had already paid some attention, were investigated, for instance, by Kazem-Beck. The self-taught enthusiast of Petrograd, Senkovsky, next stimulated the growing interest of Russian scholars in Oriental languages and literature; somewhat later Hvolson and Rosen and their pupil Kokovtsev continued with growing success the study of Hebrew and Arabic texts; the Mongolist Schmidt and the Turkish scholar Radloff made valuable contributions to the knowledge of the Mongol, Turkish and Tartar languages and folklore, and this was increased by the works of Velyaminov-Zernov, Kovalevsky and others.

Russian study of China owed much less to foreign influence. The foundation of the Orthodox Russian

mission to Peking proved to be of some consequence in this respect. Russian sinology was inaugurated by Bichurin and Katharov, the investigators of China's culture, and promoted by Vasiliev, who spent ten years at the Mission and became one of the highest authorities on Buddhism in China. Under the influence of the lectures delivered by Vasiliev in Petrograd, Minayev, the well-known critic of the "Pali-theory" of Buddhism, began to study the evolution of Buddhism in the original texts and observed its manifestations in Ceylon, Nepal and Burma. The great work done by Boethlingk in the domain of Indian philology was, of course, highly appreciated by Minayev, himself the author of a grammar of the Pali language; but he and his pupils were more inclined to continue the investigations of Minayev on Buddhistic culture; Oldenburg studied Buddhistic legends and particularly iconography; Shcherbatsky explained ancient Indian philosophical treatises in the light of modern critical thought, etc. The well-known Iranian scholar Saleman had also an influence on this movement; and Persian studies were carried on by Tukovsky in his treatise on Persian dialects and other publications.

These studies were organized by Rosen and supplemented in modern times by new branches of knowledge, cultivated more or less independently by Russian scholars; Lemm and his pupil Turayev, Golenishchev and Nikolsky promoted Egyptology and Assyriology; Brosset and Marr investigated the languages and antiquities, the literature and history of Georgia and Armenia; Tukovsky and Bartold elucidated the

mediaeval civilization and history of Central Asia, and so on¹.

The evolution of Russian thought, considered in its general aspects and in its different domains, can be stated, then, in the following terms. During the 18th and 19th centuries science and learning in Russia became, in a certain sense, Russian science and learning: Russian thought began to play its own part in the historical development of science and learning, gradually embracing all the nations of the civilized world.

3

Thanks to the growth of Russian thought the principle of its unity, which was formerly established only from a religious and specially orthodox point of view, could now be formulated afresh. This tendency manifests itself more and more in Russian philosophy, science and learning. Some examples, relating to modern times, will clear up this growing tendency to unify our general conception of the world and our knowledge of nature and history.

Philosophy is, of course, particularly called upon to fulfil such a mission and Russian philosophers have endeavoured to achieve it: they were, indeed, deeply conscious of the capital importance of such a problem, but they solved it in different ways.

The "idealists" of the thirties and forties, and particularly the Slavophiles, criticised from this point of view the "Western" rationalism: Kiryevsky,

¹ Б. Бартольдъ, Исторія изученія Востока въ Европѣ и въ Россіи, С.-Пб. 1911, pp. 145-259.

Homyakov and others insisted on the "wholeness" of consciousness, implying faith and reason, reason and feeling (with volition). Some of the "Westerners" made similar attempts, but in another spirit; in a work dedicated to Granovsky, Kavelin endeavoured, for instance, to reconcile idealism with realism from a somewhat psychological point of view.

A different conception was formed by the "materialists" of the sixties, Pisarev, Antonovitch and others: they also deliberated, in a materialistic sense, on the "unity of the physical and moral Kosmos."

In modern times this has been done not only in a monistic, but, later on, in a critical spirit.

Modern Russian monistic systems had also a spiritualistic or a materialistic character; they can be noted here only in their general aspect.

Spiritualistic monism was very clearly formulated, in the main from a religious point of view, by one of its most convinced partisans. V. Solovyev criticised in this spirit the onesidedness of Comte's conception of the three stages of evolution; the Russian writer could not agree with a theory, which excluded theology and metaphysics from a general conception of the world and restricted itself to positive science; he formulated the postulates of his own system as follows: the "creative principles which are needed for the transformation of general facts or laws into a harmonious scientific edifice, cannot be deduced from these materials, just as the plan of a building cannot be deduced from the bricks employed to construct it"; these "creative principles" must be found by means of a higher kind of knowledge—the knowledge of absolute

principles and causes, expounded in theology and metaphysics; and only in this connection of theology and metaphysics with positive science, can this whole obtain a decisive influence on Life. This epistemological theory implied corresponding views of the Universe. Solovyev worshipped the Spirit of God in the Universe; he perceived a general and positive unity in the entity of the World and in the creative power and the evolutionary process comprising its phenomena—nature and man; from this transcendent point of view Solovyev affirmed that the World must be united with God through the medium of man, and “transposed” the centre of man’s existence into a supernatural and superpersonal sphere which reveals its creative power in the collective mind of humanity and contains the leading principles of human life: “in union with God” man has to realize Truth, Good and Beauty in the World, and in fulfilling this mission he contributes to progress. Similar conceptions were enunciated by Trubetskoi and other writers¹.

Materialistic monism was an offshoot of “Marxism.” One of its most rigid partisans, Plechanov, has expressed it in the following well-known formula: “matter thinks,” and has deduced from it a materialistic conception of the world and of social life: “as soon as you have admitted,” he wrote some years ago, “that the relations of production, on which men enter independently of their will, are reflected in their heads in the form of different economic categories, in the form of

¹ В. Соловьёвъ, Сочиненія, С.-Пб. 1877, vol. 1, pp. 221–222. Cf. *infra* the brief exposition of Trubetskoi’s views on p. 225.

prices, money, capital and so on, you must acknowledge that on a certain economic basis there must grow a corresponding ideological superstructure¹." One of the adherents of this doctrine, Iljin (Lenin), stood forth recently in its defence against those "Marxists" who try to combine empirical criticism with Marxism.

These dogmatical constructions could not satisfy the critical spirit of those, who were conscious of the epistemological problems implied in them: the doctrine of Kant could not establish itself before the sixties, or even later, and only towards the end of the century, after Vvedensky began to lecture at the University of Petrograd, the critical philosophy was accepted by some Russian thinkers. From that time, however, Kantian doctrine was supplemented by neo-Kantian interpretations, and some modern Russian philosophers began to deliberate on the problem of the unity of knowledge, which underlies the unitarian conception of the World. Karinsky, well known as a critic of Kant, adhered, however, to Kant's views on self-consciousness and its unity and identity, without which knowledge is not possible, and criticised only his theory concerning the rôle which self-consciousness is playing, according to its own principles, in the construction of the external world.

Meanwhile science and learning tried, in their turn, to solve this problem, at least in some of their domains, and Russian scientific and learned men contributed to this movement.

¹ Г. Плехановъ, Основные вопросы марксизма, С.-Цб. 1908, сс. 6, 7, 25 и сл.

Great Russian mathematicians, for instance, tried to give more logical unity to their science: Lobatchevsky elaborated a more comprehensive conception of space and considered the geometry of Euclid as one of the possible cases of it. Chebyshev, in one of his treatises on averages, proved that a general theorem underlies the different problems of the theory of probabilities and implies the famous theorem of Bernoulli as a special case of it.

This unifying tendency acquired a different character in the knowledge of the external World. In natural science, besides the doctrine of conservation of force or transformation of energy, this movement manifested itself particularly in the conception of matter as a system of elements, and in the doctrine of "consensus" and evolution, as a unifying process of life.

At the end of the sixties Mendeleev published his famous treatise on the periodic system of elements, founded on the fact that, with increasing atomic or combining weights, their physical and chemical properties change; according to this regular arrangement of the elements by their weights expressed in numbers, the same properties—such as density, fusibility, optical and electric qualities, formation of oxides, etc.—recur in periods, which are, at least approximately, fixed. This theoretical scheme could not, at that time, be absolutely proved by experiment; but it was supplemented by the zero-series of indifferent gases, and the vacant places made it possible to predict the subsequent discovery of the missing numbers; some of them were really made and confirmed the unifying value of this

brilliant generalization¹. Thus the "periodic law" of the elements established systematic order in our conceptions of them.

Similar attempts were made in other domains of natural science. In mineralogy, for instance, Gadolin tried to deduce all the crystallographic systems and their subdivisions from one general principle, and Fedorov constructed a vast scheme of all the parallelhedrons, which were theoretically possible, and undertook the task of decomposing them into "stereohedrons." In biology, this principle of unity was conceived in different ways. The doctrine of a kind of "consensus" existing between the phenomena of organic life preceded the theory of evolution: Baer had been desirous to establish a connection between all natural objects, and supposed that "mutual relations of organized bodies" can be elucidated by the ontogenesis or the development of the individual; and more recently Pavlov formulated the leading idea of his physiological investigations, when he said that only by considering the organic body as a whole in its "living course" and as a correlation of its parts, can we study with some success the total importance of the functions of each one of them for this whole. The doctrine of evolution performed a similar rôle in respect to our conception of organic processes. Darwinism found many able adherents in Russia. Darwin himself had a very high

¹ Th. Merz, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 315, 422-423, 448; the author states that Mendelejev and Loth. Meyer "published their classification almost simultaneously"; he might have noted, perhaps, that Beguyer de Chancourtois had published similar views in 1862.

opinion of the palaeontological studies of Vlad. Kovalevsky and appreciated the zoological investigations of his brother Alex. Kovalevsky on the lowest vertebrates and invertebrates and on their genetical relationship. His works, as well as the works of Metchnikov, were in the main directed to establish unity of organization in animals.

The theory of evolution was, however, eventually modified by the subsequent doctrine of "heterogenesis," formulated by the late Korzinsky: he stated that among numerous homogeneous posterity, born from normal parents, there appear suddenly separate individuals with very marked peculiarities; these variations are probably due to some internal changes, occurring in the cell of the ovum, and come after a certain period of accumulation of vital energy through a series of generations; the rare individuals subjected to them are able to transmit them, in favourable circumstances, to their descendants, forming thus a new "race"; natural selection and other factors can only strengthen these acquired characters and suppress further variations in this race.

The scientific conception of evolution provoked, moreover, some criticism in the domain of moral and historical sciences. It was formulated in a transcendent way by Solovyev; he acknowledged an Absolute Cause or a Creative Force, without which evolution is not possible; but he supposed that God's thought, which is absolute destiny in regard to things, is only a duty for a moral being. In this way he tried to solve the problem of "free will" and of man's mission, which is to realize, "in union with God," Truth, Good, and Beauty in the

World. This can be done only in the great whole or collective being named mankind. This union is impossible "outside God," and can be attained in God only, that is in the universal Church, incorporating the principle of this unity, already manifested once in the person of the Christ. In this sense Solovyev spoke of the "God-Man" actually "existing on earth" and gradually advancing to perfection; of "the Kingdom of God" and its manifestation in organized states; of nations, each of which has its own importance and participates in the common life of the whole, contributing thus to its progress.

Most Russian sociologists, however, conceived the idea of progress in a more positive way; many of them discussed evolution in regard to human personality. In his well-known paper on progress Mihailovsky formulated, for instance, such a conception; he arrived at the conclusion that progress is "a gradual approximation to the wholeness of individuals, to a possibly most complete and various division of labour between man's organs and most limited division of labour between men." From this unifying point of view Mihailovsky considered the progressive evolution of mankind.

This general idea of progress included an appreciation of evolution and its results; but in concrete history it was to be considered in its individual aspect. Karyeev applied this conception to the history of European states, and this was done by other Russian historians in respect to the history of their own nation. Besides the "Slavophiles," such as Aksakov and others who considered it rather as an evolution of pre-established

qualities innate in the Russian people, the "Westerners," Solovyev and others, treated it in a more positive way as an "organic development" influenced by various external causes. At a later date, Klyuchevsky, in spite of his "sociological tendency," elaborated a much more individualized conception of Russian history: he insisted on its "originality" and considered it as a "local history"; he studied the formation of the Russian nation, and of its historical individuality; he investigated the vital forces, which moved it and produced Russian history; he examined the personalities and events, which had an influence on its evolution, on the development of Russian social and economic relations and political institutions; and in this spirit he exhibited in a masterly manner and vivid picturesque style the different periods of Russian history.

The principle of unity of thought was introduced thus into Russian science and learning and contributed to the elaboration of a harmonious conception of the World.

II

This problem of unity may be raised, however, in respect to a more complicated whole, including, besides thought in a strict sense, other components of human consciousness, i.e., will and feeling.

The part played by Russian thought in the construction of such a whole was not an exclusive one: Russian thought, in its general aspect, did not profess to despise will and feeling, and Russian thinkers tried to conceive this whole especially from a religious and moral point of view.

These attempts developed, probably, under political and social conditions: the representatives of Russian culture manifested at times a "yearning" for religion; they were disposed, moreover, to invoke Justice when it was violated by government, and occasions for this were not wanting; and serfdom, which lasted till 1861 and produced at last a growing feeling of moral responsibility for such a state of things, incited them to take social facts into consideration.

This religious and moral tendency is fairly conspicuous, for instance, in the systems of the older Slavophiles, Kireyevsky, Homyakov and others, and even in the treatises of some "Westerners," for instance, Kavelin: he was particularly anxious to take account of moral feeling, but considered it in a psychological way, which aroused some criticism.

Modern Russian philosophers wanted to go further. Solovyev, for instance, firmly believed in God as an absolute principle of Truth, Good, and Beauty, Truth being the contents of His reason, Good the contents of His will, Beauty the contents of His feeling. According to this doctrine, this unified Whole determines the unity of the human mind, which is conscious of its connection with it. Integral knowledge includes, moreover, faith and various other elements of consciousness: it ascends from feeling to thought and from thought to mystical love which leads us to the cognition of the transcendent World. Besides this knowledge and the will to acquire it, the Idea of Good is the principle to which our will tends and on which depend our aims and actions: our life can have a meaning and become worthy of our moral nature only

when it is a "justification of Good"; it proceeds from a kind of moral unity, able to govern individual and social life. Our consciousness approves these two wills, directed to "True Good," and thus establishes the union of Truth and Good. Truth and Good, however, cannot realize these ideal contents in sensual forms: this incarnation is reserved to Art and intimately connected with artistic feeling. From this preeminently religious point of view Solovyev considered, then, the problem of unity of consciousness, the correlation of reason, will, and feeling¹. Prince Trubetskoi held nearly the same religious opinions, but formulated his theory from a somewhat different metaphysical and epistemological point of view: in the Absolute he perceived the condition of our knowledge. He maintained that the Absolute cannot be limited by its essence and manifests it in everlasting free activity; the Absolute thus produces its "other self" and communicates with it; and we freely go to meet this revelation in every act of our knowledge. Hence in its intimate nature existence, known by our spiritual being, must also be spiritual; it conditions all our knowledge and can be an object of "faith," that is, of immediate impression (intuition), of reality and of volition, and not only an object of rational and empirical knowledge. Thus Trubetskoi acknowledged a unifying spiritual principle of the universe, in relation to which the phenomenal world must be considered, a concrete "subject of this universal object," which reveals itself in its creative reason and will, in its altruistic existence for others,

¹ В. Соловьёвъ, *Оправдание добра, Нравственная философия*, С.-Пб. 1897.

in its love to our "searching love," and which cannot be conceived by mere rational and empirical knowledge; this love must be realized by men in their actions¹.

These metaphysical conceptions could not satisfy the Russian philosophers and sociologists who, though they allotted an important rôle to will and feeling, yet were inclined to consider this problem in a positive way: the representatives of the "subjective" school of Russian sociology—Lavrov, Mihailovsky, Karyeev and others—supposed, as was stated above, that the knowledge of social facts is permanently accompanied by an appreciation of them, and tried to combine the objective spirit of investigation into social facts with the "subjective" valuation of them; in his conception of a growing wholeness of the individual, Mihailovsky implied the notion of a being, who possesses, besides reason, other elements of consciousness, i.e., will and feeling, and from this point of view he estimated social progress. Karyeev shared this view and conceived historical progress as a gradual ascent of human beings from coarse reality to ideals, produced by their yearning after Truth and Good, "inherent in our soul," by their desire to be happy without encroaching on the happiness of others.

It may be stated, by the way, that a similar conception became very prominent in modern Russian aesthetics; art was and still is, to some extent, considered in Russia not only as intimately connected with emotion, but as aiming at "ideals" or at moral ends.

¹ Кн. С. Трубецкой, Собрание сочинений, vol. II, pp. I-IIIO, 161-284; cf. pp. 286-290; vol. III, pp. 9, 15, 24, 37, 135.

Even in music this tendency can be traced: the presentatives of Russian music, national but tinged with "orientalism,"—Glinka, Balakirev, Mussorgsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakov and others—expressed their sympathy with some ideals and characteristic moral attitudes of the Russian people. Besides the subjective mood of Chaikovsky and the deep lyric revelations of Scriabin, other states of mind can be traced in their productions; Balakirev, for instance, was to a certain degree imbued with original mystic sentiment; Rimsky-Korsakov manifested, particularly in his latest work, an inclination to "ethical pantheism."

This movement is even more conspicuous in Russian painting. Ivanov was imbued with mysticism (at least from 1848) and chose under its influence the subject of his great work, representing the appearance of Christ to the people; Kramskoi painted his Christ in the Wilderness "with his blood and tears"; Vasnetsov executed mystical pictures on the walls of the cathedral at St Vladimir; Gué manifested his sympathy with the moral doctrine taught by Tolstoi in his works; Repin often dealt with social and political subjects; Pereshchagin was an apostle of peace, and so on.

There is no need to speak in detail of modern Russian literature which flourished after Pushkin and Lermontov, Gogol and Goncharov, and manifested, independently of the literary movement represented by Turguenev, the moral tendencies of the age; a mere mention of Dostoyevsky and Tolstoi will be enough. Tolstoi's religious and ethical views on the dependent side of art were and still are debated in Russia; but they are very characteristic of the moralising mood of

modern Russian literature, just now yielding its supremacy to more formal aesthetical ideas.

In these Russian conceptions of consciousness as a compound of thought, will, and feeling, the religious or, at least, moral point of view plays a prominent rôle, and, perhaps, in the main, appears, although not very clearly, to mark out its unifying principle.

Thus far Russian thought has been considered in its general aspect apart from its connection with practical life; but unity of thought studied in its process of unification must be made or worked out; hence, its close relation to practical life; such a real unity supposes a permanent harmony between thought and action; and consciousness, in the sense stated above, works it out and thus gives unity to our activity.

Such an agreement, however, could not always be realized, at least in the past history of Russia. In ancient Russia thought was secluded from practice. During the 17th century the utilitarian notion of the technical importance of learning began to develop itself, and Peter the Great appreciated it very highly and was really conscious of its great value to the state; but Catherine II was more interested in education, than in the practical advancement of science and learning; and under Nicolas II education became to some extent an instrument of conservative policy, which was not always in harmony with the public good. And when Russian thought, in spite of the constraint to which it was subject, tried to manifest itself in free action and in conscious applications to practical life, it often met with obstacles, which were not favourable

its development. This occurred not only in the cases of reaction mentioned above, but even later—some years before the tragical death of Alexander II, after the promulgation of the new code for the Universities in 1884, and at other times.

But the obstacles, which restrained the development of Russian thought and its conscious applications to life, could not stop its course and had even some positive results: Russian thought was obliged to struggle for its independence and to endure the severe trials, to which it had been submitted. It came out of them tried by misfortune and firmly conscious of its ideal ends, to which it is called.

These reactions could not, however, be favourable to a permanent fecundation of thought by life; this divergence between thought and life was pernicious to both of them; but it must be overcome, and this will be done as the Russian people grows into a nation, conscious of herself and acting by herself.

This unifying principle of self-conscious action can be realized in Russia, of course, only under liberal political conditions; in its strict sense it implies, moreover, a reciprocal acknowledgment of its value for every nation; the Russian nation must acknowledge, therefore, other nations just as she herself is acknowledged by them as a self-conscious cultured nation fighting for the good of humanity, and thus she becomes, in concert with other nations, a part of humanity, and obtains, in agreement with them, her right to relative dependence; and this right cannot be violated without trampling on the claim which humanity has on every one of its parts.

Cambridge:

PRINTED BY J. B. PEACE, M.A.,
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY
THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900. By F. H. SKRINE, R.Hist.S. Third edition, corrected and revised. With 3 maps. Crown 8vo. 6s net. Cambridge Historical Series.

Poland and Russia. A Political History of Poland and Russia from 1447 to 1796. By R. NISBET BAIN. Crown 8vo. 5s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.

Tolstoy: Sevastopol. The Russian Text, accented, printed, with introduction, notes, and glossary, by A. P. GOUDY, A., Lecturer in Russian in the University of Cambridge, and J. BULLOUGH, M.A., Fellow of Gonville and Caius College. With portrait and a map. Crown 8vo. 5s net.

Pushkin: A Reader. Lermontof's Modern Hero. With English Translation and Biographical Sketch by IVAN NESTOR HENRICH. Extra fcap 8vo. 8s net.

Modernization of the Russian Verb. By W. H. LOWE, Lecturer of Brisley, Norfolk. Demy 8vo. 5s net.

Modern Roots and Compounds. By W. H. LOWE. Demy 8vo. 5s net.

Cambridge Modern History. Planned by the late Lord ACTON, LL.D. Edited by Sir A. W. WARD, Litt.D., G. W. LUTHERO, Litt.D., and STANLEY LEATHES, M.A. In 14 volumes. Royal 8vo. Buckram. Price £8 15s net. Single volumes, text and index, 16s net each. Atlas 25s net. Prospectus on application.

History of Modern Europe from the middle of the eighteenth Century. By J. E. MORRIS, D.Litt. Third impression. With 8 maps. Crown 8vo. 4s net.

Europe in the XIX Century, 1815-1878. By J. E. MORRIS, D.Litt. With 8 maps and 3 pedigrees. Crown 8vo. 2s 6d net.

Europe any 1815-1890. By Sir ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, B.A., Litt.D., Master of Peterhouse. Volume I. 1815-1852. With a map. Crown 8vo. 12s net. Cambridge Historical Series.

French Monarchy, 1483-1789. By A. J. GRANT, M.A., Professor of History in the University of Leeds. With 4 maps. In 2 volumes. Crown 8vo. 7s net. Cambridge Historical Series.

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, 1789-1815. By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D., Reader in Modern History in the University of Cambridge. Sixth edition, revised. With 6 maps and plans. Crown 8vo. 3s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.

SELECTION FROM THE GENERAL CATALOGUE
(continued)

- Spain, Its Greatness and Decay, 1479-1788.** By MARTIN A. S. HUME. Third edition revised by EDWARD ARMSTRONG, M.A., Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. With 2 maps. Crown 8vo. 6s net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- Modern Spain, 1815-1898.** By H. BUTLER CLARKE, M.A. With a memoir by the Rev. W. H. HUTTON, B.D. With a map. Crown 8vo. 5s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- Italy from 1494 to 1790.** By Mrs H. M. VERNON (K. Dorothea Ewart). With 4 maps. Crown 8vo. 5s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- The Union of Italy, 1815-1895.** By W. J. STILLMAN, L.H.D. (Concordia). New edition, revised, with an Epilogue by G. M. TREVELYAN. With 4 maps. Crown 8vo. 4s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- Scandinavia: A Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden from 1513 to 1900.** By R. NISBET BAIN. With 5 maps. Crown 8vo. 5s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913.** By W. MILLER, M.A. (Oxon.), Hon. LL.D. in the National University of Greece. With 4 maps. Crown 8vo. 7s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- Europe and the Far East, 1506-1912.** By Sir R. K. DOUGLAS, late Keeper of Oriental Printed Books and MSS., British Museum. Revised and corrected with an additional chapter (1904-1912) by Professor J. H. LONGFORD. With 5 maps. Crown 8vo. 6s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- An Essay on Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects.** By the Ven. W. CUNNINGHAM, D.D. (Ancient Times.) With 5 maps. Crown 8vo. 3s 6d net. (Mediaeval and Modern Times.) With 3 maps. Crown 8vo. 3s 6d net. Cambridge Historical Series.
- A Journal of the First Two Campaigns of the Seven Years' War.** Written in French by HORACE S. PAUL, Aide-de-Camp, and Colonel of Cavalry in the Imperial Austrian Army, Count of the Holy Roman Empire. Edited by GEORGE GREY BUTLER, M.A. With 2 portraits, 3 tables, and 65 maps and plans. Royal 8vo. £3 3s 0d net.
- The Cambridge Medieval History.** Planned by J. B. BURY, M.A. Edited by H. M. GWATKIN, M.A., and J. P. WHITNEY, B.D. To be completed in 8 volumes. Royal 8vo. A portfolio of illustrative maps will be published with each volume. Price £1 net per volume, with portfolio of maps. Vols I and II now ready. Prospectus on application.
- Outlines of Medieval History.** By C. W. PREVITÉ ORTON, M.A., Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge. With 7 maps. Crown 8vo. 10s 6d net.

Cambridge University Press
Fetter Lane, London: C. F. Clay, Manager





